Aristotle on the impossibility of altruism by Schuh, Guy
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2017
Aristotle on the impossibility of
altruism
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/20871
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
ARISTOTLE ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
GUY SCHUH 
 
B.A., St. John’s College, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2017  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by 
 GUY SCHUH 
 2017  
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
 
First Reader _________________________________________________________ 
 David Roochnik, Ph.D. 
 Maria Stata Professor of Classical Greek Studies 
 
 
Second Reader _________________________________________________________ 
 Charles Griswold, Ph.D. 
 Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy 
 
 
Third Reader _________________________________________________________ 
 David Konstan, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Classics 
 New York University, Department of Classics 
	 iv 
				 	
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
My parents have given me nothing but support and encouragement over my long career 
as a student. As Aristotle says, we are better able to see the truth when we are active 
together with others. I therefore thank my committee, teachers at Boston University, and 
friends, both inside and outside of the philosophy department, for providing me many 
occasions to learn and correct my mistakes. I especially thank my advisor, David 
Roochnik, for giving me sage advice throughout the planning and writing of this 
dissertation (even if I didn’t always want to follow it at the time). I also thank David 
Konstan for generously agreeing to be an outside reader and Mark Gasser-Wingate for 
helpful comments and advice about publishing. I am grateful for financial support from 
Boston University as well as from the Hellenic Studies Fund. Finally, I owe a debt of 
thanks to Colin Cmiel for help with French, to Jesse Lopes for help with Latin, and to 
Keui-Chen Chen for help with modern technology.  
 
  
	 v 
				
v 
 
ARISTOTLE ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 
GUY SCHUH 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2017 
Major Professor: David Roochnik, Maria Stata Professor of Classical Greek Studies  
ABSTRACT 
There has recently been a reengagement with Aristotle’s ethical thought. One only needs 
to mention contemporary virtue ethics, which explicitly names him as its inspiration. 
However, not all aspects of his ethical thought have received the attention, and 
engagement, they deserve. This is especially true of his egoism. In order to facilitate this 
engagement, this dissertation will offer a thorough account of Aristotle’s egoism. It will 
focus on his seminal work, the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Chapter One serves as a methodological introduction. It argues that Aristotle often 
uses a certain investigative procedure. He often posits preliminary positions that he later 
revises or rejects. Therefore, to properly grasp his thought, we must take care to 
distinguish his merely preliminary from his final positions. 
Chapter Two argues that Aristotle accepts a form of psychological egoism, 
namely that each person acts ultimately for the sake of his own happiness (εὐδαιμονία). 
This chapter both gives evidence for this interpretation and responds to two challenges 
that have been brought against it. The first challenge stems from Aristotle’s claim that 
friends benefit their friends for their friends’ own sake. The second challenge stems from 
Aristotle’s claim that virtuous action is kalon (“noble” or “fine”) and “for the sake of the 
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kalon.” However, kala actions were popularly identified with actions of selfless 
beneficence. 
Chapter Three argues that Aristotle defends his view that we act ultimately for the 
sake of our own happiness. It is widely thought among those who agree that he holds this 
view that he never attempts to defend it. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that he does. 
It shows that he raises a challenge to his view that each person acts ultimately for the 
sake of his own happiness and then responds to it. This challenge is the popular view that 
virtuous people act in a selfless or self-disregarding way, especially in relation to their 
friends. This chapter then argues that Aristotle responds to this challenge through his 
discussion of friendship. He attempts to show, despite the popular view to the contrary, 
that virtuous people are not self-disregarding in relation to their friends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 vii 
		
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction………………………………………………………………..………………1 
Chapter One: Investigative Procedure…………………………………….………………6 
 a. Investigative Procedure…………………………………………...…………….6 
 b. Five Examples of Investigative Procedure……………………………………..7 
  i. Virtuous actions are intrinsically pleasant…………………….…….…..7 
  ii. Courage is a certain fearlessness of death………………………….…10 
  iii. Happiness is the long-lived performance of a certain activity…….…15 
  iv. Virtuous actions are chosen for their own sake…………………........20 
  v. Friendship is mutually recognized goodwill…………………………..26 
c. Why Investigative Procedure?…………………………………………...……29 
 d. Nature of the Text…………………………………………………………......34 
Chapter Two: Aristotle’s Explanatory Starting Point………………………………........46 
 a. Evidence that our own Happiness Is the Ultimate End………………..………46 
  i. Our own happiness is the “simply final” end………………………….46 
  ii. The lovable……………………………………………………….…...51 
  iii. Every intellect chooses what is best for itself………………………...56 
 b. The Challenge from Aristotle’s Account of Friendship……………….……...59 
  i. Two examples: Jennifer Whiting and Richard Kraut………..………...60 
  ii. Three difficulties for this challenge…………………………...………62 
  iii. The second difficulty…………………………………………..……..63 
	 viii 
				
viii 
 
(Ch. 2 continued) 
  iv. Kraut’s additional evidence…………………………………………..76 
  v. The third difficulty…………………………………………………….80 
 c. The Challenge from To Kalon…………………………………………………83 
  i. The popular understanding of kala actions………………………….…83 
  ii. The challenge as given by Irwin…………………...………………….85 
  iii. The meaning of συμφέρον; Crisp’s criticism of Irwin……………….87 
  iv. Further examination of Irwin’s evidence……………………………..98 
  v. A further difficulty…………………………………………………...106 
  vi. Aristotle’s understanding of kala actions…………………………...106 
Chapter Three: Aristotle’s Defense of His Explanatory Starting Point………………...116 
 a. Arguing to and from An Explanatory Starting Point…………………..….…116 
 b. Arguing to Aristotle’s Explanatory Starting Point…….……………………..117 
  i. The argument in IX.8………………………………………………....117 
  ii. Aristotle’s defense…………………………………………………...122 
 c. Aristotle’s Principle of Friendship Dissolution………………………………124 
 d. Friendship Dissolves with Distance………………………………………….124 
  i. Friendship is mutually recognized goodwill………………………….124 
  ii. Friendship is the mutual wish to live life together………….…...…..126 
  iii. Friendship and goodwill…………………………………………….132 
  iv. Why do friends wish to live life together?..........................................141 
 
	 ix 
	
ix 
 
(Ch. 3 continued) 
v. Conclusion…………………………………………………………...150 
e. Not Wishing Your Friend to Become A God………………………...………152 
 f. The Necessity of An Equal Return……………………….…………………..159 
  i. Equality in friendship………………………………………………....159 
  ii. Equality in virtue friendship…………………………………………170 
  iii. Equality and living life together…………………………………….185 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...187 
 a. Summary of Conclusions…………………………………………………….187 
 b. What Remains to be Done?..............................................................................188 
Appendix: The Friend as “Another Onself”……………………………………………190 
 a. The Friend as “Another Oneself”…………………………………………….190 
 b. The Extension Interpretation………………………………………………....191 
 c. The Similarity Interpretation…………………………………………………195 
 d. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...198 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..………..200 
Cirriculum Vitae………………………………………………………………………..210 
 
1 
 
§ Introduction 
There has recently been a reengagement with Aristotle’s ethical thought. One only needs 
to mention contemporary virtue ethics, which explicitly names him as its inspiration. 
However, even those who are not members of this tradition tend to grant that engagement 
with Aristotle’s ethical thought, even if this engagement ultimately results in 
disagreement, is a way to gain insight about ethical matters.
1
 Nevertheless, not all aspects 
of his ethical thought have received the attention, and engagement, they deserve. And this 
is especially true of his egoism. 
I will attempt to lay the foundations for a more adequate engagement with 
Aristotle’s egoism. As I said, the ultimate purpose of this engagement is to learn 
something important for ourselves, namely, whether or not his egoism is correct, or, at 
least, philosophically attractive. And though a more adequate critical engagement with 
this aspect of his thought cannot occur here, this project was undertaken in order to help 
make this possible. It is common to divide egoism into “rational” and “psychological.” 
The first is the normative claim that one “should” do whatever is best for oneself; the 
second is the psychological claim that each person actually does act ultimately for the 
sake of what is best for themselves. I will focus on Aristotle’s psychological egoism. 
There are two ways that, in my view, scholars and philosophers have failed to 
adequately engage with Aristotle’s psychological egoism. The first way is to deny 
altogether that he accepted psychological egoism, or to grant that he did, but be 
inconsistent about this point in one’s interpretation. The second way is to accept that 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Roger Crisp, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, xxxiv, bottom paragraph. 
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Aristotle held psychological egoism, but to dismiss this aspect of his thought (or even 
personally accept it) without adequately investigating his reasons for holding this view. 
By far the greatest motivation for the second way of failing to adequately engage with 
Aristotle’s psychological egoism is the mistaken view that he never attempts to defend or 
justify it.  
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle lays it down as an ἀρχή, or “explanatory 
starting point,” that human beings act ultimately for the sake of their own εὐδαιμονία 
(traditionally rendered as “happiness”). This principle serves as an explanatory starting 
point for human action insofar as it specifies one’s own happiness as its ultimate “final 
cause.” 2  But since happiness is the “best good” that an individual can possesses 
(1095a14-20, 1097b22-4), this principle amounts to a form of psychological egoism.
3
 To 
be sure, Aristotle’s explanatory starting point is controversial. It implies that self-
sacrificial or self-disregarding action is impossible for a human being. For the only 
substantial way in which our action could be self-sacrificial or self-disregarding is if we, 
in the first case, knowingly give up our happiness for the sake of something else or, in the 
second case, fail to aim at our own happiness when we act. But this starting point forbids 
both of these things.  
Despite the controversial character of Aristotle’s explanatory starting point, many 
scholars claim that he never attempts to defend it. David Bostock, for example, says that: 
Aristotle simply takes it to be obvious both that each man ought to pursue what is 
good (for him) and that each man does in fact pursue what (the thinks) is good 
(for him). The truth is that both these claims are controversial (and, I would say, 
                                                 
2
 For final causes as explanations of action, see Metaphysics 1013a32-5. 
3
 As is observed by Terence Irwin (From Socrates to the Reformation, 125, bottom paragraph). 
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false), but since Aristotle does not recognize this he offers us no arguments in 
their favor. (Aristotle’s Ethics, 228, my emphasis). 
 
And Julia Annas says: 
It is not made clear what is wrong with this claim, basic to ancient theories, which 
follow Aristotle in thinking it trivially true that we all seek happiness, so that 
disagreement sets in only at the level of the right specification of happiness. 
(“From Nature to Happiness,” 70, my emphasis). 
 
If we ask in response why a philosopher of Aristotle’s rank would assume this 
controversial starting point without argument, we will be told that it simply reflects 
Ancient Greek common sense. Unlike us, the Ancient Greeks would not have considered 
Aristotle’s explanatory starting point to be controversial. They would have seen it, rather, 
as an expression of what everyone commonly accepted. Irwin puts this point as follows: 
The assumption that happiness (eudaimonia) is the ultimate end for action is not a 
paradoxical Socratic claim. According to Aristotle’s account of common ethical 
views, we all agree that our ultimate end is happiness.
4
 The main ethical question 
is not about whether we take happiness as the ultimate end, but about how to 
achieve happiness. (Socrates to the Reformation, 22, my emphasis). 
 
And the view goes back at least as far as Henry Sidgwick, who paraphrases Aristotle as 
follows: 
All men, in acting, aim at some result, either for its own sake or as a means to 
some further end; but obviously everything cannot be sought merely as a means; 
there must therefore be some ultimate end (or ends), and the science or study that 
inquires into this must be “architectonic” in relation to all arts that aim at some 
special end or utility. We find, in fact, that men commonly recognize such an end, 
                                                 
4
 Irwin cites Rhetoric 1360b4-7 for this point: “for nearly each individual by himself as well as all in 
common there is a certain target, aiming at which, they choose and avoid; and this is, in summary, 
happiness and its parts” (Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός τις ἔστιν οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ 
αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἥ τ' εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς). However, 
there are three difficulties with his citation of this passage: (i) it does not clearly express a common view as 
opposed to Aristotle’s own analysis; (ii) Aristotle shows elsewhere in the Rhetoric that there are popular 
views that contradict the claim that everyone acts for the sake of their own happiness (for example, 
1158b38-1359a5); (iii) Irwin ignores Aristotle’s “nearly” (σχεδὸν) qualification. 
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and agree to call it wellbeing (εὐδαιμονία).5 (Outlines of The History of Ethics, 
56, my emphasis). 
 
However, Aristotle himself did not accept this characterization of Ancient Greek popular 
opinion. In his reports of popular ethical views, he makes it clear that the Ancient Greeks 
did not uniformly accept that human beings always act for the sake of their own 
happiness. According to Aristotle, at least, his claim that they did was controversial in his 
day, just as it is in ours.
6
 
But even more importantly, the interpretation of Aristotle’s ethical thought that 
this contemporary characterization of Ancient Greek popular opinion is intended to 
support—that he fails to defend or justify his controversial explanatory starting point—is 
false. For he both recognizes popular challenges to his explanatory starting point and 
responds to them. Adequate engagement with Aristotle’s psychological egoism 
consequently requires that we understand how he defends his explanatory starting point 
against these popular challenges. This dissertation will attempt to provide part of this 
understanding. 
Besides failing to adequately investigate why Aristotle accepted psychological 
egoism, I have also claimed that some scholars and philosophers have failed to 
adequately engage with his psychological egoism by denying that it exists. Since my 
claim that he defends his psychological egoism presupposes that he actually holds this 
                                                 
5
 This is a common, but inaccurate report of the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. What Aristotle claims is 
commonly agreed to is that the “highest good” (ἀκρότατον ἀγαθόν) is happiness (εὐδαιμονία), i.e., that 
happiness is the “best” good in the class of goods (1095a15-19, 1097b22-3). By contrast, he does not claim 
common agreement for the fact that (our own) happiness is the ultimate end of our action; compare 
previous with 1097b2-5. 
6
 See 1168a29-b1, Rhetoric 1358b38-1359a5, 1366b36-1367a6, 1389a32-5, 1389b35-1390a1; compare 
Suzanne Stern-Gillet, “Souls Great and Small,” 66, second paragraph; Edward Cope, The Rhetoric of 
Aristotle with A Commentary, vol. 2, 147, note 12. 
5 
 
view, it is first necessary to address this denial. I will therefore begin by presenting 
evidence that he accepts psychological egoism. I will then examine, and respond, to two 
challenges that scholars have brought against this interpretation. The first challenge 
draws from Aristotle’s account of friendship; the second from his account of virtue. I do 
all of this in Chapter Two, as Chapter One stands as a methodological prelude to my 
interpretation as a whole. 
In Chapter Three, I argue that Aristotle defends his explanatory starting point that 
human beings act ultimately for the sake of their own happiness. I do this by showing that 
he introduces a credible challenge to his explanatory starting point and then responds to 
it. This challenge is the popular view that virtuous people are self-disregarding, and most 
especially in relation to their friends. In response, Aristotle declares that this popular 
view “does not agree with the facts.” I then argue that at least some of the “facts” he is 
referring to are the actions of virtuous people towards their friends as he brings them to 
light in his examination of friendship. Virtuous people were thought to be most capable 
of overlooking their own good in acting for their friends. Aristotle can therefore attack 
the view that virtuous people are self-disregarding by giving evidence that they fail to be 
so even when acting toward their friends.  
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
§ Chapter One: Investigative Procedure 
In this chapter, I will discuss how to read the Nicomachean Ethics in light of the fact that 
Aristotle uses a certain investigative procedure. I will give evidence that he uses this 
procedure, discuss his motivation for doing so, and, since the claim that he uses this 
procedure requires a genuinely unified text, I will discuss issues concerning its 
composition. 
a. Investigative Procedure 
Aristotle often employs a certain “investigative” procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
This procedure is to lay down a preliminary position about a subject and then later 
qualify or even reject it as the result of subsequent investigation. His use of this 
procedure has important consequences for how we should read the work.  
These consequences are as follows. We cannot simply pick out Aristotle’s claims 
in isolation and declare them to be his considered views, for the claims he makes at a 
given point are potentially subject to revision or even rejection at a later point. To 
understand Aristotle’s thought, we will have to pay close attention to the path of his 
investigation. We will have to discern what final, as opposed to merely preliminary, 
positions his investigation leads him to. We must then grasp why he abandons this 
preliminary position and replace it with that final one. And if we ever find that he later 
says something that contradicts an earlier claim, we cannot simply conclude that he is 
confused (or that the two contradictory claims are the result of an interpolated text). We 
must also give serious consideration to the possibility that he is intentionally correcting 
an earlier, merely preliminary, position. 
7 
 
To make it clear that Aristotle uses this procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics, I 
will discuss five examples. I add that I do not think what I am claiming is altogether 
controversial or original. Many scholars believe that he, at one point or another, makes a 
preliminary claim that he later qualifies or rejects.
7
 What I wish to make clear is the 
extent to which he does so in order that I may even more plausibly call upon his use of 
this procedure at certain parts of my interpretation. 
b. Five Examples of Investigative Procedure 
 i. Virtuous actions are intrinsically pleasant 
My first example of Aristotle revising and qualifying an earlier position concerns the 
pleasure of virtuous action. Initially, in Book I, he claims that virtuous actions are 
intrinsically pleasant: 
To the lovers of kala
8
 things, the things pleasant by nature are pleasant. And the 
deeds according to virtue are of this sort, so that indeed for these people they are 
also pleasant according to themselves. (1099a13-15).
9
 
  
However, courage, a particular virtue, later comes to light as essentially involving the 
endurance of fear and fearful things,
10
 but since fear is “a certain pain or disturbance out 
                                                 
7
 David Ross (Aristotle, 205, paragraph two; compare Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics, paragraph 592) acknowledges that Aristotle’s discussion of courage corrects the “too readily 
assumed” harmony between pleasure and virtue in Book I. John Cooper (“Aristotle On Friendship,” 337, 
note 16) attributes this same procedure to Aristotle at one place in the Eudemian Ethics. A.W. Price (Love 
and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, 138-9, 150, 161), in turn, criticizes Cooper for overlooking the 
preliminary character of Aristotle’s first definition of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. Sarah Broadie 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 408) and Lorraine Pangle (Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, 54) also 
observe the preliminariness of this definition. C.D.C. Reeve (Nicomachean Ethics, xlviii-xlix) notes the 
preliminary character of Aristotle’s famous definition of happiness.  
8
 Καλόν is notoriously difficult to translate. In order to avoid forcing an inaccurate translation of so 
important a term, I will transliterate the word into roman characters as kalon (singular) and kala (plural). 
However, if I were forced to choose among the common translations for this word in ethical contexts, I 
would choose “noble.” I discuss how kala actions were popularly understood in Chapter 2, section c.i. 
9
 τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ’ αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν 
ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ’ αὑτάς. All translations from Greek are my own. 
10
 See 1115b7-13. I discuss this point in the next example. 
8 
 
of imagination of a future evil that is either destructive or painful,”11 courage also comes 
to light as essentially involving the endurance of a certain pain and so as essentially 
painful:  
By virtue of enduring painful things, as was said, men are said to be 
courageous. On account of which, courage is also painful, and it is justly 
praised, for to endure painful things is more difficult than to hold back 
from pleasant ones. (1117a32-5, my emphasis).
12
 
 
Aristotle here states that the endurance of certain pains, and no doubt most importantly 
the pain of fear, is one of the features of courageous action that we (correctly) look to in 
indentifying a courageous person. But if enduring a certain pain is part of the essence of 
courageous action, then it is essentially painful.
13
 And if the exercise of courage, one of 
the virtues, is essentially painful, then it is not unqualifiedly true that virtuous actions are 
intrinsically pleasant. 
Aristotle is thus compelled to reconsider his earlier position. He states, “To be 
active with pleasure does not belong to quite all the virtues, except to the degree that one 
grasps the end.” (οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ’ 
ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται,1117b15-16).14 Since the exercise of courage turned out to be 
                                                 
11
 ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ (Rhetoric 
1382a21-2). 
12
 τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως 
ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. Compare 1117b7-13. 
13
 That courage essentially involves the endurance of pains is well observed by Heliodorus (In Ethica 
Nicomachea Paraphrasis, 58, line 40- 59, line 1), Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 584-586, 588-9, note 
“since fortitude consists in enduring distressing things”), and John Burnet (The Ethics of Aristotle, 152, 
note 2). On this point, see also Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria, 87, lines 6-7; Joachim, 
commentary ad loc.; Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 38, bottom paragraph, and note “the painful ‘thought 
of death’ (fear)”.  
14
 Aquinas (note 7), Ross (ibid.), Gauthier and Jolif (comment on 1117b16), and Broadie (note 7) observe 
that Aristotle is intentionally qualifying his earlier statement from Book I. Michael Pakaluk (Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction, 166, top paragraph) also takes Aristotle to be revising an earlier 
claim, though he thinks it is the claim at 1104b5-8 that feeling pleasure, or at least not feeling pain, while 
9 
 
painful, Aristotle denies that all virtuous actions are pleasant when we are in the process 
of performing them (“being active with pleasure”). It is true that he allows that all 
virtuous actions involve a certain pleasure “insofar as one grasps the end,” but I 
understand this to mean “insofar as one accomplishes the end they are aiming for,” 
which, seeing as kalon action is the end of virtue
15
 is presumably a virtuous or kalon 
action.
16
 That is, the virtuous person takes pleasure in the accomplishment of a virtuous 
action, but, as in the case of courage, the process of accomplishing the virtuous action can 
be painful. As Joachim puts it, “good action is pleasant only so far as the agent attains his 
end: the actual activity will involve at least effort and often pain.” (Nicomachean Ethics, 
121, my emphasis). Some activities, by contrast, are pleasant in the very process of doing 
them, such as listening to a piece of music.
17
 
Someone might object that, insofar as (a) the end of virtue (and the virtuous 
person) is kalon action; and (b) when he is acting the virtuous person is doing a kalon 
action, the very process of doing a virtuous action is pleasant. However, “being a kalon 
action” is presumably exemplified by the whole virtuous action and not its nascent parts. 
                                                                                                                                                 
doing virtuous actions is a sign of virtuous character, as does Harry Jaffa (Thomism and Aristotelianism, 
54). Taylor (commentary ad loc.) similarly reads Aristotle as addressing a “tension” between this earlier 
claim and the claim that courage is painful. However, he pays insufficient attention to the fact that, since 
the two claims contradict each other (note μὴ λυπούμενός γε, “at any rate, not being pained,” at 1104b5-8), 
any resolution requires the rejection or qualification of one of the claims; compare, Ronna Burger, 
Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, 79, bottom paragraph.  
15
See 1115b12-13, 1116a11-12, 1117a16-17, b9; compare Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima Libri 
Mantissa, 154, lines 30-2; Ross, Aristotle, 204, bottom paragraph. 
16
 For this reading, see Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, Volume I, 226; René Gauthier and Jean 
Jolif’s comment on 1117b16. Καλόν is notoriously difficult to translate. In order to avoid forcing an 
inaccurate translation of so important a term, I will transliterate the word into roman characters as kalon 
(singular) and kala (plural). However, if I were forced to choose from among the common translations for 
this word in ethical contexts, I would choose “noble.”  
17
 For similar readings of Aristotle’s qualification, see Christine Korsgaard, “From Duty and for the Sake of 
the Noble,” 222, bottom paragraph; Curzer, Virtues, 38, bottom paragraph, with 35, bottom paragraph, and 
what follows.  
10 
 
If I am going to the bank to get money in order to give it away liberally, I am in the 
process of doing something kalon, but have not, as of yet, done anything kalon. If so, 
then we will not necessarily feel pleasure when we are in the process of doing a virtuous 
action. Only when we have actually brought into being or "accomplished” a virtuous 
(kalon) action, will we necessarily feel pleasure. 
To sum up, in Book I, Aristotle first makes a general and unqualified statement 
about the intrinsic pleasure of virtuous actions (“pleasant by nature,” “pleasant according 
to itself”). But, as the result of further investigation into one of the virtues, namely, 
courage, that statement is shown to be true in only a very qualified way. All virtuous 
actions involve pleasure at the moment of their accomplishment, but at least some of 
these actions are also painful to perform. Of course, Aristotle could have proceeded 
differently. He could have qualified his statement in Book I right after he made it, but he 
chooses not to. He chooses to wait for the facts that force this qualification to come to 
light in connection with their relevant subject matter, and only then (two books later) to 
qualify what he had earlier said in an unqualified way. 
 ii. Courage is a certain fearlessness of death 
My second example of Aristotle’s investigative procedure also occurs in his discussion of 
courage. He first presents courage as a certain fearlessness of death: 
The one who is fearless concerning a kalon death and as many things as, being 
close at hand, inflict death, could be said to be courageous in the authoritative 
sense. (1115a32-4, my emphasis).
18
 
 
                                                 
18
 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ’ ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα. 
Compare 1115a15-16. 
11 
 
The above definition marks out courageous people as both fearless of death generally—
“as many things as, being close at hand, inflict death”—and fearless of a kalon death 
specifically. That it is Aristotle’s intention to assign a general fearlessness of death to the 
courageous is confirmed by his subsequent comparison of courageous people and 
experienced sailors in the face of the danger of drowning at sea: “But certainly the 
courageous man is also fearless among diseases and in the sea, but not in the way that 
sailors are.” (1115a32-b2, my emphasis).19 
However, it becomes clear from considering the very example of drowning at sea 
that courageous people are “displeased” to die this sort of death. To return to Aristotle’s 
comparison of sailors and courageous men,  
For those [the courageous] despair of being saved and are displeased with this sort 
of death, but those [the sailors] are of good hope according to their experience. 
(1115b2-4).
20
 
  
But if the courageous are displeased to die “this sort of death,” which I take to mean a 
non-kalon death, then they must consider suffering this death to be something bad. As the 
anonymous commentator on Book III puts it: 
For as he is deprived of many and great goods, and also deprives his family and 
fatherland of this sort of splendor, it is reasonable that he will be pained at the 
prospect of death. On account of which, he would also be on guard against his 
dying for the sake of nothing kalon, for example, dying at sea or in a flood or in 
an earthquake or in any other sort of circumstance. (Commentaria, 168, lines 23-
7, my emphasis).
21
  
                                                 
19
 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι. 
20
 οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι 
παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.  
21
 ὡς γὰρ πολλῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αὐτός τε ἀποστερούμενος καὶ ἀποστερῶν τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τὴν 
πατρίδα τῆς ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου προστασίας, εἰκότως ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται. διὸ καὶ τὸν μηδενὸς χάριν 
καλοῦ γινόμενον θανάτον φυλάσσοιτο ἂν οἷον τὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ ἐμπρησμῷ σεισμῷ ἢ τινὶ ἄλλῃ τοιαύτῃ 
περιστάσει. This point is also observed by Burnet, who comments, “there is surely a touch of humour in 
12 
 
 
However, Aristotle had earlier observed that fear is, or at least attends upon, the 
expectation of personal harm. He says, “It is clear that we fear the fearful things, and 
these are, to speak simply, bad things. On account of which people also define fear as the 
expectation of evil. (1115a7-9).
22
 It follows that if courageous people take dying a non-
kalon death to be something bad, then they actually will fear it, especially if this sort of 
death is a present risk. As Heliodorus puts it, “Death in the grips of a disease or in the sea 
will be frightening to the courageous person, to the extent that it does not come according 
to something honorable.” (Paraphrasis, 54 lines 3-4). 23 The courageous are not simply 
fearless of death after all. 
 Even if the courageous are not simply unafraid of death, we may still be tempted 
to say they are unafraid of a specifically kalon death. However, even this qualified form 
of Aristotle’s initial definition of courage turns out to be untenable. The very features that 
make suffering death at sea something bad belong equally well to suffering a kalon death. 
Dying at sea is bad because it is painful and because it deprives us of the opportunity to 
act virtuously in the future. But, as Aristotle himself points out, a kalon death is both 
                                                                                                                                                 
this contrast between the cheerful sailors and the brave Hellene who has given up all hope, and laments that 
drowning is a nasty death, not fit for a gentleman and soldier” (The Ethics, 142, note 11, my emphasis). 
22
 Φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται 
προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. 
23
 ὁ δὲ ἐν νόσῳ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ θάνατος, καθόσον μὲν οὐκ ἐπῆλθε κατὰ σεμνοῦ τινος, φοβερὸς ἔσται τῷ 
ἀνδρείῳ. This point is also observed by the anonymous commentator I quoted before. He states that 
courageous people who face death at sea “do not give themselves up to their fear about themselves” (οὐκ 
ἐνδιδόντες αὑτοὺς τῷ περὶ αὑτοὺς φόβῳ, Commentaria, 162, lines 24-5). That is, the courageous feel, but 
are not overcome by, their fear of their own death. Aspasius (Commentaria, 81, lines 18-21 with 29-35) 
approaches the consistent conclusion, but fails to draw it. He remains in the awkward position of claiming 
that the courageous really are fearless in the face of death at sea, even though they are displeased at dying 
such a “vain death” (μάτην ἀποθνήσκειν); compare Taylor’s comment on 1115a35-b3. 
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painful
24
 and deprives us of a future of virtuous activity.
25
 Indeed, all death deprives us of 
the enjoyment of future goods, including life itself.
26
 Therefore, assuming that 
courageous people are not ignorant of these two features of a kalon death, they will also 
take it to be something bad. This is no doubt why Aristotle says that courageous people 
suffer death, even a kalon death, “unwillingly” (ἄκων);27 that is, they attempt to act nobly 
in battle while struggling, if possible, to avoid having to die. 
I have shown that things Aristotle says in his investigation of courage support the 
conclusion that (contrary to what he initially says) courageous people fear even a kalon 
death. Did Aristotle also draw this conclusion? It appears that he did. Immediately after 
directing our attention to the fact that courageous people feel “displeasure” at the 
prospect of drowning at sea, he proceeds to revise his initial account by making the active 
fear of death a part of courage:  
The fearful is not the same for everyone, but we say that there is also something 
above a human being. This is fearful to everyone, at least, to everyone having 
sense. But the fearful things that are according to a human being differ by 
magnitude and by ‘more’ and ‘less.’ And in the same way with regard to what 
inspires confidence. But the courageous man is as unperturbed as a human being 
can be. He will then fear also things of this sort [i.e., he will fear both kinds of 
things], but, as he should and as reason commands, he endures for the sake of to 
kalon. (1115b7-13, my emphasis).
28
 
                                                 
24
 See 1117a35-1117b9. 
25
 See 1117b9-15; Aquinas, Commentary, paragraphs 588-9. 
26
 See 1115a26-7 with 1170a19-22; Aquinas, Commentary, paragraph 536. 
27
 See 1117b7-8. 
28
 Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ 
γε νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ 
θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ 
λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. 
14 
 
The distinction between what is “above a human being” (ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον) and what is 
“according to a human being” (κατ’ ἄνθρωπον) need not concern us here. 29  The 
important point is that the courageous person now fears both sorts of fearful things but 
“endures” them. This is clear from the fact that he “fears also” the things that are 
according to a human being. And since (a) the division of fearful things into above a 
human being and according to a human being appears to be exhaustive; (b) death is 
among the fearful things (1115a26); and (c) courage is essentially limited to acting in the 
face of a kalon death (1115a28-34), we can be confident that among the fearful things 
that the courageous person fears but endures is his own death.
30
  
To sum up, Aristotle first presents courage as involving the fearlessness of death 
generally and of a kalon death specifically. However, due to the consideration of death in 
non-kalon circumstances, such as drowning at sea, it became clear that courageous people 
actually do fear this sort of death. But, since the features that make a non-kalon death 
frightening to courageous people belong equally well to a kalon death, it turned out, 
contrary to Aristotle’s initial position, that courageous people fear even a kalon death. He 
is then forced to revise his initial position. He does so by recasting courage not as a 
certain fearlessness of death, even of a specifically kalon death, but rather as an active 
endurance of the fear of death. As Curzer observes, Aristotle “alternates between saying 
                                                 
29
 The traditional interpretation (for example, Aquinas, Commentary, paragraph 544) is that this is a 
distinction between fearful things that we are incapable of resisting and fearful things that we are capable of 
resisting, for example, a tidal wave in comparison to a person who is trying to harm us. 
30
 That courage involves the fear of death is also the view of Aspasius (Commentaria, 82, lines 15-17), 
Ross (Aristotle, 204, bottom paragraph, 205, second paragraph), Jaffa (Thomism and Aristotelianism, 85-7 
with 100 and 102), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 212, note on paragraph §2), Pakaluk (Introduction, 160, 
bottom paragraph), Ronna Burger (Aristotle’s Dialogue, 75, bottom paragraph), and Curzer (Virtues, 56, 
bottom paragraph).  
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that courageous people feel fear and saying that they are fearless” (Virtues, 57). However, 
he ascribes the earlier “fearless” account to “exaggeration” and “hyperbole.” I have 
argued, to the contrary, that Aristotle knows exactly what he was doing. He is 
considering, and ultimately rejecting, one possible account of courage.
31
 
It is then this revised account of courage as the endurance of the (painful) fear of 
death that leads Aristotle to the conclusion that courage is essentially painful and, as we 
saw in the previous section, to yet another revision of an earlier position. Such is the 
searching character of the work.  
iii. Happiness is the long-lived performance of a certain activity 
 
My third example occurs in Aristotle’s discussion of happiness in Book I.32 Aristotle 
initially defines happiness as follows: 
The human good [then] comes to be an activity of soul according to virtue, and if 
there are many virtues, according to the best and most complete virtue. But in a 
complete life, for one swallow does not make a spring, and neither does one day. 
But, in this way, neither does one day nor a short time make one happy and 
blessed. (1098a16-20).
33
 
 
According to this definition, all that is required for a happy life is the long-lived 
performance of a certain activity. But it later turns out that, 
Nevertheless, the external goods are manifestly needed in addition [to the best 
activity or activities], just as we said. For it is impossible or not easy to do kala 
deeds while being ‘without equipment.’ For many kala deeds are done through 
friends and wealth and political power, just as through tools. But also the lack of 
some things mars blessedness, for example, being well-born, being blessed with 
children, and beauty. For not very likely to be happy is someone who is very ugly 
                                                 
31
 Note, in this regard, the tentativeness with which Aristotle states his first account at 1115a32-4; compare 
David Roochnik, “Courage and Shame: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9,” 217, bottom paragraph. 
32
 This example is also mentioned by Reeve (note 7).  
33
 τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην 
καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ’ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ 
μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ’ ὀλίγος χρόνος. 
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in their appearance or ill-born or alone and without children and perhaps even less 
so if he should have absolutely bad children or friends or if being good, they died. 
Then, just as we said, it is reasonable that this sort of external prosperity is needed 
as well. (1099a31-b7).
34
 
 
Aristotle here observes that it is one detriment to our blessedness to be alone and without 
family or children, but an even greater one to have good children only to experience their 
death. It is presumably the manifest and enduring pain of this loss that stops the person 
who suffers it from being “blessed,” even if they are still able to carry out certain 
activities. To quote Aquinas, “it is incompatible with happiness if formerly a man had 
good friends or sons and they have died, for from this a cause of sadness remains in his 
heart” (Commentary, paragraph 163). 35  But if this is what Aristotle means by his 
observation, then he is revising his initial definition of happiness. For it would now 
essentially require more than the performance of a certain activity. It would also 
essentially require freedom from intense and enduring pain. In other words, a happy life 
would essentially include both a “positive” feature—the presence of a certain activity—
and a “negative” one—the absence of intense and enduring pain.  
That Aristotle thinks intense and enduring pain can by itself ruin our happiness is 
confirmed by his subsequent discussion of the role of fortune in happiness: 
It’s clear that small pieces of good fortune do not turn the scale of our life, and the 
same for small pieces of the opposite kind. But if they come to be great and 
                                                 
34
 φαίνεται δ’ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ 
καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι’ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου 
καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· 
οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ’ ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ 
τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς 
τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· 
35
 repugnant felicitate si aliquando habeurit bonos et mortui sunt, quia ex hoc aliqua causa tristitiae 
remanet in corde eius. I thank Jesse Lopes for help with this translation. Eustratius (In Ethica Nicomachea 
Commentaria, 86, lines 18-22) and Peter Martyr Vermigli (Commentary Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
214, bottom paragraph) also make this point well. 
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numerous, they will make a life even more blessed, for they also adorn it by 
nature, and their inclusion comes to be kalon and important. But if fortunes of the 
opposite sort occur, they afflict and destroy blessedness, for they both inflict pains 
and impede many activities. (1100b23-30).
36
 
 
It is not merely that misfortunes can destroy our blessedness by preventing us from 
performing certain activities. They can “also” destroy it by inflicting pains; that is, they 
can destroy it for both of these reasons.
37
 This passage confirms why Aristotle said it was 
a greater blow to our happiness to have good children only to endure their death than not 
to have any in the first place. The premature death of our children inflicts us with a 
tremendous degree of spiritual pain that, by its very presence in our lives, can destroy our 
claim to be “blessed human beings.” 
So far in our discussion I have been treating “blessed” (μακάριος) and “happy” 
(εὐδαίμων) as synonyms.38 However, some scholars attempt to assign different senses to 
these words in the Nicomachean Ethics, namely, “blessedness” as a condition exceeding 
“happiness.”39 These scholars would then read the previous two passages not as revising 
Aristotle’s initial definition of happiness, but rather as laying out requirements for the 
                                                 
36
 τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ 
δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν 
πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται 
τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. (1100b23-30). 
37
 Consider, in this regard, 1153b1-3, 1158a23-5. That pain by itself threatens happiness is observed by 
Aspasius (Commentaria, 30 lines 9-10), Joachim (commentary ad loc.), and Curzer (Virtues, 419, bottom). 
Eustratius, on the other hand, does not hold onto his earlier insight (note 35) when commenting on this 
passage and weakens Aristotle’s point; compare Commentaria, 98, lines 27-29 with 1100b28-30, and note 
that Eustratius paraphrases Aristotle’s θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται (“afflict and destroy”) with στενοχωρεῖ καὶ 
βλάπτει (“oppress and harm”), though he is soon forced back to the correct interpretation (100, lines 12-
18). Richard Kraut (Aristotle on the Human Good, 256), on the other hand, quotes this passages but misses 
this point. He seems to overlook the force of Aristotle’s τε…καί (“both…and”), which he translates merely 
“and.” Contrary to Kraut, the evil of pain and anguish is not simply reducible to the fact that it prevents us 
from performing virtuous actions.  
38
 On this point, see Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 44. 
39
 For examples, see Timothy Roche, “Happiness and the External Goods,” 47, note 30. 
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greater condition of blessedness. But this reading does not really fit the text.
40
 Especially 
good evidence of synonymy is the sequence ‘happiness (εὐδαιμονία) needs external 
goods in addition’ (1099a31-2); ‘for lacking certain external goods can mar our 
blessedness (τὸ μακάριον, 1099b2-3); ‘for not very likely to be happy (εὐδαιμονικός) is 
the one who lacks these goods’ (1099b3-6).41 
However, some scholars who do not attempt to read happiness and blessedness as 
having different senses still deny that Aristotle revises his earlier definition of happiness. 
A. W. Price, for example, attempts to read the necessity of external prosperity for 
happiness as following entirely from Aristotle’s initial definition. 42  This attempt 
introduces two difficulties into his reading.  
First, he is unable to plausibly explain Aristotle’s strong distinction between 
external goods that are needed as “tools” for virtuous activity and those things whose 
absence “mars” our blessedness.43 Because Price does not see Aristotle as at all enlarging 
and modifying his earlier definition of happiness, he has to account for this second class 
of external goods solely in terms of its impact upon our virtuous activity. He labels this 
class “resources,” and he understands it as comprising certain necessary conditions for 
the performance of virtuous actions, for example, the there be people who are in need of 
the benefits that the virtuous person provides.
44
 Thus, the absence of these “resources” 
reduces our ability to perform virtuous actions and, for this reason, mars our blessedness.  
                                                 
40
 See Roche, “External Goods,” sections III-IV for a critique. 
41
 As Roche notes (“External Goods,” 47). 
42
 See Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle, 61, bottom paragraph. 
43
 See 1099a33-1099b2, note μέν…δέ, “on the one hand…on the other.” 
44
 See Virtue and Reason, 62-3. 
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The difficulty with this reading is that the absence of the tools we need to perform 
virtuous actions also reduces our ability to perform virtuous actions and so would mar 
our blessedness in the very same way. That is, there is not a strong distinction between a 
class of objects that are “tools” for virtuous actions and a second class of “resources” 
whose absence mars our blessedness by making us less able to perform such actions.
45
 
But Aristotle’s use of μέν…δέ (“on the other hand…on the other”) indicates a strong 
distinction.
46
 It is as if Aristotle were to say, “on the one hand, there are Greeks; on the 
other hand, there are human beings.” 
Second, Price is somewhat insensitive to some of the examples of the second class 
that Aristotle mentions. As one of the conditions that mars our blessedness and makes us 
unlikely to be happy, Aristotle mentions “being alone” (μονώτης), but the importance for 
happiness of sharing one’s life with others, and not just for the sake of obtaining further 
goods such as virtuous actions, is later emphasized by Aristotle using this very same 
word.
47 It is therefore reasonable to take μονώτης here as an early expression of 
Aristotle’s belief that sharing our life with others is important for our happiness.48 
Further, as I have discussed, Aristotle claims that losing one’s children makes one even 
less likely to be happy than never having any children in the first place. But if children 
were simply being considered as “resources” for virtuous actions, how would this be 
true? The man who had children, but lost them, would have more “resources” for a 
longer time. The obvious explanation is that the premature death of those we love causes 
                                                 
45
 As Price acknowledges (Virtue and Reason, 62, bottom paragraph). 
46
 On this point, see Broadie’s comment on 1099a33-b3. 
47
 Compare 1169b16-21. 
48
 On this point, see Burnet, The Ethics, 45, note 16. 
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us intense pain and anguish. And it is by virtue of experiencing this “lasting sadness in 
our heart,” that we are “even less likely to be happy,” as Eustratius, Aquinas, and Peter 
Martyr Vermigli correctly, and humanely, point out.
49
  
Price is himself open to this interpretation insofar as he acknowledges that the last 
passage I discussed points to pain as destructive of blessedness even apart from its ability 
to impede virtuous activities. He understands this as destroying blessedness by providing 
“an unwelcome context for action” (61). However, this is already to admit a qualification 
of Aristotle’s earlier definition. For, performing virtuous actions is no longer sufficient 
for blessedness. One must at least perform them in a “welcome context,” or, to put it 
differently, one must at least be unafflicted with intense and enduring pain. 
To sum up, Aristotle first defines happiness as the long-lived performance of a 
certain activity. However, through considering the example of bereavement, it becomes 
clear that the presence of intense and enduring pain can by itself take away our claim to 
be living a blessed life. As a consequence, the definition of happiness is implicitly 
expanded to include not only the “positive” feature of the presence of a certain activity, 
but also the “negative” feature of freedom from intense and enduring pain.  
iv. Virtuous actions are chosen for their own sake 
My fourth example concerns a well-known difficulty. Aristotle denies in Book X that 
kala actions in politics and war—that is, the preeminent actions of moral virtue50—are 
chosen for their own sake (αἱρετὸν δι’ ἀυτόν): 
                                                 
49
 See note 23. 
50
 Compare 1094b7-10. 
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If, among the actions according to virtue, those in politics and war are preeminent 
in kalon-ness and greatness, they are without leisure and aim at some end and are 
not chosen for the sake of themselves. (1177b16-18, my emphasis).
51
 
 
But this comes as a shock, for Aristotle had earlier laid it down as a necessary condition 
for a virtuous action that it be chosen for its own sake: 
With regard to the things that come to be according to the virtues, not if they 
should be a certain way are they done “with justice” or “with moderation,” but 
also if the one who is acting acts while being in a certain condition. First, if he 
should act knowingly, next, by choosing, and choosing the actions for their own 
sake, and third, if he should act while being in a steady and unmovable state. 
(1105a28-33).
52
 
 
Ηε had also defined the essential aim of virtuous action as to kalon—that is, the kala 
actions themselves that the virtuous person performs: 
As he [the courageous person] should and as reason commands, he endures for the 
sake of to kalon, for this is the end of virtue. (1115b12-13).
53
 
 
Understandably, Aristotle’s ultimate denial that the preeminent actions of moral virtue 
are chosen for their own sake has perplexed readers of the Nicomachean Ethics. Some 
simply take him to be confused.
54
 Others either (i) deny that he means what he says
55
 or 
(ii) attempt to give a meaning to the phrase αἱρετὸν δι’ ἀυτόν that differs from the one it 
plainly bears in other parts of the text.
56
 However, we are now in a position to appreciate 
a better alternative. This reversal is merely another example of the investigative 
                                                 
51
 εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται 
δ’ ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι’ αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν. 
52
 τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ 
πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ’ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι’ αὐτά, 
τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. 
53
 ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. For kala actions as the 
end of virtue, see note 15. 
54
 This is the view of Sidgwick (Outlines, 68) and Ross (Aristotle, 233-4). 
55
 This is the view of Bostock (Aristotle’s Ethics, 239). 
56
 This is the view of Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 309, note to paragraph §7) and Price (Virtue and Reason, 
75-6). Contrast their readings with the uses of αἱρετὸν δι’ ἀυτόν at 1097a30-b5, 1105a31-2, 1176b7-10. 
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procedure that Aristotle employs throughout the work.
57
 Still, this reversal remains 
perplexing to the degree that we do not fully perceive the considerations that led him to 
it. And while I am not able to discuss all of them, I will discuss what I take to be an 
important one.  
It seems to me that one of the reasons why Aristotle eventually concludes that the 
preeminent actions of moral virtue are not chosen for their own sake is the alleged fact, 
which becomes gradually visible over the course of the Nicomachean Ethics, that 
virtuous people understand their actions to be deserving of rewards.
58
 In other words, he 
agrees with Kant that “From the very same grounds on which he [the upright man] 
believes in virtue, he also believes in reward” (Lectures on Ethics, 78). But, according to 
Aristotle, an action, such as a virtuous benefaction, deserves a return from another, such 
as a reward, only if the actor gets less out of it than the recipient. This is clear from his 
discussion of the relationship between (virtuous) benefactors and their communities.
59
 He 
says there that honor, the “reward of virtue” (γέρας τῆς ἀρετῆς), must be given to 
(virtuous) benefactors by their communities because “nobody endures having less in 
everything” (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει). In other words, the reward of 
                                                 
57
 Others who view Aristotle as intentionally reversing himself on this point include Burger (Aristotle’s 
Dialogue, 202, first paragraph) and Christopher Bruell (“Aristotle on Theory and Practice,” 21-2). 
58
 On virtuous actions as deserving of rewards, see 1099b16-18, 1113b22-6, 1115a28-32, 1123b15-1124a1, 
1124b9-12 and note προσοφλήσει (“owe in addition”), 1134b1-8, 1163a26-1163b11. That Aristotle thinks 
virtue requires a return is well observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 539, 742, 745, 1010-11, 
1748-51, and note praemium [“reward”] in 539 and 742, merces [“payment”] in 1011, 1748-51, and 
retributio [“repayment”] in 1749 and 1751). It is also observed by Susan Colins (“Moral Virtues in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” 141, second paragraph) and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 6, second 
paragraph, and what follows, 60, first paragraph, 128, second paragraph, 129-30, 220, note 25).  
59
 This discussion occurs at 1163b1-12. 
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honor is given to (virtuous) benefactors in order to prevent them from “getting less” out 
of their (virtuous) benefactions than their beneficiaries.
60
 
Consequently, if a virtuous benefactor got more out of his virtuous benefaction 
than his beneficiary, his beneficiary would not owe him anything in return for his 
benefaction. If anything, it is the virtuous benefactor who would be indebted to his 
beneficiary for providing him the opportunity to do something so choiceworthy as a 
virtuous benefaction.
61
 But Aristotle does not think that virtuous people accept either that 
they are indebted to their beneficiaries or that their beneficiaries owe them nothing 
whatsoever in return for their benefactions.
62
 He therefore concludes that virtuous people 
view their actions as less choiceworthy, in themselves, than the benefits that their actions 
provide to others. And a plausible explanation for why this is so—for why virtuous 
actions are understood by the virtuous to be unqualifiedly deserving of rewards—is that 
they are understood by them as not being choiceworthy for their own sake. 
That virtuous actions are not choiceworthy for their own sake (though not 
necessarily not chosen for their own sake) may also be implied by Aristotle’s claim that 
one owes one’s (virtuous) benefactor a return in the form of honor that is “according to 
worth” (κατ' ἀξίαν): 
For that which is according to worth equalizes and preserves friendship, just as 
has been said. And in this way one must also associate with unequals, and the one 
who as been helped with a view to money or virtue must pay back honor, paying 
                                                 
60
 This point is well observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1749-51), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 
288, notes on chapter 14, paragraphs §2 and §3), and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 129-30).  
61
 This consequence is well observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 236, note 13). 
62
 For the point that the virtuous see their beneficiaries as indebted to them, see 1124b9-12 and note 
προσοφλήσει (“owe in addition”). Compare Kant, Ethics, 78, first paragraph, 197, second paragraph. That 
the virtuous view the beneficiaries as indebted to them is also observed by Pangle (Philosophy of 
Friendship, 128, second paragraph). 
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back what is possible. For friendship seeks what is possible, not what is according 
to worth. For neither is this possible in all things, just as in the case of honors 
given to the gods and also in the case of one’s parents. For nobody could pay back 
the worth of what they give. (1163b11-17).
63
 
 
 There are two senses of “worth” (ἀξία). One is related to exchange: the “worth” or 
“value” of something. 64  The other is related to proportional distribution: distributing 
shares that are proportional to some measure of “merit” (ἀξία).65 Thus, if virtue is the 
measure of merit and honor is what is distributed, then the more virtuous person merits a 
proportionally greater share of honor, though the share he gets need not actually be equal 
in “worth” (in the sense related to exchange) to what he has provided. It is clear that 
when Aristotle says we should pay back honor “according to worth” above, he means in 
the sense related to exchange, not distribution.
66
 
First, paying back our benefactors according to worth is introduced in the context 
of communities paying back their benefactors with honor.
67
 However, that payment is 
part of an exchange. It is given, in return, for benefactions. Moreover, as we saw, it is 
explicitly motivated by the consideration that the benefactors would otherwise be getting 
less out of their benefactions than their beneficiaries, but, as I noted above, the 
consideration of whether benefactors get “as much” out of their benefactions as their 
                                                 
63
 τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, 
καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. τὸ δυνατὸν 
γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ 
τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ' ἂν ἀποδοίη. 
64
 See 1133a5-12. 
65
 1131a22-29. 
66
 This is also the view of Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 288 notes on chapter 14, paragraphs §2 and §3) and 
Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 129-30). 
67
 See 1163b10-12. 
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beneficiaries is only relevant to worth in the sense related to exchange, not in the sense 
related to distribution. 
 Second, Aristotle says above that it is often not possible to pay back our 
benefactors according to worth. He offers as examples the honors that are given to 
parents and gods and claims that “nobody could pay back the worth.” But this is only true 
if worth has the sense related to exchange, not distribution. For as long as we gave the 
gods or our parents a proportionally greater share of honor, regardless of how far that 
honor fell short of being an equal repayment, we would be paying them back according to 
worth in the sense related to distribution. 
 Third, Aristotle says above that giving according to worth “preserves friendship.” 
He repeats this claim in the next chapter and there gives the example of paying a 
shoemaker for shoes “according to worth.”68 However, paying a craftsman according to 
worth for his products is clearly an example of paying according to worth in the sense 
related to exchange. This same sort of example is even used to illustrate giving according 
to worth in this sense in Book V.
69
 
 In sum, when Aristotle says we should do our best to pay back our benefactors 
“according to worth,” he means worth in the sense related to exchange, not distribution. 
Now, “according to worth” (in the sense related to exchange) is presumably short for 
either “according to the worth of what is owed” or “according to the worth of what they 
have given us.” If this phrase means the latter,70 or it means the former and what is owed 
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 See 1163b32-5. 
69
 See 133a5-11, 1133a31-b6, 1133b21-6. 
70
 This is the view of Irwin and Pangle (note 66). 
26 
 
is a return that is equal in worth to what has been given; and if a return is owed in an 
interaction to the degree that it is not equally choiceworthy for both people, then 
performing the benefaction cannot be to any degree choiceworthy for the (virtuous) 
benefactor. For, if it were, it would to this degree reduce what is owed by the beneficiary. 
In other words, the beneficiary would not owe a return equal in worth to what was 
provided, but something less. The (virtuous) benefaction would thus be choiceworthy for 
the beneficiary but not the (virtuous) benefactor. 
To sum up, Aristotle first presents all virtuous actions as chosen for their own 
sake. But, after observing throughout the Nicomachean Ethics that virtuous people 
consider their actions to be deserving of rewards and considering the conditions that 
would make virtuous actions deserving of returns from others, he concludes that this 
position should be abandoned.
71
 Hence his concluding declaration that the preeminent 
actions of moral virtue are not chosen for their own sake.  
 v. Friendship is mutually recognized goodwill 
My fifth example of Aristotle revising or rejecting an earlier position is his definition of 
friendship. He first defines friends as those who “have goodwill toward each other and 
wish the good things for each other, while not escaping each other’s notice” (εὐνοεῖν 
ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας, 1156a4), while “goodwill” (εὔνοια) is 
said to be wishing good things for a person “for their own sake” (ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, 
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 This is also Pangle’s interpretation (Philosophy of Friendship, 60, first paragraph, 77, bottom paragraph, 
120-2, 126-30, 139, first paragraph, 165, bottom paragraph, and what follows, 199, first paragraph). She is 
challenged by Gabriel Lear (“Review of Philosophy of Friendship, by Lorraine Smith Pangle”), but she 
appears to have missed parts of Pangle’s argument. The difficulty is not, as Lear represents it, that the 
virtuous strive for honor (paragraphs 9, 12, 15), but that they perceive honor, or some other external 
benefit, as their justly owed reward, as she herself acknowledges (paragraphs 12, 14, 20). 
27 
 
1155b31-2). Recognized, mutual goodwill is therefore the definition of friendship. 
However, we soon learn that,  
Those who accept each other, but do live their lives together, are more like those 
who have goodwill than they are like friends, for nothing belongs to friends in the 
way that living one’s life together does. (1157b17-19).72 
 
Those who mutually accept each other but do not live their lives together are like those 
who have goodwill for each other. Nevertheless, they fail to be like friends. The reason is 
not that they fail to recognize how they are disposed to each other. We can presume that 
they do recognize this about each other and are therefore actually like those who have 
mutually recognized goodwill. The reason is rather that they fail to be like those who live 
their lives together. But if those who mutually accept each other without living their lives 
together fail to be like friends not by virtue of failing to be like those who have mutually 
recognized goodwill but rather by virtue of failing to be like those who live their lives 
together, then living life together is a more important characteristic of friendship than 
mutually recognized goodwill. Indeed, Aristotle here claims that it is the most important 
characteristic of friendship. He therefore rejects mutually recognized goodwill as the 
essential characteristic of friendship, and if friendship turns out to essentially involve 
several characteristics, he at least rejects it as its central one.
73
 
Aristotle again emphasizes that living life together is more characteristic of 
friendship than mutually recognized goodwill in his comparison of the relationships of 
the young and the old: 
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 οἱ δ’ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ 
φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν. 
73
 Price believes the definition of friendship as mutually recognized goodwill is rejected even earlier (note 
7). 
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The young come to be friends quickly, but the old do not, for friends do not come 
to exist among those who do not delight in each other. In the same way, neither do 
the sour. But these sorts of people do have goodwill for each other, for they wish 
good things for each other and meet one another with a view to their needs. But 
they are not quite friends because they do not live their lives together nor do they 
delight in one another, things which are most especially held to be marks of 
friendship. (1158a5-10, my emphasis).
74
 
 
Aristotle explicitly states that these elderly associates have goodwill for each other. 
Furthermore, since they have an established relationship of mutual assistance, they surely 
recognize how they are disposed toward each other. They therefore possess mutually 
recognized goodwill. Nevertheless, they are “not quite friends” because they fail to 
pursue and enjoy each other’s company.75 Aristotle therefore rejects mutually recognized 
goodwill as the definition of friendship.
76
 Moreover, pursuing and enjoying each other’s 
company are now the two most important characteristics of friendship—more important, 
therefore, than mutually recognized goodwill. As Pakaluk observes:  
Aristotle now argues that ‘living life together’ (suzēn)’ is the more characteristic 
of friends. This is surprising, since it was the wishing and providing of goods that 
had figured in the apparent definition of friendship in VIII.2 and in his delineation 
of the three forms in VIII.3.” (Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX, 84, my 
emphasis).
77
 
 
To sum up, Aristotle initially defines friendship as mutually recognized goodwill. 
However, he later rejects this account of friendship in favor of one that privileges living 
life together and enjoying one another’s company. This still leaves the question of what 
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 νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ’ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ’ οὐδ’ 
οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς 
χρείας· φίλοι δ’ οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκεῖ 
φιλικά. 
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 Compare 1165b26-31. 
76
 That Aristotle is here rejecting his earlier definition is well observed by Broadie (comment on VIII 2, 
1155b17-1156a5) and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 54, bottom paragraph). 
77
 Aquinas also observes this point (Commentary, paragraphs 1599-1600). 
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considerations lead him to adopt this “surprising” change. But since these considerations 
play an important role in my interpretation, I will address them later, in Chapter 3, section 
d. 
c. Why Investigative Procedure? 
If we accept that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle often uses the investigative 
procedure I have described, we may wonder why he chose to do so. Why begin with a 
false view instead of the true one? One advantage of this procedure is that it allows the 
listener or reader to witness, even experience, the defects of an attractive but ultimately 
false position. For by first adopting a position before rejecting it, Aristotle encourages us 
to take it seriously and think it through. This procedure therefore likely has an 
educational function.  
To give an example, we saw that he initially defines courage as a certain 
fearlessness of death. It is fair to say that this definition has an intuitive pull. We can see 
this pull at work in the fact that Aristotle endorses this definition of courage in the 
Topics.
78
 We can also see it at work in the fact that, in the Eudemian discussion of 
courage, he follows his intermediary conclusion that “the courageous person feels many 
great fears” (1228b14-15) 79  with the objection, “but it seemed to the contrary that 
courage makes one fearless, and this is by virtue of fearing little or nothing” (1228b15-
17).
80
 Aristotle therefore begins his Nicomachean discussion of courage by presenting us 
with an attractive, though ultimately false, account. He then shows us the difficulties that 
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See 125b20-7. This reference is from Gauthier and Jolif (comment on 1115b12-13). 
79
 τὸν ἀνδρεῖον μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς φοβεῖσθαι. 
80
 ἐδόκει δὲ τοὐναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ’ εἷναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι. 
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one encounters in trying to maintain this attractive account, namely, that courageous 
people consider death to be harmful and, therefore, fearful. And finally, after providing 
us an opportunity to observe these difficulties, he rejects it. 
A further motivation for Aristotle’s use of this investigative procedure may be 
related to the fact that the Nicomachean Ethics is not an example of a strict ἐπιστήμη or 
“body of scientific knowledge;” that is, it does not consist wholly of deductions from 
known, but indemonstrable starting points.
81
 One clear example of how the work as a 
whole falls short of a body of strict scientific knowledge is that some of its parts aim 
explicitly at a less demanding πίστις, “conviction” or “trust.”  
Πίστις is named as a goal in at least two places in the Nicomachean Ethics.82 The 
first place is in his discussion of ἀκραςία or “weakness of will”: 
Since one must not only say what is true but also the cause of what is false (sc. 
“false belief”), for this contributes to the trust (or “conviction”), for whenever 
someone shows, in a reasonable way, that on account of which something seems 
true, while not being true, it makes one trust more in (or “be more convinced of”) 
what is true. (1154a22-25, my emphasis).
83
 
 
However, Aristotle also attributes πίστις—conviction—to those who possess scientific 
knowledge.
84
 It will therefore be useful to distinguish between knowing and unknowing 
πίστις85—that is, “knowing conviction” and “unknowing conviction”—or simply, “trust.”   
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 That the Nicomachean Ethics is not a body of strict scientific knowledge is also the view of Aquinas 
(Commentary, paragraphs 32, 35, 414), Peter Martyr Vermigli (Commentary, 7, bottom paragraph, and 
what follows, note “Thus defined, philosophy is divided into active and contemplative,” 10, bottom 
paragraph, 82, first paragraph, 83, bottom paragraph), Grant (The Ethics, Volume I, 395-6), and Reeve 
(Practices of Reason, 27-8, 32, first paragraph; Nicomachean Ethics, xxii-iv). 
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 It is also named as a goal in the Eudemian Ethics (1216b26-28). 
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 Ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν 
πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον. 
84
 See 1139b33-4. 
85
 Compare Gorgias 454b7-e5. 
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That πίστις is the above passage is the unknowing kind, or at least not the kind 
that accompanies scientific knowledge, is clear from the fact that that it needs to be 
shored up by “reasonable” explanations of the (supposed) errors of those who disagree. 
This sort of buttress would not be necessary if we possessed scientific knowledge. 
Mathematicians, for example, do not need to prop up their conviction in the theorems 
they have demonstrated by coming up with plausible explanations for why people have 
not always accepted what they have now proven. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
adducing merely “reasonable” explanations of the (supposed) errors of those who 
disagree with us will do the work of converting our (non-scientific) conviction into 
genuine scientific knowledge.
86
  
The second place Aristotle identifies πίστις as a goal is at the close of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. He tells us there that the πίστις he may have established in us is 
potentially refutable given closer contact with “the deeds” of life: 
These sorts of things (sc. “arguments” or “considerations”), then, possess a 
certain conviction, but the truth among the things related to action is judged from 
the deeds and from life. For what is authoritative is among these things. One must 
consider the previously said things with a view to the deeds, and, carrying them to 
life, if they are consonant with the deeds, they must be accepted, but if they 
disagree, they must be taken as mere speeches” (1179a17-22, my emphasis).87 
 
Aristotle here warns us not to give undue weight to the πίστις he may have established in 
us. It may yet turn out to be false. Given its potential fallibility, he clearly does not 
consider this πίστις to be an example of strict scientific knowledge. He therefore 
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 Though Reeve disagrees, at least with regard to knowledge of explanatory starting points (Action, 
Contemplation, and Happiness, 61-3).  
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 Πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου 
κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα (καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ 
συνᾳδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. 
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identifies the result of at least part of the Nicomachean Ethics as something below the bar 
of strict scientific knowledge. He therefore identifies the result of at least part of the 
Nicomachean Ethics as something below the bar of strict scientific knowledge.
88
 
My claim that Aristotle sometimes employs a standard below strict scientific 
knowledge in the Nicomachean Ethics is contested by Richard Kraut, who claims 
“Aristotle…sees no reason to admit that in ethics we must work with a lower standard of 
justification than is used in other fields of inquiry” (“How to Justify Ethical 
Propositions,” 86), and he intends his point to apply specifically to the Nicomachean 
Ethics.
89
 But, as we have observed, Aristotle at least sometimes employs the standard of 
reasonable trust, which is surely a weaker standard of justification than mathematical 
demonstration. Mathematics (or even logic) therefore appears to be a counterexample to 
Kraut’s claim.90 Though if he were to stress his qualification “in other fields of inquiry,” I 
would agree insofar as it is plausible that Aristotle thought that in other fields of inquiry 
we sometimes have to make do with reasonable trust. But I am not sure that this is a 
conclusion that Kraut himself would endorse. 
It also appears that Kraut’s point that “even if it passes the many intellectual tests 
to which it is put, an ethical theory must fit with the way we experience our lives. For 
ethics has to do not merely with the way we should think, but the way we should feel” 
(“Ethical Propositions,” 91) is inconsistent with his claim that the Nicomachean Ethics 
does not employ lower standards of justification than are available in other fields of 
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 The un-definitive character of Aristotle’s conclusions in Book X is well observed by Heliodorus 
(Paraphrasis, 226, lines 24-30, note πίστις μετρία, “measured trust”) and Reeve (“Beginning and Ending 
with Eudaimonia,” 32). 
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 See “Ethical Propositions,” 87, 89-90. 
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 Compare Peter Martyr Vermigli, Commentary, 82, first paragraph. 
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inquiry. For if the arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics do not sufficiently establish their 
conclusions without additional “non-theoretical” tests, then they are deficient in a way 
that mathematical demonstrations are not.
91
  
Now, if Aristotle had been in possession of a strict science of ethics that clearly 
deduced all important ethical truths from known but indemonstrable starting points, he 
probably would have presented us with it. It therefore appears that he did not think such a 
science was readily available. He consequently had to proceed in a different way. He 
chose, at least in the Nicomachean Ethics, to undertake a μέθοδος that is a ζήτησις, an 
“inquiry” that is an open “investigation.”92 And the investigative procedure that I have 
discussed can be understood as part of this investigation. That is, one of the ways 
Aristotle investigates ethical matters in the absence of a strict science is by positing 
initially attractive ethical views and then considering their consequences.
93 
And if he later 
finds that one of these initially attractive views contradicts a more plausible view or 
known fact, he qualifies or rejects it. As Grant puts it, “Whatever use Aristotle may make 
of his ἀπορίαι, of appeals to language and experience, of the authority of the many and 
the few, these are only means of testing, correcting, illustrating, and amplifying his 
conceptions” (The Ethics, Volume I, 396, my emphasis). However, as we have seen, 
Aristotle does not simply test and correct “his” conceptions, but attractive ones more 
generally.  
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 Contrast “Ethical Propositions,” 90, first paragraph, note “it is only then that the student of ethics can be 
said to have knowledge in the strict sense.” 
92
 See 1094b10-11 with 1102a12-15.
 
The investigative character of the Nicomachean Ethics is also 
emphasized by Peter Martyr Vermigli (Commentary, 81, first two paragraphs), Pakaluk (An Introduction, 
1-2; “On the unity of the Nicomachean Ethics,” 26, top paragraph), Natali (“Rhetorical and Scientific 
Aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics,” 377, top paragraph), and Curzer (Virtues, 388). 
93
 Consider 1098b11-12. 
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d. Nature of the Text 
My claim that Aristotle often uses an investigative procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics 
makes certain demands on the text. I have argued that he often lays down an initial 
position that, as a result of further investigation, he later qualifies or rejects. This requires 
that he intended the text of the initial position, the relevant intermediate investigation, 
and the text of the final position to all be part of a larger whole. But some scholars doubt 
that the Nicomachean Ethics was made into a whole by Aristotle himself. 
To be exact, my claim does not require that Aristotle composed the entire 
Nicomachean Ethics. Three of my examples are confined to a single book: my second 
courage example, my happiness example, and my friendship example. As far as I know, 
no scholar has argued that he did not compose the initial discussion of happiness, the 
discussion of courage, or the discussion of friendship as a whole.
 94
 The question scholars 
ask is rather whether these discussions were composed by him as independent works, but 
were then stitched together by a later editor. Thus, even on the extreme hypothesis that 
Aristotle composed each major section of the Nicomachean Ethics as a separate work and 
never intended to join them together, three of my examples still stand. 
My remaining two examples require continuity between Books II and X (virtuous 
actions are chosen for their own sake) and I and III (virtue is intrinsically pleasant). There 
is good evidence that Books IΙ and IIΙ were intended to be part of the same work. In II.7, 
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 Cicero is an exception. In On Moral Ends, his character Piso suggests, contrary to what he identifies as 
the received view, that the Nicomachean Ethics was written by Aristotle’s son, Nicomachus: “I shall 
confine myself to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus. Now the elaborate treatise on ethics is attributed to his 
father, but I do not see why the son should not have matched the father.” (V.12, 122). However, it seems 
that Nicomachus died young; see Natali, Aristotle: His Life and School, 15, first paragraph. Piso appears to 
be taking his lead from the title of the work. Two other explanations for the title are as follows: (i) 
Nicomachus edited the work; (ii) Aristotle dedicated the work to his son, Nicomachus. 
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Aristotle gives an outline of the various character virtues and vices and promises a more 
detailed treatment later,
95
 which treatment occurs in Books III-V. And in III.5, Aristotle 
refers to his outline definition of moral virtue that “has been stated by us” (εἴρηται ἡμῖν, 
1114b26-7), which statement occurs earlier in Book II.
96
 Aristotle also proposes in Book 
III to “take up the individual virtues again” (ἀναλαβόντες, 1115a4-5), 97  the first 
discussion of which occurs in II.7.
98
  
There is also good evidence that Books Ι and IΙ were both intended to be part of 
the same work. At the end of Book I, Aristotle states the need to examine virtue,
99
 which 
he divides into moral and intellectual,
100
 and Book II begins this task.
101
  
Finally, there is good evidence that Books I and X were intended to be part of the 
same work. Book X refers to an earlier discussion of happiness
102
 and incorporates the 
results of the investigation in Book I.
103
 Book I, in turn, claims that the “contemplative 
life” will be discussed in “what follows,”104 which promise Book X fulfills. Furthermore, 
the discussion of happiness in Book I is incomplete as it stands. Aristotle there fails to 
specify which virtue happiness is activity in accordance with.
105
  
                                                 
95
 1107b14-16. 
96
 1106b36-1107a2. 
97
 See Liddell and Scott ἀναλαμβάνω definition II.4. 
98
 On this point, see Natali, “Particular Virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,” 85, bottom 
paragraph. 
99
 1102a5-7. 
100
 1103a3-10. 
101
 1103a14-18. On this point, see Pakaluk, An Introduction, 87-88; Natali, “Scientific Aspects,” 380, 
second paragraph. 
102
 1176a30-1176b2. 
103
 See Natali, “Scientific Aspects,” 374, bottom paragraph, for a list of examples. 
104
 1096a4-5 
105
 See 1098a16-18, 1099a29-31, 1102a5-7, 1103a3-10. This point is well observed by Natali (“Scientific 
Aspects,” 380, second paragraph). 
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In sum, it is likely that Book III was intended to be part of the same work as Book 
II, Book II was intended to be part of the same work as Book Ι, and Book I was intended 
to be part of the same work as Book X. It is therefore likely that Aristotle intended Books 
I, II, III and X to all be part of the same work. This is sufficient for my last two examples 
to stand. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether Aristotle composed the Nicomachean 
Ethics is worth discussing. If he never intended for two contradictory claims about an 
issue to be part of the same text, then we cannot read the first as a mere preliminary 
position that he is investigating and later rejecting. He may still intend one of these 
claims to revise the other which occurred in an earlier work. The difficulty in this case 
would be in determining which claim belongs to an earlier work and which to a later one.  
Whether or not Aristotle composed the Nicomachean Ethics is, and will remain, 
controversial. I will limit myself to evaluating some of the prominent reasons that 
scholars have given for supposing that he did not do so. Five prominent ones are the 
following: 
(1) There is evidence that Andronicus edited Aristotle’s works.106 
(2) Three books of the Nicomachean Ethics (V,VI,VII) are common to the 
Eudemian Ethics. 
                                                 
106
 This reason is given by Annas (Morality of Happiness, 261, note 51) and A. A. Long (“Aristotle,” in The 
Cambridge History of Classical Literature, edited by Easterling and Knox, 530). Johnathan Barnes 
mentions, but does not endorse, this reason (“Roman Aristotle,” 28, top paragraph).  
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(3) There are two discussions of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, one in the 
common books, and one at the beginning of Book X, and the later discussion does 
not mention the earlier one.
107
 
(4) Book X appears to contradict the earlier books insofar as it identifies 
happiness with the activity of contemplation, whereas the earlier books identify it 
with the activity of moral virtue.
108
 
(5) The Nicomachean Ethics does not appear on the earliest catalogue of 
Aristotle’s works. This suggests that it was put together at a later date.109 
Reasons (1) and (4) are the least compelling. Regarding (1), there is no indisputable 
evidence that Andronicus edited Aristotle’s works. One passage that is sometimes offered 
as evidence is the following report from Plutarch: 
And, upon being initiated into the mysteries, he [Sulla] took for himself the 
library of Apellikon of Teos, in which were most of the books of Aristotle and 
Theophrastus, which were not yet at that time clearly known to most people. And 
it is said that, it being brought to Rome, Tyranno, the grammarian, prepared most 
of it, and Andronicus of Rhodes, being well supplied with copies from him, 
published them and drew up the catalogues which are now in circulation. (Life of 
Sulla, 26.1.2-26.2.1).
110
  
                                                 
107
 This reason is given by Aspasius (Commentaria, 151, lines 18-26, though he shows some doubt at line 
26). Line 25’s τὸ ἐν τῷ […six-letter manuscript gap…] λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς 
διειλεγμένου, “in the … he [Aristotle] speaks about pleasure as if he had not yet spoken about it,” probably 
refers to 1172a15-19, which can be read to imply that pleasure has not yet been discussed. This reason is 
also given by Hardie (Arsitotle’s Ethical Theory, 2, bottom paragraph), though it is unclear whether he 
ultimately accepts it ( 8, bottom paragraph), Annas (Morality of Happiness, 261, note 51), and Barnes 
(“Roman Aristotle,” 59, note 252). 
108
 This reason is given by Annas (Morality of Happiness, 261, note 51) and Martha Nussbaum (The 
Fragility of Goodness, 375-7). 
109
 That preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his life of Aristotle, considered to have derived from an early 
catalogue of the library of Alexandria, perhaps that of Callimachus. This reason is given by Anthony 
Kenny (The Aristotelian Ethics, 239). It is mentioned, but not endorsed, by Barnes (“Roman Aristotle,” 40, 
bottom paragraph). 
110
 καὶ μυηθεὶς ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶνος τοῦ Τηΐου βιβλιοθήκην, ἐν ᾗ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριςτοτέλους 
καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὔπω τότε σαφῶς γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς 
εἰς Ῥώμην Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλά, καὶ παρ'αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον 
εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας. 
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It is unclear what “preparing” (ἐνσκευάσασθαι) here entails. Did Tyranno prepare the 
manuscripts for open publication, by checking them for errors for example? Did he 
merely organize and catalogue them along with the rest of the library? Either way, this 
activity is ascribed to Tyranno and not to Andronicus. As far as Plutarch tell us, 
Andronicus simply published works he got from Tyranno.
111
 It is also worth noting that 
Strabo, in a similar report, implies that Tyranno himself allowed booksellers to copy and 
publish copies of Aristotle’s writings from the library and makes no mention of 
Andronicus.
112
 
There is, however, a second passage that is offered as evidence for Andronicus’ 
editorial activity. It is from Prophry’s description of how he prepared Plotinus’ works for 
publication: 
Since he [Plotinus] turned it over to us to do the arranging and correcting of his 
books, and I promised him while he was still living, and also professed that I 
would do this to our other companions, I first decided not to let the books be 
published in their chronological order and in confusion, but, imitating 
Apollodorus the Athenian and Andronicus the Perapatetic, the first of which 
brought the works of Epicharmus the comedian together into ten volumes, the 
other of which divided the works of Theophrastus and Aristotle into pragmateias, 
bringing related treatments into the same place. Thus, I also, having 54 books of 
Plotinus, divided them into six enneads, pleasantly discovering the perfection of 
the number six also in the enneads, and in each ennead I took related material and 
collected it together, giving the early order to the easier problems. The first 
ennead contains the following more ethical works. (Pophyry, Life of Plotinus, 
24.2-17).
113
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 As is noted by Barnes (“Roman Aristotle,” 28, bottom paragraph). 
112
 See Strabo, Geography, 13.1.54.30-38. This point is noted by Barnes (“Roman Aristotle,” 19, bottom 
paragraph). 
113
 Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων ποιεῖσθαι ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψεν, ἐγὼ δὲ κἀκείνῳ 
ζῶντι ὑπεσχόμην καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑταίροις ἐπηγγειλάμην ποιῆσαι τοῦτο, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία οὐ κατὰ 
χρόνους ἐᾶσαι φύρδην ἐκδεδομένα ἐδικαίωσα, μιμησάμενος δ'Ἀπολλόδωρον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ 
Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τὸν κωμῳδιογράφον εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων 
συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν 
συναγαγών· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ <νδ> ὄντα ἔχων τὰ τοῦ Πλωτίνου βιβλία διεῖλον μὲν εἰς ἓξ ἐννεάδας τῇ 
τελειότητι τοῦ ἓξ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐννεάσιν ἀσμένως ἐπιτυχών, ἑκάστῃ δὲ ἐννεάδι τὰ οἰκεῖα φέρων 
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The italicized phrase above is sometimes translated as “divided the works of 
Theophrastus and Aristotle into treatises” (see LSJ, ‘πραγματεία,’ III.2).114 So translated, 
this phrase does imply that Andronicus himself joined together related Aristotelian 
material into “treatises” of his own devising. But this phrase can equally well be 
translated as “divided the works of Theophrastus and Aristotle into treatments of a 
subject matter” (see ibid., III)115—that is, grouped the works according to the similarity 
of their subject matter: ethical works, logical works etc…—while “into the same place” 
can be glossed as “into the same division or heading.” And this is the better reading. 
Andronicus was well known for authoring a work on the writings of Aristotle.
116
 
This work included a collection of Aristotle’s letters, his will, an ordered, thematically 
arranged “list” (πίνακες) of his known writings, and discussions of authenticity. If, when 
Pophyry is pointing to Andronichus as one of his exemplars, he is referring to this well 
known work, then he is presumably referring to the fact that, in it, Andronicus ordered 
and arranged the whole of Aristotle’s writings according to subject matter. Pophyry is 
telling us that he accomplished this same task for Plotinus’ writings through the way he 
grouped them into published volumes. In other words, he took advantage of the occasion 
of publishing Plotinus’ writings to present, à la Andronichus, an ordered, thematic 
arrangement of Pophry’s writings. And this is exactly what he does. By his own 
testimony, the first volume is, for example, a grouping and ordering of Plotinus’ “more 
                                                                                                                                                 
συνεφόρησα δοὺς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη ἐννεὰς ἔχει τὰ 
ἠθικώτερα τάδε. 
114
 Examples include Barnes (“Roman Aristotle,” 37) and Fortenbaugh et al. (Theophrastus of Eresus: 
Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Part One, 95, top). 
115
 As is argued by Inegmar During (Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, 415). 
116
 On this work, see Düring, Aristotle, 421-5; Barnes, “Roman Aristotle,” 25-6. 
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ethical” works. But if this is how we understand Pophyry’s allusion to Andronichus, then 
he only provides testimony that Andronichus produced an ordered, thematic arrangement 
of Aristotle’s writings, not that he edited or combined them. 
Barnes makes a similar point about Pophyry referring to Andronicus’ work on 
Aristotle’s writing as one of his exemplars.117 However, he accepts the translation of 
“divided the works of Theophrastus and Aristotle into treatises” for τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ 
Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε,118 which he understands to mean “into published 
volumes.” He therefore takes the above passage from Pophyry as evidence of 
Andronicus’ activity as a “consolidator” of Aristotle’s writings.119 However, there is no 
independent evidence that Andronicus published thematically grouped “volumes” of 
Aristotle’s writing. We only get this implication if we have already decided to read 
πραγματείας as “treatises” rather than “treatments of a subject matter.” But if we stand 
back and treat the translation of πραγματείας as an open question, then we have reason to 
read it as “treatments of a subject matter,” since we already know that Andronicus’ work 
on Aristotle’s writings contained an ordered, thematically arranged list of Aristotle’s 
writings. 
During, one the other hand, reads πραγματείας as “treatments of a subject matter.” 
However, he translates τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών as “having put 
together treatises on the same subject into one work” (Biographical Tradition, 415, my 
                                                 
117
 See “Roman Aristotle,” 38-40. 
118
 See 37. 
119
 See 65. 
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emphasis). He therefore, like Barnes, takes the previous passage as evidence that 
Andronicus published thematically grouped volumes of Aristotle’s writings.120 
Even if Andronicus did edit some of Aristotle’s works, if the Nicomachean Ethics 
was already composed by Aristotle, then, whatever this editing amounted to, it would not 
have included putting together the work. And if we take Andonichus’ supposed editorial 
or publishing activity to post date Cicero, given that he, or his activity, is never 
mentioned by him,
121
 then there was a Nicomachean Ethics text that predated 
Andronicus’ supposed editing, since, as I have mentioned,122 a Nicomachean Ethics is 
referred to by a character in one of Cicero’s dialogues. Thus, (1) simply does not help us 
decide the question of whether or not Aristotle composed the work. 
(4) appears to be based on an insufficient appreciation of the text. As I have 
discussed, there are pretty clear references between Books I and X.
123
 Still, there is some 
truth to the claim that Book X paints a contrasting picture of happiness in comparison 
with the earlier books. Even though Aristotle officially leaves it an open question whether 
happiness is activity in accordance with moral or intellectual virtue,
124
 he does at times 
associate happiness with the activity of moral virtue.
125
 However, this preliminary 
                                                 
120
 See ibid., note “the backbone in our evidence on the Roman edition of Aristotle.” 
121
 On this point, see Barnes, “Roman Aristotle,” 24, second and third paragraphs, 46, first paragraph.  
122
 See note 94. 
123
 See notes 102-5. Irwin correctly deems this reason to be “unsatisfactory” (Socrates to the Reformation, 
151, top paragraph). 
124
 See note 105. 
125
 For example, 1099a31-3, 1101a9-13, 1117b9-11. This point is well observed by Bruell (“Theory and 
Practice,” 21, first paragraph). 
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association, and its eventual qualification in Book X,
126
 can be understood as yet another 
example of investigative procedure. 
This leaves (2), (3), and (5) as the stronger reasons. Regarding (2), there is a ready 
explanation for why Aristotle, if he did compose the Nicomachean Ethics, would have 
made the common books a part of it. If, as most scholars suppose, the Eudemian Ethics is 
the earlier work, then, in composing the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle chose to re-use 
the common books instead of re-writing them.
127
 This choice is readily understandable if 
we suppose that the Nicomachean Ethics was a work intended (a) to be read aloud to an 
audience
128
 and (b) for only limited circulation.
129
 Thus, re-incorporating older material 
was not tantamount to “re-publishing” it.130  
(3) is the strongest reason for denying that Aristotle composed the Nicomachean 
Ethics. The argument is that the best explanation for why the work contains two 
discussions of pleasure that do not refer to each other is that a later editor placed together 
two separate discussions that Aristotle never intended to be part of the same work. There 
is, however, an alternative explanation. Aristotle, in re-using the common books, chose to 
preserve their discussion of pleasure because he thought it was still valuable.
131
 And, by 
introducing a second, later discussion, he brought it about that the earlier would be 
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 See 1178a5-9. 
127
 This possibility is noted by Hardie (Ethical Theory, 8, bottom paragraph), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 
xv, third paragraph), and Bostock (Aristotle’s Ethics, 1, second paragraph).  
128
 See 1095a2-3, 11-13; compare Metaphysics 994b32-995a1. That the Nicomachean Ethics was intended 
to be read aloud to an audience is the view of Hardie (ibid), Richard Bodéüs (The Political Dimension of 
Aristotle’s Ethics, 85-88), and Bostock (Aristotle’s Ethics, 1, second paragraph, 3, bottom paragraph). 
129
 This is a common way to understand the difference between Aristotle’s “exoteric” and “esoteric” works. 
130
 This point is well observed by Hardie (ibid). 
131
 This possibility is noted by Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 268, note to paragraph §1). That the earlier 
treatment of pleasure is valuable in its own right is the view of Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1954), 
Bostock (Aristotle’s Ethics, 143, first paragraph), and Pakaluk (“Unity,” 41-3). 
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superseded and, where necessary, corrected by the later.
132
 As to why he would not have 
mentioned the earlier discussion of pleasure in the later, there are two possible 
explanations. One, he thought that it was sufficiently clear that the later discussion was 
intended to supersede and, in places, correct the earlier. This is how many scholars 
understand the relationship between the two discussions, even if they don’t necessarily 
think that Aristotle intended for both to be part of the same work.
133
 Two, if the 
Nicomachean Ethics was a work that was composed to be read aloud to an audience, he 
would have had ample opportunity to clarify the relationship between the two discussions 
should he have felt the need to do so. 
Concerning (5), the earliest catalogue (Diogenes’) appears to be a library 
catalogue.
134
 Perhaps that of the library of Alexandria. If so, it makes no pretension to 
being a complete record of the works of Aristotle at the time it was composed.
135
 
Furthermore, this catalogue does not include anything that can be clearly identified with 
“pieces” of the Nicomachean Ethics.136  There is no two book work on friendship137 
(corresponding to Books VIII-IX) or a one or two book work on happiness (Books I, X), 
or a two or three book work on character virtue (Books II-IV), or a seven book ethical 
work that would correspond to the Nicomachean Ethics minus the common books.  
                                                 
132
 This is Bostock’s view (ibid. with 1, second paragraph).  
133
 For example, Ross (Aristotle, 227, bottom paragraph), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 307, note to 
paragraph §7), and Bostock (ibid.). 
134
 See During, Biographical Tradition, 67-9; Barnes, “Roman Aristotle,” 41, second paragraph.  
135
 Barnes makes this point well (“Roman Aristotle,” 64, bottom two paragraphs). See, also, During, 
Biographical Tradition, 68, top. 
136
 Barnes observes this point with regard to the five book “ethics” in the catalogue (“Roman Aristotle,” 43, 
top paragraph). 
137
 There is, however, a one book discussions of friendship (During, Biographical Tradition, 42, number 
24) and, in a another catalogue, a three book discussion ( 83, number 24). One could always claim that one, 
or both, of these books contain the material from VIII and IX, but in one larger, or several smaller, books. 
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There is a five (or perhaps four)
138
 book work on ethics. One could claim that this 
work consisted of Books I, II, III, IV, X, but, again, there is no record of a separate two 
book discussion of friendship. And further, Book X clearly refers to an earlier discussion 
of friendship,
139
 which would then be missing from this hypothetical work, while Books 
II and IV refer to later discussions of justice, intellectual virtue, and self-control 
(ἐγκράτεια),140 which would also be missing. Likewise, if one claimed that this work 
consisted of Books I, II, VIII, IX, X, there would be missing the promised discussions of 
justice and intellectual virtue as well as the promised discussion of the particular 
character virtues.
141
 Book III, if divorced from Book II, would also refer to an earlier 
given definition of virtue that would not exist.
142
  
One could claim in response that all of these references are the interpolation of a 
later editor. One thus hypothesizes a number of Aristotelian “ur” texts that were 
interpolated by a later editor and combined into a whole of his own devising. But if there 
is no independent evidence for the existence of these ur texts, what motivates this 
hypothesis? 
In conclusion, two hypotheses about the Nicomachean Ethics appear to be the 
most plausible. One, Aristotle himself arranged the Nicomachean Ethics, joining the 
newly written Books I-IV and VIII-X with the common books from the Eudemian Ethics. 
                                                 
138
 See the critical apparatus for number 38 in During, Biographical Tradition, 43. 
139
 1179a33-4. 
140
 See 1108b7-10, 1128b33-5. 
141
 See note 95. 
142
 See 1114b26-7. The reference is presumably to 1106b36-1107a2 in Book II. 
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It thus represents a complete work that he, in all likelihood, read to an audience.
143
 In this 
case, any two contradictory claims in the work may be an example of investigative 
procedure.  
Two, Aristotle planned (another) major work on ethics. He managed to write 
Books I-IV and VIII-X, but he died before he could rework the discussions of justice, 
intellectual virtue, and self-control from the Eudemian Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics 
was thus an unfinished work, and he most likely never read it to an audience. However, 
since the finished parts possessed clear references to at least some of the remaining 
topics,
144
 someone, perhaps whoever first prepared the work for open publication 
(ἔκδοσις), added the relevant books from the Eudemian Ethics in order to give the reader 
the best available indication of what Aristotle would have said had he finished the work. 
And not wanting to do too much violence to what Aristotle had decided to treat together 
in the Eudemian Ethics, this person left the discussion of pleasure that follows that of 
self-control intact.
145
 Or perhaps someone thought that the Eudemian books were 
originally part of the work but had become missing, since there were apparent references 
to them in the other Nicomachean books. Either way, if Aristotle did not put the books 
that are common to the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
then only contradictory claims that both occur the common books or both occur in the 
exclusively Nicomachean books could be examples of investigative procedure.  
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 Bostock (Aristotle’s Ethics, 1, second paragraph) and Christopher Rowe (Nicomachean Ethics, 4, first 
paragraph) incline towards this hypothesis. 
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 For example, 1108b7-19, 1128b33-5. 
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 Irwin seems to incline towards this hypothesis (Nicomachean Ethics, xv, third and fourth paragraphs). 
This possibility is also mentioned by Rowe (ibid). 
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§ Chapter Two: Aristotle’s Explanatory Starting Point 
In this chapter, I will argue that Aristotle posits it as an ἀρχή or “explanatory starting 
point” that human beings act ultimately for the sake of their own εὐδαιμονία or 
“happiness.” I will first present evidence that he posits this explanatory starting point. I 
will then elaborate and respond to two challenges that are brought against this 
interpretation. 
a. Evidence that our own Happiness Is the Ultimate End 
i. Our own happiness is the “simply final” end 
In Book I, Aristotle explicitly lays it down as an explanatory starting point that all human 
beings do everything for the sake of happiness. He says, 
And it is reasonable that happiness is this way [sc. prized and final] also on 
account of its being an explanatory starting point, for we all do all of the 
remaining things for its sake. (1102a2-3, my emphasis).
146
  
  
Sarah Broadie, on the other hand, denies that this passage describes actual human action. 
She says, “this is not an observation about human motivation, but a normative declaration 
that everything else should be subordinated to happiness” (Nicomachean Ethics, 291, my 
emphasis). However, she is clearly reading the text against the grain. Aristotle does not 
say δεῖ (“should”). He makes a clear statement about the end—“happiness”—that human 
beings actually act for.  
We do “everything else” for the sake of “happiness.” But whose happiness? It is 
reasonable to take Aristotle to mean “each person’s own.”147 This is the most natural way 
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 ἔοικε δ’ [εὐδαιμονία] οὕτως ἔχειν [sc. τιμία καὶ τελεία] καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ 
πάντα πάντες πράττομεν. 
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to take his statement, and he says nothing in this section to prevent or correct this 
interpretation. He even gives us a positive indication that each person’s own happiness is 
what he has in mind.  
Prior to the above passage, in I.7, Aristotle says that, of all ends, happiness “most 
of all seems” (μάλιστα δοκεῖ) to be “simply final” (ἁπλῶς τέλειον); that is, always chosen 
for its own sake and never for the sake of anything else.
148
 And to illustrate this point, he 
says that while we choose other ends such as virtue, pleasure, honor and awareness (νοῦς) 
for their own sake, “we, supposing that we will be happy by means of these things, also 
choose these things for the sake of happiness.”149 That is, he illustrates his claim that 
happiness most of all seems to be simply final by pointing to the fact that we ourselves 
choose other ends for the sake of ourselves being happy. This illustration thus suggests 
that each person’s own happiness is what Aristotle has in mind as a simply final end. But 
if each person’s own happiness is a simply final end, then it is presumably this happiness, 
and not anyone else’s, that we do “all of the remaining things” for the sake of. 
Eustratius and Aquinas seem to understand Aristotle as positing each person’s 
own happiness as a simply final end as I do.
150
 Peter Martyr Vermigli’s treatment of this 
section is confusing, nor is he aided by his translators. On the basis of De Anima 415b20-
2, Vermigli distinguishes between two senses of ἕνεκα οὗ (“for the sake of which”); (a) 
“that [end] for the sake of which,” ὅ in the De Anima manuscripts and so quoted by 
                                                                                                                                                 
147
 On this point, see Bostock Aristotle’s Ethics, 26, bottom paragraph, 237, second paragraph; Pakaluk, An 
Introduction, 12, top; Irwin, Socrates to the Reformation, 125; Hurka, “Aristotle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong, 
and Wrong,” 14, bottom paragraph. 
148
1097a33-4.  
149
 αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. 
150
 See Eustratius, Commentaria, 62, lines 6-15; Aquinas, Commentary, paragraph 111. 
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Vermigli, but amended to οὗ by modern editors of De Anima; and (b) “[that being] for 
whose benefit,” ᾧ. In other words, if we say “x is for the sake of y,” y could either name 
the goal that we are acting toward when we do x (i.e., “glory”), or it could name the being 
we intend to benefit in doing x (i.e., “John”). 
 However, Vermigli’s translators render (a) “because of which” and (b) “for the 
sake of which,” which is the customary translation of ἕνεκα οὗ in sense (a) not sense 
(b).
151
 At any rate, Vermigli appears to say that Aristotle is only here speaking of 
happiness as an abstract goal, divorced from any consideration of whose benefit this 
happiness is to serve, for, if we were to introduce this consideration, happiness would no 
longer be the most ultimate end, but rather that being for whose benefit we are pursuing 
happiness.
152
 If this is what Vermigli intends, then he overlooks the fact that Aristotle 
does here speak about happiness in relation to the question of “whose happiness,” for he 
speaks of “us” choosing other things in order that “we” may be happy. 
On the other hand, one could object that by “supposing that we will be happy” 
Aristotle does not mean “each person supposes that he himself will be happy,” but “we 
all suppose that all of us together will be happy.” That is, one could take the “ourselves 
being happy” collectively instead of individually.153 This reading suggests that we act for 
the sake of the collective happiness of all, rather than our own individual happiness.  
However, in addition to striking me as unnatural in itself, this reading will force 
us to read other claims Aristotle makes in this section in an unnatural way. This difficulty 
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 See Vermigli, Commentary, 31. 
152
 See Vermigli, Commentary, 176. 
153
 I thank Christiana Olfert for pointing out this possible reading to me. 
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stems from the fact that only the virtuous, and not the vicious, could plausibly be 
understood to act for the sake of the collective happiness of all. The vicious, by contrast, 
surely act for the sake of their own individual happiness.
154
 As a result, one could not say 
without qualification, as Aristotle appears to above, that happiness is a “simply final end” 
or that “we all do all the remaining things for the sake of happiness.” The reason is that 
the virtuous would actually choose their own happiness for the sake of a further goal, 
namely, the collective happiness of all. But neither could we say unqualifiedly that “the 
happiness of all” is a “simply final end” or that “we all do the remaining things for the 
sake of the collective happiness of all,” since vicious people do not act ultimately for the 
sake of this end, but rather their own happiness.  
We therefore have to give a very qualified interpretation to the above two 
seemingly unqualified claims. Namely, when Aristotle claims that happiness is a simply 
final end, he really means, “for any given person, either their own happiness or the 
collective happiness of all is, for them, a simply final end.” And when he claims, “we all 
do the remaining things for the sake of happiness,” he really means “we all do the 
remaining things either for the sake of our own individual happiness or for the sake of the 
collective happiness of all.” And further, when he claims “nobody chooses happiness for 
the sake these things (sc. “virtue, pleasure, honor, and awareness”) and neither generally 
for the sake of anything else” (1097b5-6),155  he really means “there is nobody who 
chooses both their own happiness and the collective happiness of all for the sake of a 
further goal,” since virtuous people, if they act ultimately for the sake of the collective 
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 See 1169a6-15. 
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 τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. 
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happiness of all, would actually choose their own individual happiness for the sake of this 
further goal. But if Aristotle had such qualified claims in mind, one would have expected 
him to be more explicit about it. 
Furthermore, on this reading, Aristotle would fail to point to a simply final goal 
that applies to all human action. Rather, he would only be pointing to different goals that 
are simply final for some, but not all, human action. But it seems, to the contrary, that he 
intends to identify an ultimate goal that applies to all, not only some, human action.
156
   
And finally, if virtuous people subordinate their own personal happiness to the 
happiness of all, then there would be no need for him to revise, as he does, the popular 
view that only vicious, and not virtuous, people are φίλαυτοι (“self-lovers”).157 For, on 
this reading, he would actually accept this view. Virtuous people really would be 
distinguished from vicious people by the fact that they subordinate their personal good to 
a higher end, namely, the collective happiness of all.  
In conclusion, it is better not to adopt this reading of the passage, unless, of 
course, other parts of the text compel us to do so. We will consider whether other parts of 
the text do in fact compel us when I examine the challenges that have been made against 
the interpretation that each person’s own happiness is the ultimate goal of their action.158 
For now, I will set down this part of the text as evidence for the interpretation that our 
own happiness is the ultimate aim of our action. 
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 See, for example, 1094a18-26, 1095a14-20, 1097a15-24. 
157
 See 1168a28-1168b1, 1168b19-31. This point is also observed by Irwin (Socrates to the Reformation, 
125, note 27). 
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 See sections b and c. 
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ii. The lovable 
That Aristotle intends to posit each person’s own happiness as the ultimate end of their 
action is also supported by his account of the lovable (τό φιλητόν). In VIII.2, Aristotle 
articulates three fundamental objects of love, namely, the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), the pleasant 
(tὸ ἡδύ) and the useful (τὸ χρήσιμον).  
After defining the useful as what produces what is pleasant or good,
159
 he asks, 
Is it the case that people love the good or that which is good for themselves? For 
sometimes these things differ from one another. And the same also concerning 
pleasure. But it seems that each person loves what is good for himself, and that 
while the good is lovable simply, that which is good for each is lovable for each. 
But each person loves not that which is good for himself, but what appears to be 
such. But this makes no difference, for this will be what appears to be lovable. 
(1155b21-7, my emphasis).
160
 
 
Aristotle asks above whether people love “the good” or “what is good for themselves.” 
What does he mean by this contrast? It is common to read it as identical to the one he 
spells out earlier in his discussion of justice, namely, that between what is good ἁπλῶς—
good “simply” or “without qualification”—and what is good for someone given their 
actual condition or situation.161 To give an illustration, it is simply bad (and not good) to 
have one’s appendix removed, but it is good for someone suffering from appendicitis.  
However, another reading is possible. Notice that while Aristotle explicitly 
contrasts “lovable ἁπλῶς” with “what is lovable for each person,” he does not explicitly 
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 See 1155b19-21. 
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 πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ 
ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ· 
φιλεῖ δ’ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ’ οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν 
φαινόμενον. 
161
 See 1129b1-6. Those who read the contrast in this way include Aspasius (Commentaria, 162, line 15-
25), Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1553-4), Stewart (commentary ad loc.), Pangle (Philosophy of 
Friendship, 37, bottom paragraph). Pakaluk mentions this reading, but doesn’t entirely commit to it ( Books 
VIII and IX, 58).  
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contrast “good ἁπλῶς” with “what is good for each person,” but rather, “the good.” Since 
he expresses the contrast concerning the lovable in terms of ἁπλῶς, but not the one 
concerning the good, we may suspect that he has a different contrast in mind. If so, we 
could take the contrast concerning the good to be between the larger class of “what is 
good” in the sense of “good for someone, regardless of who they are” and the more 
restricted class of “what is good for myself.” For example, your health is something that 
is good for someone. It therefore belongs in the first class. But it is not good for me. It 
therefore does not belong in the second.. 
Whichever reading of the contrast between “the good” and the “good for oneself” 
we adopt, one result will be the same. What is lovable for each person—that is, actually 
lovable for them given their actual condition—is what is actually good for them. I, 
therefore, do not love what is good for you merely because it is something that is good 
for someone. Only if what is good for you were also good for me (or appeared so) would 
I actually be capable of loving it. As Aristotle puts it in the Eudemian Ethics, “That 
which is not good for oneself is nothing to oneself” (1236b38).162 This same result then 
applies to happiness insofar as it is the “best good.”163 The happiness that we are actually 
capable of loving is that which is actually good for us, and this is clearly our own. Of 
course, we could also love the happiness of another, but only on the condition that it was 
also good for us—that is, only on the condition that it also contributed to our happiness. 
Aristotle’s claim that what is loveable for each person is what is good for them thus 
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 τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν. Compare Magna Moralia II.xi.8. That Aristotle here limits our love for 
the good to our own is observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1553-4) and Pangle (“Friendship 
and Self-Love,” 173, first paragraph), though she later changes her view (195-6). 
163
 See 1095a14-20, 1097b22-24. 
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implies that it is our own happiness that he intends to posit as the ultimate end of our 
action. 
Michael Pakaluk may seem to challenge my reading of Aristotle’s discussion of 
the lovable. He writes,  
We should not interpret the claim that it is a necessary condition that anything 
loved “as an end” is good or pleasant to (or for) the lover as committing Aristotle 
to egoism, in any of its usual forms. As we said, the idioms “to the lover” or “for 
the lover” (simply the dative case in Greek) are rather indistinct; they seem 
intended to suggest that some sort of relation holds between the thing loved and 
the lover, in virtue of which the lover is somehow better off. They need not in 
particular be taken to imply that what is loved contributes to the “interests” or 
“self-interest” of the lover, in the usual sense of those words. (Books VIII and IX, 
58, his emphasis). 
 
However, whether Pakaluk is attempting to resist the reading I outlined above hinges on 
what he means by “egoism in any of its usual forms” and “‘interests’ or ‘self-
interest’…in the usual sense of those words.” He grants that “some sort of relation holds 
between the thing [i.e., good] loved and the lover, in virtue of which the lover is 
somehow better off.” This clearly commits Aristotle to some form of egoism. It seems 
charitable, then, to read Pakaluk as cautioning us against assuming that this egoism is the 
“usual” sort, for example, that it precludes concern for virtue or the good of others.  
Similarly, according to the usual sense of “interest” and “self-interest,” whatever 
makes me “better off” for that reason advances my interests or self-interest. It therefore 
seems charitable to take Pakaluk to mean that we need not attribute to Aristotle the 
“usual” understanding of what things are (or are not) in our interest, for example, that 
virtue or the happiness of others is not an intrinsic part of our own interest. But, so 
understood, Pakaluk does not challenge my reading of the lovable. He merely warns us 
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against being presumptuous about what sorts of things Aristotle thinks are or are not good 
for oneself. 
There is one further challenge to my reading of the passage about the lovable. 
Ἀγαθόν (“good”) in that passage is sometimes read as “good” in the sense of “virtuous or 
excellent something” rather than in the sense of “good for a human being,” as is, for 
example, health or knowledge.164 Scholars are inspired to this reading because Aristotle 
later says that “perfect” friends love each other insofar as they have virtue (ἀρετή).165 
Virtue, then, must be in some way lovable. They then read “virtue” back into the earlier 
list of lovable things by claiming that “virtuous or excellent something” is what Aristotle 
there means by ἀγαθόν. But it is clear that ἀγαθόν does not there mean this, but rather 
what is good in the sense of “good for a human being.”  
First, as I have noted, just before his discussion of the lovable, Aristotle uses 
ἀγαθόν to define “the useful” (τὸ χρήσιμον), but the useful is properly defined as “that 
which produces what is good or pleasant for a human being” and not as “that which 
produces a virtuous or excellent something or pleasure.” Second, there is a perfectly clear 
Greek word that Aristotle could have used to signify the goodness of something as a 
ground for love: ἀρετή.166 Third, the “for oneself” (αὑτῷ) qualification that Aristotle 
introduces in this passage makes vastly better sense with ἀγαθόν in the sense of “good for 
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 This reading is common. Cooper (“Aristotle Forms of Friendship,” 317, bottom paragraph, 321, bottom 
paragraph) and Broadie (Nicomachean Ethics, 57, second paragraph) offer clear examples. Further 
examples include Price (Love and Friendship, 104, top paragraph), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 274, note 
to paragraph §3), David Konstan (Friendship in the Classical World, 72-4), Burger (Aristotle’s Dialogue, 
164, first paragraph), Alexander Nehamas (“Aristotelian Philia, Modern Friendship?”,” 224, second 
paragraph and note 29), and Patrick Lee Miller (“Finding Oneself with Friends,” 323, bottom paragraph, 
327, bottom paragraph). The contrary reading I prefer can be found in Arthur Adkins,“‘Friendship’ and 
‘Self-Sufficiency’ in Homer and Aristotle,” 39, bottom paragraph.  
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 See 1156b7-12, 1162b6-7. 
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 See 1106a15-21. 
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a human being” than it does with it in the sense of “virtuous or excellent something.” If 
ἀγαθόν means the latter, then what is lovable for each person is “what is a virtuous or 
excellent thing to themselves”? But “to themselves” cannot mean “what seems to them to 
be such,” since he goes on to add “what appears to be such” (τὸ φαινόμενον) as a further 
qualification to what is ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ. And what would it mean for something to be a 
virtuous or excellent thing “to me,” if it does not mean that this thing seems to me to be a 
virtuous or excellent thing? Fourth, and finally, if ἀγαθόν here means “virtuous or 
excellent something” and not “what is good for a human being,” then Aristotle has 
obviously failed to give an adequate account of the lovable, for what is good for us in the 
sense of “good for a human being” is manifestly lovable to us as such.  
Someone might respond to these objections by offering a hybrid reading. They 
could argue that τἀγαθὸν (“what is good”) above should be read as τἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς 
(“what is good simply”) and that this phrase designates ἀγαθόν in the “non-relative” 
sense of “virtuous or excellent something.” In other words, Aristotle wishes to claim that 
ἀγαθόν in the sense of “virtuous or excellent something” is lovable “simply” (ἁπλῶς), but 
ἀγαθόν in the sense of good for that person (αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν) is what is lovable for that 
person.
167
 This reading appears to have the following advantages: it (i) explains 
Aristotle’s later statements that friends love each other on account of virtue; and (ii) still 
maintains that what is good for us is lovable to us as such. However, the difficulty with 
the hybrid reading lies in the fact that ἀγαθόν bears fundamentally different senses on 
each side of the ἁπλῶς / αὑτῷ distinction. But Aristotle’s other uses of this distinction 
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 This reading is well described by Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 58), who is attracted to it, but also notes 
some of its difficulties (ibid., 72, An Introduction, 265-6). 
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require that the word that denotes the subject of the distinction maintain the same sense. 
For example, his earlier contrast between what is “good simply” and “good for a 
particular person” in his discussion of justice requires that “good” (ἀγαθόν) maintain the 
core sense of “good for a human being.” This is clear from that fact that unjust people 
excessively pursue the things that are “good simply” without paying sufficient attention 
to whether “the simply good things are also good for themselves” (1129b5-6). 168 
Likewise, Aristotle’s distinction in the lovable passage between what is “lovable simply” 
and “lovable for a particular person” requires that “lovable” maintain the core sense of 
either “capable of being loved” or “compelling love.” In sum, instead of trying to read 
“virtue” back into Aristotle’s list of lovable things, we should read the lovability of virtue 
in light of his list.  
iii. Every intellect chooses what is best for itself 
A third example that suggests that Aristotle intends to posit each person’s own happiness 
as an explanatory starting point is his claim in IX.8 that every intellect (νοῦς) chooses 
what is best for itself: 
And the virtuous person does the things that he should do, for every intellect 
chooses what is best for itself, and the good person obeys his intellect. (1169a16-
18).
169
 
 
This passage appears to be an example of synecdoche. The action of “choosing what is 
best for oneself” that properly belongs to the being that possesses intellect is being 
metaphorically attributed to the intellect through which the being performs the action. 
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 τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι. 
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 ὁ δ’ ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ’ ἐπιεικὴς 
πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. 
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Compare the phrase, “communication with an alien intelligence.” It is worth noting, in 
this regard, that one of the definitions of the good that Aristotle offers in the Rhetoric is 
that which an intellect would choose for the being it is the intellect of: 
“Let ‘good’ be…that which all things aim at, or all things having perception or 
intellect, or what they would aim at if they should acquire intellect, and as many 
things as intellect would give to each thing, and as many things as the intellect of 
each gives to each [itself].” (1362a21-5).170 
 
On the other hand, one might claim, as some interpreters do, that Aristotle identifies each 
person with their intellect or mind, and that he therefore means the claim that each 
intellect chooses what is best for itself literally.
171
 That is, insofar as each person just is 
their intellect, and insofar as each person chooses what is best for themselves, each 
intellect chooses what is best for itself, literally speaking. But it is not true that he simply 
identifies each person with their intellect. He hedges and qualifies this identification with 
ἢ μάλιστα (“or most of all,” 1169a2). Either each person is their intellect “or is most of 
all” their intellect.172  
As for what it means for us to “most of all be” this part of ourselves, I take 
Aristotle to mean that we come closer to being identical to this part than we do to any 
other. We come closer to being identical to our intellect, than we do to, say, our foot. Or, 
to put this point another way, if human beings had to be identical to one of their parts, 
then they would be identical to their intellect, and not their foot.
173
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 ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ…οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ 
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 See, for example, Charles Kahn, “Aristotle and Altruism,” 29-30. 
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 Percival observes this qualification well, and he takes it to express Aristotle’s true view (Aristotle on 
Friendship, 127, note his editorial addition, “rather, to be accurate”). 
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It is rather this second, qualified, identification that is suggested by Aristotle’s 
earlier assertion that a human being, being the interweaving of thought and desire, is the 
“source” (ἀρχή) of action.174 It is also suggested by one of the ways he argues that we 
are—or “are most of all”—intellect or mind. He claims that any σύστημα (“complex 
entity”) is “most of all” its most authoritative part. Just as a city is “most of all” its ruling 
part, a human being is “most of all” its intellect or mind.175 But this argument does not 
attempt to establish that a complex entity “just is” its most authoritative part. That would 
be absurd, for to be a complex entity at all, something must be a certain whole with parts. 
Rather, it attempts to establish that a complex entity, such as a human being, is “most of 
all” its most authoritative part. As Aquinas puts it, 
It is obvious from the discussion that everyone is his intellect or reason, or rather 
(since several other ingredients concur in the essence of man) it can be said that 
man is especially this part, i.e., intellect or reason because it is the formal and 
perfective element of the human species” (Commentary, paragraph 1872). 
 
If we then read the above passage as an example of synecdoche, it restricts (at least non-
akratic)
176
 choice to what is (or appears) best for oneself.
177
 Consequently, if, as Aristotle 
says, we choose all other things for the sake of “happiness,” then it must be that particular 
happiness that is best for ourselves, and this is clearly our own. 
 Lorraine Pangle considers
178
 but ultimately rejects this reading of the passage. She 
claims, instead, that every intellect pursues what is best for itself in the sense that it 
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 See 1139b4-5. This point is Bruell’s (“Theory and Practice,” 22, first paragraph). 
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 See 1168b31-33. 
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 On this point, see Michael of Ephesus, In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria, 506, lines 1-16; Gauthier 
and Jolif, commentary ad loc.; Erik J. Wielenberg, “Egoism and Eudaimonia-Maximization in the 
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“rationally” pursues the (not always self-interested) ends of the being it is the intellect 
of.
179
 However, I cannot see how this is a gloss of intellect choosing “what is best for 
itself,” unless she posits in addition that what is always best for every intellect, but not 
the being whose intellect it is, is to make “rational” choices.  
I find this supposition doubtful, however. For one, it sharply divides the good of 
an intellect from the good of the individual whose intellect it is, so that an intellect is 
choosing what is best for itself even if it is choosing what is worse for the individual 
whose intellect it is.
180
 And also, this supposition locates the greatest good for an intellect 
in the activity of practical deliberation and not in theoretical contemplation. However, 
Aristotle seems to say that theoretical contemplation, and not practical deliberation, is the 
greatest good an intellect can achieve.
181
 
b. The Challenge from Aristotle’s Account of Friendship 
Some scholars challenge the more egoistic interpretation of Aristotle’s explanatory 
starting point that I have given evidence for. I will consider two such challenges, the first 
of which draws on his discussion of friendship. He says in that discussion that “perfect” 
(τέλειον) friends wish good things for their friends “for their friends’ own sake” (ἐκείνων 
ἕνεκα).182 Some scholars conclude from this claim that he believes friends can benefit 
each other even while failing to aim at their own happiness and that, therefore, if 
happiness is to serve as the ultimate end of our action, it cannot simply be our own.  
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i. Two examples: Jennifer Whiting and Richard Kraut 
Jennifer Whiting is one such scholar.
183
 She puts this point as follows: 
In sum, we need not read the “eudaimonist axiom” as requiring that all actions be 
performed ultimately for the sake of the agent’s own eudaimonia: for Aristotle’s 
account of philia shows how, given human nature, it is possible to act directly for 
the sake of another’s eudaimonia (“The Nicomachean Account of Philia,” 302).  
 
Part of the reasoning that Whiting employs in concluding from Aristotle’s statement 
about perfect friendship that friends can benefit each other even while failing to act for 
the sake of their own happiness is given clear expression by Richard Kraut, who shares 
her non-egoistic interpretation of Aristotle’s explanatory starting point.184 He argues as 
follows: 
I believe that pure egoism [the view that each person either should do or 
necessarily attempts to do what “maximizes their own good” or, more naturally, 
what is best for themselves]
185
 is incompatible with the ideal of human 
relationships that Aristotle puts forward in his discussion of friendship. When he 
discusses this topic in Books VIII-IX of the NE, he frequently says that in a 
perfect friendship each individual wishes for and acts for the good of the other 
person for the sake of that other person. Now, he does not tell us what it is to act 
for the sake of another, but I see no way to understand that notion other than this: 
when one acts for the sake of another, one is not benefiting him merely as a 
means to some further goal. Instead, one is taking the good of that person as 
something that by itself provides a reason for action. And pure egoism forbids 
this.  
 
Notice that this construal of “for the sake of another” leaves open the possibility 
of complex motivation: one may undertake an act both because it benefits oneself 
(one does it for one’s own sake) and because it benefits someone else (one also 
does it for his sake). In these complex cases, one has two independent reasons for 
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 Other scholars who make this same inference include Annas (“Self-Love in Aristotle,” 11-12; compare 
Morality of Happiness, 259-60, though the point is less clear here); Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 201); 
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 See Kraut, Human Good, 144, bottom paragraph. 
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action: one is not benefiting the other person merely as a means to one’s own 
good, but instead the good of the other person provides a further reason for action, 
beyond the self-interested reason one already has. (Human Good, 78-9). 
 
Kraut thus argues that (a) Aristotle’s account of perfect friendship and (b) what he 
assumes is Aristotle’s belief that we can achieve this perfect friendship in relation to 
others, sufficiently justifies (c) that Aristotle believes the good of our friends constitutes a 
non-“self-interested reason” for acting.  
Kraut explicitly follows Cooper in drawing this conclusion.
186
 If we then turn to 
Cooper, we see that he implies that if someone acts for the sake of another, he has a non-
self-interested reason for acting. Concerning Aristotle’s use of the qualification “for 
somebody else’s sake,” he says, “it is not implied that this [the well-being of the other] is 
the agent’s only reason for acting as he does, nor, in particular, that he does not also have 
a self-interested reason for acting.” (“Aristotle on Friendship,” 334, note 6, my bold).187  
I take it that Whiting joins Kraut (and Cooper) in concluding (c) from (a) and (b). 
But she additionally concludes that Aristotle thinks (perfect) friends can benefit each 
other while failing to aim at their own happiness. Kraut, by contrast, is more cautious. He 
recognizes that even if the good of my friend counts as a non-self-interested reason for 
me to act, it is logically possible that it always “count for less” than my own good. In 
such a case, I would always choose to act for my happiness over acting for my friends’. 
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 It is fairly common to understand “for the sake of another” as implying, to at least some degree, “not for 
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To then sufficiently discount this possibility, he offers additional evidence that Aristotle 
believes human beings can act while failing to aim at their own happiness.
188
  
There are thus two versions of the challenge to the egoistic interpretation of 
Aristotle’s explanatory starting point from his account of friendship. The first and most 
common, exemplified by Whiting, relies only on his statements about perfect friendship 
to conclude that he thinks it is possible for human beings to act for the benefit of their 
friends while failing to aim at their own happiness. The second, offered by Kraut, agrees 
with the first insofar as it also concludes from Aristotle’s statements about perfect 
friendship that he believes the happiness of a friend provides a non-self-interested reason 
for acting, but, in order to justify the further conclusion that he thinks human beings can 
act while failing to aim at their own happiness, it offers additional evidence.  
ii. Three difficulties for this challenge 
There are three difficulties that speak against the success of either version of this 
challenge. The first is that the second premise assumed above by Whiting and Kraut—
that Aristotle believes friends can achieve the ideal of “perfect” friendship in relation to 
others—is false. I will argue in Chapter Three that Aristotle’s final—as opposed to his 
merely preliminary—position is that human beings fail to live up to this ideal of perfect 
friendship, at least in relation to others.
189
  
If I am correct, then the common version of this challenge fails, while the success 
of Kraut’s version hinges upon the strength of his additional evidence. But since I make 
the case for the falsehood of this premise in a later chapter, I will here pass over this 
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difficulty. Indeed, even granting Kraut and Whiting’s second premise, both versions of 
this challenge encounter two further difficulties. 
The second difficulty is that it does not actually follow from the fact that a friend 
acts “for the sake of his friend” that he has a “non-self-interested reason” for acting. 
Kraut and Whiting’s two premises therefore fail to sufficiently justify the conclusion that 
Aristotle believes friends have a non-self-interested reason for benefitting their friends. 
The third difficulty stems from the way both versions of this challenge are 
compelled to interpret Aristotle’s explanatory starting point. They are compelled to 
interpret his claim that “we all do everything else for the sake of happiness” to mean “the 
happiness of someone or other but not necessarily oneself.” However, this interpretation 
is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of deliberation and choice.  
iii. The second difficulty 
To elaborate the second difficulty, it is clear enough that if I act “for the sake of my 
friend,” I must choose his good for its own sake. If I choose his good merely for the sake 
of some further thing, I am clearly not acting for his sake.
190
 But it does not follow from 
this requirement that I have a “non-self-interested reason” for benefitting my friend.  
At least some of the things that we chose for their own sake are things that are 
good for ourselves, namely, those things that are “good according to themselves” (ἀγαθὰ 
καθ’ αὑτά).191  It is therefore possible that a friend choose the good of his friend as 
something that is good according to itself or “intrinsically good” for himself; for 
example, it is possible that a friend pursue the happiness of his friend as an intrinsic 
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component of his own happiness. And if so, then, although he acts for the sake of his 
friend, he would clearly have a self-interested reason for acting.
192
  
Kraut, Whiting, or Cooper might respond that if I choose my friend’s good as 
something that is intrinsically good for myself—for example, as an intrinsic part of my 
own happiness—then, I no longer act “for the sake of” my friend. On this understanding, 
“doing something for the sake of another” does not merely mean “choosing their good for 
its own sake,” but rather, “choosing their good for its own sake and not as something that 
is intrinsically good for oneself.”  
Kraut does appear to make an argument like this: 
How can benefiting another person for your own sake provide a reason for 
benefiting him for his sake? Your own good can of course provide a reason for 
benefitting another person—but it cannot provide a reason for benefitting that 
person for his sake. To benefit another for his sake is to take his good as 
something that by itself provides a reason for action. But if one takes the good of 
another as a reason for action because promoting his good serves one’s own, then 
one does not in fact take his good as something that by itself provides a reason for 
action. If one says, “I did it for his sake for my sake,” the last three words 
undermine the claim made in the first part of the sentence.” (Kraut, Human Good, 
137). 
 
And summarizing his point later, he says, “For reasons give in 2.15, I am mystified by the 
notion that one’s own good can provide a reason for benefitting others for their sake.” 
(147).  
However, Kraut’s argument that one’s own good cannot provide a reason to 
benefit another for their sake involves two confusions. First, he overlooks the possibility 
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that the good of another constitutes an intrinsic good for oneself, since he clearly limits 
self-interested reasons for benefitting others to merely instrumental ones: 
But the pure egoist says that even when one rightly promotes the good of others, 
doing so has merely instrumental value, for one is never to take the well-being of 
others as an independent reason for action. All of one’s relationships with others 
are to be instrumental: if one benefits them at all, one should do so only as a 
means to one’s own optimal good (Human Good, 78, my emphasis).193 
 
Second, and relatedly, Kraut fails to distinguish between two different cases of having a 
self-interested reason to benefit another for their own sake. Since he overlooks the 
possibility that the good of another could be intrinsically good for oneself—as it would 
be if the happiness of a friend were a part of our own happiness—he takes it that the only 
way I could benefit my friend “for his own sake” for a self-interested reason is if I were 
to choose to “benefit my friend for his own sake” for my own sake—that is, if the object 
of my choice were not merely the physical action—“benefitting my friend”—but the 
physical action along with a certain intention—“benefitting my friend for his own sake,” 
all of which I am choosing for my own sake.
194
 But, Kraut claims, such an action 
“undermines” itself and is “unintelligible.”195 He thus concludes that it is impossible to 
benefit a friend for their sake for a self-interested reason. 
Now, I do not agree that the sort of action described above is unintelligible. It is 
not evidently self-contradictory, though Kraut is certainly correct that, in certain 
circumstances, it would be impossible for me to act like this. Say that I am not 
independently motivated to choose my friend’s good for its own sake. I may well believe 
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that “benefitting my friend for his own sake” is a great good for myself.196 I may then 
actually benefit my friend in a misguided attempt to “benefit him for his own sake.” 
However, because I have no independent motivation to choose my friend’s good for its 
own sake, I will end up pursuing his good merely as means to my self-beneficial action of 
“benefiting him for his own sake.” I will therefore fail to benefit my friend for his own 
sake.
197
  
On the other hand, if I did have independent motivation to choose my friend’s 
good for its own sake, and I also believed that “benefitting my friend for his own sake” 
was good for myself, then I could conceivably “benefit my friend for his own sake” for 
my own sake. In this case, I would have two separate reasons for acting. One would be 
the good of my friend. The other would be the benefit I receive by virtue of the way that I 
am independently motivated to act towards that good. There is nothing evidently self-
contradictory about that.
198
 
Be that as it may, the case of acting for the sake of another for a self-interested 
reason that I am proposing is not the one that Kraut claims is “unintelligible.” It is not a 
case of me choosing to act with a certain intention because acting with that intention is 
good for me. It is rather the case he overlooks, namely, choosing my friend’s good as 
something that is intrinsically good for myself. I say that in this case I do act for the sake 
of my friend, for to act for the sake of another is to choose their good for its own sake and 
I evidently do that.  
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I consequently reject the inference from “for the sake of another” to “non-self-
interested reason for acting.” It simply does not follow from the very fact that I do 
something for the sake of another that I have a non-self-interested reason for doing it. 
Aristotle’s claims about perfect friendship therefore fail to logically commit him to the 
position that perfect friends have a specifically non-self-interested reason for benefitting 
their friends. 
On the other hand, people do commonly hold apart the actions they do for the 
sake of others and the actions they do for the sake of themselves, and especially in the 
case of friends. It was a popular view among the Ancient Greeks, just as it is still one 
among us, that true friends are unselfishly dedicated to the good of their friends.
199
 Kraut 
and Whiting could then point to this popular belief about friendship in order to support 
their claim that Aristotle believes friends have a non-self-interested reason for benefitting 
their friends.  
But the fact that a view was widely shared in his day does not mean that Aristotle, 
who was a philosopher after all, also shared it. We have to look for ourselves and see 
what he says. We will find that he was aware of this popular view. The supposed 
unselfishness of friendship is apparent in the definition he offers in the Rhetoric: 
Let loving be wishing for someone that which one thinks is good for him, for that 
person’s sake but not for the sake of oneself, as well as being productive of these 
things according to one’s ability. And a friend is one who loves and is loved in 
return. (1380b35-1381a2, my emphasis).
200
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However, the Rhetoric provides definitions and premises for use in popular speeches.
201
 
Aristotle may not therefore have personally accepted all of its premises and definitions. 
We must turn to the more philosophical Nicomachean Ethics for a surer indication of his 
considered views.
202
 
A comparison between the equivalent definitions of friendship in the two works is 
revealing. As we saw earlier, friendship is first defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as 
“goodwill among those who experience it in return while not escaping each other’s 
notice” ([εὔνοιαν ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι] μὴ λανθάνοθσαν, 1155b33-4), while “goodwill” 
(εὔνοια) is “wishing good things for the sake of that person” (βούλεσθαι τἀγαθα ἐκείνου 
ἕνεκα, 1155b31-2). Aristotle thus leaves out the “but not for one’s own sake” (ἀλλὰ μὴ 
αὑτοῦ) or any equivalent phrase. In contrast to the Rhetoric, he refrains from defining 
friendly love as unselfish in the Nicomachean Ethics.
203
 
Aristotle’s further claims about friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics show that 
this omission is significant. Immediately after stating the above definition, he says that 
friends wish good things for one other “on account of” (διά) what we must understand as 
each friend’s own good or pleasure. He states,  
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Then, one should say that friends have goodwill and wish for the good things for 
each other while not escaping each other’s notice, on account of some one of the 
things mentioned before. (1156a3-5, my emphasis).
204
 
 
But “the things mentioned before” are the lovable things (τα φιλητά) that I discussed 
above, namely, each person’s own good or pleasure and what is productive of such. 
Friends therefore wish good things for each other “on account of” (διά) their own good, 
pleasure, or utility, and this sort of wishing evidently fails to be unselfish or “not for the 
sake of oneself” (μὴ ἕνεκα αὑτοῦ).205 
Cooper and Whiting argue to the contrary that διά above refers not to the just 
discussed loveable features of an object, but to the preceding conditions that cause our 
love, just as being dehydrated is a preceding condition that causes us to desire water, but 
is not itself the object of our desire.
206
 They thus understand Aristotle to claim, not that 
we wish for our friends to possess good things as something that is useful, good, or 
pleasant for us, but rather that we wish for our friends to possess good things because of 
the preceding condition that they have been good, useful, or pleasant for us.  
However, their reading is implausible. It is far more natural to read διά as 
referring to the just discussed “responsibility” born by the lovable features (τό φιλητόν) 
of the things we love, namely, being useful, good or pleasant for ourselves. That is, since 
human beings are only capable of loving things that bear (or appear to them to bear) 
certain features—being useful, good or pleasant for themselves—the fact that something 
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bears (or appears to bear) one or more of these features is part of what “explains” our 
love for it. We can therefore say that something is loved “on account of” (διά) one or 
more of these features.
207
  
A further example from the Nicomachean Ethics that contrasts with the popular 
view of friendship presented in the Rhetoric is Aristotle’s claim that a friend will not 
actually wish for his friend to become a god, even though this is the greatest imaginable 
benefit that could befall his friend.
208
 Aristotle’s explanation for why we would not wish 
this great benefit for our friend is that having a friend is a great personal good and there 
can no longer be any friendship between ourselves and a god.
209
 He then concludes,  
[the friend] will wish the greatest goods for [his friend] as a human being (i.e., not 
as a god), but he will perhaps not wish all good things for him, for each person 
most of all wishes the good things for himself. (1159a10-12).
210
  
 
Thus, the friend cares more about the personal good he finds in having a friend than he 
does about the happiness of his friend per se.
211
  
Now, Aristotle’s conclusion that our love for our own good limits the good things 
we will wish for our friends does not logically exclude that friends love each other in a 
selfless way. Perhaps friends selflessly wish good things for their friends when their 
friends possessing these goods does not significantly conflict with their own good. 
Nevertheless, the (alleged) absence of selfless love among friends in cases where the 
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good of the friend would be significantly detrimental to the other does plausibly suggest 
that friends fail to love each other in a selfless way.
212
 
Burnet, Gauthier and Jolif, and Irwin, on the other hand, give a reading of the 
above passage that softens its apparent egoism. They take Aristotle to be saying that a 
friend would not wish one’s friend to become a god because this would deprive the 
apotheosized friend of one’s own friendship, which is an important good.213 However, 
this reading overlooks the fact that the Ancient Greeks considered gods to be perfectly 
blessed beings as well as contradicts Aristotle’s own statements to this effect.214 His point 
is rather that the human friend is worried about himself being deprived of the good of 
friendship.
215
  
Irwin and Gautheir and Jolif also understand Aristotle’s comment that a friend 
will wish the greatest goods for his friend “as a human being” to simply state a 
consequence of his essentialism. Because human beings are essentially such they could 
not actually become gods. To become a god is therefore not the greatest possible good 
that we could wish for a friend.
216
 But Aristotle’s point is rather that a friend will not 
wish what he believes to be the greatest good for his friend if it would mean being 
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deprived of the good of friendship in an uncompensated way. That this “greatest good” 
turns out to be actually impossible is irrelevant.
217
  
Moreover, wishing one’s friend to become a god simply serves as a vivid example 
and is inessential to Aristotle’s general point (note οἷον, “for example,” at 1159a5). 
Hence Aquinas: “He says that from the discussions a doubt arises whether men can wish 
their friends the greatest goods, for example, that they be gods or kings or most virtuous.” 
(Commentary, paragraph 1636, my emphasis).
218
 
Yet another example of how in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle diverges from 
the popular account of friendship in the Rhetoric is his depiction of the motivation of 
friends who choose to die on behalf of their friends. He does grant that a virtuous friend 
will do this,
219
 but only after explicitly denying that virtuous people overlook their own 
good when they act toward their friends: 
It seems to people that the virtuous person, on the other hand, acts on account of 
to kalon, and by as much as he should be better, by this much more he acts on 
account of to kalon, and for the sake of a friend, and he disregards what concerns 
himself (i.e., disregards his own good). But the deeds (or “facts”) do not agree 
with these speeches. (1168a33-b1, my emphasis).
220
  
 
As Aristotle here tells us, it was a popular view in his time that virtuous people act for the 
benefit of others while disregarding their own good, and especially when they act toward 
their friends. However, he declares that the “deeds” (or “facts”) do not agree with this 
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popular “speech.” He therefore denies that virtuous people act in a self-disregarding way, 
even when they act towards their friends.
221
 
Then, in accord with this denial, Aristotle goes on to explain the apparent 
sacrifices that virtuous friends make not by appealing to selfless love, but rather by 
claiming that virtuous friends choose kala deeds, such as dying on behalf of their friends, 
on the grounds that these deeds constitute great personal goods: 
Every intellect chooses what is best for itself, and the virtuous person obeys his 
intellect. And it is true that it belongs to the virtuous person to also do many 
things for the sake of his friends and his fatherland, and even if it should be 
necessary, to die on their behalf, for he will give away money and honors and on 
the whole the goods that are fought over, while securing for himself what is kalon. 
For he would choose to enjoy intense pleasure for a little time rather than slight 
pleasure for a long time, and to live nobly for a year than to live in whatever 
chance way for many years, and one great and kalon deed rather than many small 
ones. And perhaps this is what occurs for those who die for others. They choose a 
great and kalon thing for themselves, and they will give away money in order that 
his friends will get more, for there will be money for his friends, but for himself, 
what is kalon, and he distributes the greater good to himself. (1169a17-29, my 
emphasis).
222
 
 
As we saw, Aristotle denies that virtuous friends overlook their good when they act 
toward their friends. Then, in the above passage, he “reinterprets” the apparently self-
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sacrificial action of virtuous friends in terms of self-regarding motivation.
223
 The 
intention of these two passages is quite clear. Apparent examples of disregarding one’s 
own good for one’s friends (or country) are merely that. 
Julia Annas, followed by Michael Pakaluk, argues to the contrary that, although 
Aristotle says that the virtuous person who dies for his friend is “securing for himself 
what is kalon” and “assigning himself the greater good” and “choosing to enjoy intense 
pleasures,” he does not actually think any of this is the intention of the virtuous person 
when he acts.
224
 Rather, the virtuous person aims exclusively at the good of his friend and 
chooses ‘what is best, most kalon, and most pleasurable for himself’ in a merely 
incidental way. 
But this really cannot stand as a plausible reading of the text. The fact that 
Aristotle consistently and explicitly describes what would otherwise appear to be self-
disregarding actions in explicitly self-regarding terms clearly suggests the attribution of 
self-regarding intentions.
225
 Moreover, these descriptions occur in the immediate context 
of (a) Aristotle’s flat out denial that virtuous people overlook their own good when they 
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282, bottom paragraph; John Tutuska, “Aristotle on the Noble and the Good,” 168-9. 
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act for their friends (see above); (b) his attempt to show that the virtuous person is a 
φίλαυτος (“self-lover”) or that he loves himself most of all;226 and (c) his claim that every 
intellect chooses what is best for itself.
227
 
Additionally, Annas is motivated to this reading by the mistaken assumption that 
acting for another’s sake logically precludes acting for one’s own sake.228 Pakaluk, on the 
other hand, is motivated by the claim that: 
Although it might seem that love and friendship require a kind of forgetfulness of 
oneself, and a full attention to another’s needs, Aristotle would apparently have an 
agent dwell on how much better off he is than are his friends, precisely while he 
does good things for his friends. (Books VIII and IX, 200). 
 
However, this is a condition for love and friendship that Pakaluk himself supplies, not 
Aristotle. But even if he did accept it, it does not follow that he thinks human beings 
actually succeed in living up to it, at least with respect to others.
229
 Furthermore, 
Pakaluk’s proposed solution that the virtuous person “foresees” but does not “aim at” the 
personal good of a kalon action is implausible. If the virtuous friend foresees that his 
kalon action will constitute a great good for himself, how can he not want that good?
230
 
In conclusion, there is strong evidence that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
rejects the popular view that friends are selflessly dedicated to the good of their 
friends.
231
 This evidence speaks strongly against the claim, essential to the most common 
version of the challenge from his account of friendship, that he thinks the good of a friend 
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constitutes a non-self-interested reason for acting. It instead points to the conclusion, 
which I explore in Chapter Three, that he thinks actual human friendships are best 
explained in terms of self-interested motivation. 
However, as I have mentioned, Kraut’s version of this challenge appeals to 
evidence beyond Aristotle’s discussion of friendship. To what degree his version can 
stand up to the contrary evidence I have offered depends upon the strength and cogency 
of this evidence. It is to this consideration that I will now turn.  
iv. Kraut’s additional evidence 
l will here address the additional evidence that Kraut offers to justify his conclusion that 
Aristotle believes human beings are capable of acting in disregard of their own happiness. 
I will focus on what I believe Kraut takes to be his most decisive evidence, namely, 
Aristotle’s treatment of ostracism and the sharing of power in the Politics.232  Kraut 
understands Aristotle to hold that it is just for equals in virtue to share ruling offices.
233
 
He then concludes that Aristotle believes a virtuous person should surrender political 
power whenever equal or just sharing demands it, even if they could successfully hold 
onto it: 
Since it is better for each to have longer rather than shorter periods of ruling 
activity, why should anyone leave office and let others make major decisions in 
his place? One answer Aristotle can give is this: the other citizens in this 
community will not allow one to have more than an equal share of high office. If 
one tries to prolong one’s hold on these offices beyond the allotted time, one will 
be severely punished, and the likely result is that one will end up with less 
political power rather than more. 
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But it would be a serious mistake to think that this appeal to maximal self-interest 
is the only argument Aristotle has for cooperating in a scheme of equal political 
power. For he would say, in addition, that you should give up your office to others 
because they are as worthy of it as you are. Since they are your equals, they have 
as much claim to political power as you do, and if you tried to prolong your stay 
in office, you would be unfairly depriving them of something of great value in 
their lives. (Human Good, 100-101).  
 
But, according to Kraut, the life of moral virtue is the best life available to a human being 
who is incapable of theoretical activity. We can then imagine “a community of equally 
capable citizens who rightly take the political life to be the best they can achieve: none 
can develop the theoretical virtues, and so they devote their full energies to exercising the 
practical excellences” (Human Good, 99).  
We can also imagine that there is a member of this community who uses his 
political authority to perform great acts of moral virtue.
234
 But when this person has used 
up his equal allotment of political authority, Kraut believes Aristotle would say that they 
should willingly give up their power even if by doing so they are choosing a worse life 
for himself when they could choose a better one:  
And so, for reasons I have just given, Aristotle cannot be read as an egoist. He 
holds that since one must share power equally with equals, one must give up high 
office to others whether or not doing so maximizes one’s interest. Of course, in 
a way it is contrary to one’s greatest good to give up office; for great power gives 
one the opportunity to engage in the greatest acts of ethical virtue. (Human Good, 
101, my bold). 
 
Kraut then concludes that, since Aristotle believes human beings should sometimes 
(knowingly) choose a worse life for themselves, he also believes they are psychologically 
capable of doing so.
235
 Aristotle must then deny that human beings necessarily do 
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everything for the sake of their own happiness, for otherwise, we would never choose a 
worse life for ourselves when we knew we could choose a better one.  
However, Kraut’s argument is open to the following objection. Those who would 
choose to stay in power for the sake of performing great acts of moral virtue would 
unjustly deprive others of their share of ruling and so would corrupt their own virtuous 
activity.
236
 If, with Kraut, we assume that morally virtuous activity constitutes the best 
life for those who are incapable of theoretical activity, it would actually be better for such 
people to relinquish political authority rather than to grasp onto it at the price of continual 
injustice.  
Surprisingly, Kraut himself mentions this possibility in a footnote, but he does not 
connect it to an objection against his main argument: 
In Pol. VII.3 1325a34-b7, Aristotle considers a case in which seeking more than 
one’s fair share of political power is contrary to one’s interests. He discusses the 
view of a hypothetical person who favors a political life, and who holds that one 
should keep all others—including one’s equals—from office, thus reserving the 
finest acts of virtue for oneself. Aristotle replies that such a policy would be best 
for oneself only if one assumed that “the most choiceworthy of existing things 
will belong to those who use robbery and force.” (1325b1-2). But he denies the 
assumption, and insists that the person who used these methods to deprive others 
of political power would depart so much from virtue that no later acts would set 
right what he had done. The passage does not claim that continuous officeholding 
is wrong in all circumstances; for Aristotle holds that if one is superior to all other 
in virtue, then one should be king, and others should accept their subordination. 
Here he is saying that when one forces one’s equals into a position of political 
inferiority, one is acting contrary to virtue, and one will not in fact succeed in 
achieving the best good for oneself. The best good (apart from contemplation, as 
we learn in NE X.7-8) is to engage in ethically virtuous activity, and someone who 
forcibly keeps others from political office is so distant from this goal that he will 
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never make up for this deviation by anything he does with his power. I take 
Aristotle to be saying that this power-grabbing ruler will not be able to exercise 
the virtues, and so will not really be promoting his own good (let along the good 
of the others). He will not be able to exercise the virtues because doing so requires 
the willing cooperation of others. So the project of seeking permanent power in 
order to exercise the virtues can undermine itself, when others resist. (Kraut, 
Human Good, 100, note 31, my emphasis).  
 
However, as we have seen (second above passage), Kraut elsewhere describes the choice 
of justly abdicating power when one could otherwise hold onto it as contrary to one’s 
own interest. To give another example, when discussing the fate of those who are “justly” 
ostracized by their cities because their presence prevents the just sharing of power,
237
 
Kraut says that had such a person not been physically voted into ostracism, even though it 
would have been just for the city to do so, they would have been able to maintain their 
power and successfully exercise moral virtue: 
When ostracism is just, its victim is obeying a just command in leaving the polis. 
In this sense he is acting justly. Furthermore, if he has the virtue of justice, then in 
leaving the polis he is exercising that virtue. And if it is always good, from the 
agent’s point of view, to exercise an ethical virtue, then leaving the city is not 
entirely bad. But it should not be inferred that his ostracism was after all the best 
thing that could have happened to him. Had he not received so many votes, the 
community would have allowed him to stay and retain his full power, and this 
would have been the better outcome from his point of view. Even if each virtuous 
activity is desirable to some extent, not all such activities are equally desirable. 
The major political activities that the ostracized citizen would have been able to 
undertake had he remained are more valuable from his point of view that the just 
act of obediently leaving the city. (Kraut, Human Good, 95, note 22, my 
emphasis).  
 
Thus, Kraut does not consistently describe the condition of avoiding a “just” ostracism as 
one of maintaining power and attempting virtuous deeds only by means of unjustly 
depriving others. Put in these terms, and assuming that the life of moral virtue is the 
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second best life, it is not difficult to argue that it is better for those who have power to 
justly relinquish it rather than to unjustly grasp onto it. That way, they both avoid 
continual acts of injustice in the present and preserve the possibility of performing less 
corrupted acts of virtue in the future. For this reason, Kraut fails to make a persuasive 
case that Aristotle’s account of ostracism and the sharing of power in the Politics is 
evidence that he believes human beings can act in knowing disregard of their own 
happiness.  
v. The third difficulty 
I will now address the third and final difficulty I have mentioned. Kraut clearly, and I 
think Whiting also, understands Aristotle to believe that we sometimes decide to pursue 
our own happiness, while at other times, we decide to pursue someone else’s happiness at 
the expense of our own. When discussing an example involving a philosopher and his ill 
father, Kraut says, 
On my interpretation, Aristotle is not committed to saying that the son must refuse 
to help his [ill] father. Although he thinks that perfect happiness consists entirely 
in contemplation, he is not claiming that this is a good that one must maximize. 
How then should the son make his decision? Again, Aristotle would say that there 
is no formula. Presumably, he would agree that such factors as these should be 
taken into consideration: How serious is the father’s illness? How much good can 
the son do? How much does the father want the son’s care? How much time 
would it require? Are there others who would be willing and better able to help? 
Has he been a good father and is he a good man? Is the amount of care that would 
be needed beyond what is normally expected of children? If these questions are 
answered in a certain way, then Aristotle would say that the son must help his 
father, despite the fact that as a result his life is less desirable than it would 
otherwise have been. In this case, it is not just the father who has suffered a 
misfortune; the son suffers a loss too, since he must give up the best activity, to 
some extent. (Kraut, Human Good, 11, my emphasis).
238
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Kraut thus holds that, on Aristotle’s view, we sometimes decide to pursue the happiness 
of others at the expense of our own. However, according to Aristotle’s account of 
deliberation, all deliberation and choice takes place with regard to some guiding goal that 
is not itself an object of deliberation or choice: 
We deliberate not about the ends, but about the things in relation to the ends. For 
a doctor does not deliberate if he will heal, and neither the orator if he will 
persuade, and neither the statesman if he will produce the condition of having 
good laws, and neither any of the remaining about the end, but having set down 
the end, they consider how and through what it will come into being. (1112b11-
16).
239
   
 
As we have seen, Kraut takes Aristotle to believe that we sometimes deliberate and make 
a choice about whether to pursue our own happiness or rather someone else’s. But, 
according to the above passage, there is necessarily some goal that guides this 
deliberation. What is this goal? Kraut himself is reluctant to say.
240
 Let us simply assume 
that there is some goal, as Aristotle’s account requires. This goal, whatever it is, is the 
goal that the son in Kraut’s example appeals to when he deliberates and makes a choice 
about whether to pursue his or his father’s happiness.  
However, this goal cannot be identical to either the son’s or the father’s 
happiness. If it were identical to either one, the son would not actually deliberate about 
whether to pursue his or instead his father’s happiness. He would rather deliberate about 
the way to secure either his or his father’s happiness as an already set end. There is 
therefore at least one goal that the son does not pursue for the sake of his, his father’s, or 
plausibly anyone else’s happiness, for he deliberates about and decides whose happiness 
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he is to pursue for the sake of achieving this very goal. But then, Aristotle’s claim that 
everyone does “everything else” for the sake of happiness, even “someone or other’s 
happiness,” will be false.241  
In truth, I suspect that Kraut has something quite plausible in mind as the goal that 
guides the son’s deliberation. The goal I would offer on his behalf is “the most 
choiceworthy,” understood (a) de dicto and (b) potentially distinct from any given 
person’s happiness. If the son decides to sacrifice his own happiness for the sake of his 
father’s, it is because he believes that making this sacrifice will secure what is most 
choiceworthy given the circumstances. But if the son’s deliberations about whose 
happiness he is to pursue are guided by the goal of “the most choiceworthy,” as 
understood above, then it is rather this goal, and not any particular person’s happiness, 
that would more properly be the ultimate end of the son’s actions. 
“The most choiceworthy,” as understood above, may be the true end of human 
action, but I do not think that this is Aristotle’s view. Kraut has in effect replaced 
happiness with a different explanatory starting point—one that I suspect he believes is 
more correct than the one that Aristotle actually proposes. As far as I can tell, he falls into 
this difficulty because he has not considered the consequence that if we deliberate about 
whether to pursue our happiness or rather someone else’s, then, at least according to 
Aristotle, we must be making this deliberation in pursuit of some further goal that cannot 
be identical to either our own or the other’s happiness. 
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c. The Challenge from To Kalon 
i. The popular understanding of kala actions 
The second challenge to the interpretation of Aristotle’s explanatory starting point as 
one’s own happiness takes its bearing from his account of virtuous action. According to 
that account, virtuous action is done “for the sake of to kalon” (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), i.e., it 
is done with the motivation or intention of doing what is kalon, “for this (sc. to kalon) is 
the end of virtue (τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς, 1115b12-13). However, kala actions—that 
is, “deeds” or “chosen actions” (πράξεις)—were popularly identified with those that were 
done with a view to benefitting others but not oneself. This can be grasped from 
Aristotle’s popular description of kala actions in the Rhetoric: 
And as many things are kala as, being among the things chosen, someone does 
them not for the sake of himself; and the things that are good generally, and also 
as many things as someone does on behalf of his fatherland while disregarding 
what concerns himself (i.e., his own good); and the things that are good by nature; 
and the things which are not good for oneself, for one does the things that are of 
this sort (i.e., good for oneself) for the sake of oneself; and as many things as can 
belong to someone who has died rather than to someone who lives, for the things 
that belong to the one who is living have more of the “for the sake of oneself”; 
and as many actions as are for the sake of others, for they are less for the sake of 
oneself; and as many things [i.e., actions] as are concerning others but not 
concerning oneself, and as many as concern those who have provided a benefit, 
for it is just; and benefactions conferred, for they are not toward oneself. 
(1366b36-1367a6).
242
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Selfless benefaction runs as a common thread through this popular description of kala 
actions. We can therefore conclude that, in at least the popular understanding, kala 
actions were unselfish actions that benefitted others.
243
 
Gabriel Richardson Lear, on the other hand, argues that the Rhetoric does not 
describe kala actions as “altruistic,” but “for the sake of fame and honor,” though she 
does concede that the “fine” person “does not seek his own profit.”244 Does Lear mean 
that Aristotle depicts kala actions as the disinterested pursuit of one’s own honor and 
fame? Does she then mean that one’s own honor and fame are pursued as things that are 
choiceworthy but not good for oneself.
245
 And that because a fine person does not benefit 
others for their own sake, but for the sake of his own honor and fame, which he 
apparently does not take to be good for himself, his actions “do not seek his own profit” 
but still fail to be “altruistic”?  
If this is what she means, then she is straightforwardly contradicted by the text.
246
 
Lear is correct that at one place Aristotle indicates a connection between kalon and what 
brings oneself a good reputation (specifically, 1367a16-17), but she is incorrect that in 
this passage he explicitly depicts a good reputation for oneself as the goal of all kala 
actions.
247
 1390a1-3 is a more promising example, but it must be kept in mind that the 
Rhetoric is not an ethical treatise, but a collection of popularly acceptable ethical 
premises. We should therefore not assume that every popular view harmonizes with 
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every other (or even with Aristotle’s own views). Each premise, or related group of 
premises, stands on its own as a strand of popular opinion. 
ii. The challenge as given by Irwin 
We have seen that kala actions were popularly understood to be selfless. Does Aristotle 
employ this understanding in the Nicomachean Ethics? Terence Irwin argues that he 
does: 
We can fix the property that Aristotle refers to in speaking of the kalon. If “kalon” 
in this context refers only to action embodying the correct rational order, the 
claim that rational self-love pursues the kalon does not help to answer the charge 
of selfishness; for we need some further argument to show that concern for the 
correct rational order will require unselfish action. Aristotle assumes, however, if 
rational self-lovers pursue the kalon, they act unselfishly for the good of others. 
(“Beauty and Morality in Aristotle,” 251, my emphasis). 
 
Even though that work [the Rhetoric] does not fix Aristotle’s view, it describes 
views that he might regard as familiar. If he regards the connection between the 
kalon and unselfishness as familiar, he may reasonably rely on it without a full 
explication. 
 
The appeal to impartiality and unselfishness is intended to express what the 
Rhetoric and the Ethics have in common. (ibid., 252, my emphasis). 
 
Irwin claims that Aristotle maintains the popular understanding of kala actions in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. However, as we have seen, Aristotle understands virtuous actions 
as kalon (and for the sake of to kalon). Therefore, if Irwin is correct, Aristotle must deny 
that virtuous people act for the sake of their own happiness.
248
 Otherwise, their actions 
                                                 
248
 Jenneifer Whiting comes to a similar conclusion in “Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing 
Virtuous Actions for Themselves,” though not from a consideration of to kalon, which she does not 
extensively discuss; see 281, first paragraph. She argues that the requirement of choosing virtuous actions 
for their own sake is incompatible with intentionally choosing them for the sake of one’s own happiness 
(281-6) . I do not see why, however. There is nothing absurd about “mixed” motivation or choosing 
something both for its own sake and for the sake of something else; see 1097a30-1097b5; Republic 357b4-
c4; Kraut, “Comments” 22.  
86 
 
would not be “not for the sake of oneself” and so would not be kalon according to the 
popular understanding. 
Irwin supports his claim that Aristotle maintains the popular understanding of 
kala actions from the Rhetoric with the observation that the contrast between συμφέρoν 
and καλόν that appears there also appears in the Nicomachean Ethics: 
The contrast between the kalon and the expedient [συμφέρον] is present in the 
Ethics no less than in the Rhetoric (1125a11-12, 1168a9-12, 1163a3-6; Pol. 
1338a30-32). Most people are ready to wish for what is kalon, but tend to decide 
to do what is expedient; and whereas it is kalon to benefit another without 
expecting a return, it is expedient to receive a benefit (1162b35-1163a1). If the 
kalon were simply whatever we want for its own sake, it would be trivial to claim 
that we wish for what is kalon; for wish (boulēsis) is essentially wanting 
something for its own sake. But Aristotle’s claim that we wish for kalon things for 
their own sake is not meant to be trivial. It means that our generous impulses 
towards unselfish ends are not translated into decisions that result in unselfish 
actions. Since he expresses this point through a contrast between the kalon and the 
expedient, he takes concern for the kalon to be impartial concern. (Irwin, “Beauty 
and Morality,” 250).  
 
Irwin here takes συμφέρον to mean “expedient” or “advantageous”—that is, what 
contributes towards one’s happiness. Thus, both merely useful goods and intrinsic goods 
can be “advantageous” since they can both contribute, the one indirectly, the other 
directly, to our happiness. If kala actions are actions that are done with a view to 
benefitting others but not oneself, it is reasonable that they are not always advantageous 
for oneself. Indeed, we saw above that Aristotle explicitly says in the Rhetoric that 
actions that are not good for oneself are kalon because one is not motivated to do such 
actions for one’s own sake.249 Therefore, if, as Irwin claims, Aristotle implies in the 
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Nicomachean Ethics that kala actions are generally not advantageous for oneself, there is 
good evidence that he is employing the popular understanding of these actions. 
 Irwin does offer an additional argument for this conclusion that draws on IX.8,
250
 
but it is based on an insufficient appreciation of the meaning of φίλαυτος (“self-lover”). It 
is correctly criticized by Crisp,
251
 and I will not focus on it. The problem is that Irwin 
takes φιλαυτία (“being a self-lover”) to mean “having self-love” rather than “loving 
oneself most of all.”252 He then interprets Aristotle’s distinction between blameworthy 
and not blameworthy φιλαυτία as one between “selfish” and “unselfish” self-love.253 
However, Aristotle is actually distinguishing between a blameworthy way of loving 
oneself more than others and a not blameworthy way of doing so. In effect, 
“blameworthy selfishness” and “not-blameworthy selfishness.” If this sounds 
paradoxical, so much the better. That is exactly how Aristotle’s distinction sounded to 
most Greeks.
254
 
iii. The meaning of συμφέρον; Crisp’s criticism of Irwin 
We saw above that Irwin takes συμφέρον to mean “advantageous.” He consequently 
understands any contrast between what is kalon and συμφέρον as one between what is 
kalon and what is (personally) advantageous. However, Irwin’s understanding of 
συμφέρον as “advantageous” is disputed by Roger Crisp, who contends that συμφέρον 
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rather means “(instrumentally) useful.”255 He then claims, against Irwin, that Aristotle 
contrasts kalon with συμφέρον without implying that kala actions are not advantageous 
for those who do them:  
As I have already suggested, however, the contrast between the noble [το καλόν] 
and the expedient [το συμφέρον] can be seen as one between one class of 
happiness-constituting or happiness-related goods and another. (Crisp, “Nobility,” 
239). 
 
However, upholding this translation of συμφέρον leads Crisp into the following 
difficulty. At 1104b30-31, Aristotle names what is kalon, συμφέρον, and pleasurable as 
the three possible grounds of choice: “For the things in relation to choices and the things 
in relation to acts of avoidance are three, [for choice:] kalon, sumpheron, and 
pleasurable.” 256 But if συμφέρον means “instrumentally useful,” then, unlike 
“advantageous,” intrinsic goods do not fall under its heading.257 They are then excluded 
from being a ground of choice. But this is absurd. We clearly do choose some things as 
intrinsic goods.
258
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 See Crisp, “Nobility,” 233-4. This is also the view of Heliodorus (Paraphrasis, 198, lines 32-36), 
Michael of Ephesus (Commentaria, 494, line 34- 495, line 2), Peter Martyr Vermigli (Commentary, 312), 
Burnet (The Ethics, 85, note 7), Joachim (comment on 1168a9-27, note that he writes χρήσιμον, “useful,” 
for Aristotle’s συμφέρον), Gauthier and Jolif (comment on 1104b31-2, note that they translate συμφέρον by 
“l’utile,” “useful”), and Broadie (comment on 1168a11-12, note “the useful”), though her comment on 
1104b31 actually implies that συμφέρον includes the good and not merely the useful. She claims there that, 
according to Aristotle, happiness is συμφέρον, kalon, and pleasant, but this can only be true if συμφέρον 
means “advantageous” and not “instrumentally useful,” for happiness, being “simply complete” (ἁπλῶς 
τέλειον), is never chosen for the sake of anything else (1097a33-b6). It is therefore not instrumentally 
useful.  
256
 τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος. 
257
 See 1155b19-21. 
258
 See 1097b2-4. 
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Crisp can be said to respond to this difficulty in the following way:
259
 “we should 
understand 1104b31 to be referring to the καλόν in its broadest sense, equivalent to the 
ἀγαθόν or τἀγαθά.” (Crisp, “Nobility, 234). He claims that in the passage about the 
grounds of choice kalon actually means “good” (ἀγαθόν). Intrinsic goods would then be 
included in the list of grounds of choice under the label of kalon. 
In support of his claim that in the list of the objects of choice kalon means “good” 
(ἀγαθόν) and συμφέρον means “useful,” Crisp cites the later list of lovable objects (το 
φιλητόν) at 1155b18-21. 260  As we saw, this list mentions ἀγαθόν (“good”), ἡδύ 
(“pleasant”), and χρήσιμον (“useful”), but not kalon. He assumes that the list of the 
grounds of choice and the later list of the lovable objects are identical. This would make 
kalon and συμφέρον in list of the objects of choice equivalent to ἀγαθόν and χρήσιμον in 
the list of lovable objects.  
However, that these lists are identical is not obvious. I would say, to the contrary, 
that they are interestingly different. Aristotle is not being careless with his language. He 
is rather indicating in the later list that to kalon, as an object of pursuit, must ultimately 
be subsumed under the pleasant, good or useful.
261
 The first list is, as it were, from a 
point further back. It leaves open the possibility that to kalon is an object of choice 
independent of the personally good or pleasant, as it was popularly thought to be.
262
 The 
                                                 
259
 I am unsure if Crisp recognizes, and is attempting to respond to, this particular difficulty. Either way, 
what he says here can be treated as a response. 
260
 See Crisp, ibid. 
261
 On this point, see Pangle, Philosophy of Friendship, 37; compare 1168b28-30, 1169a16-b29. 
262
 See 1168a33-5, note “because of to kalon,” and compare Rhetoric 1359a1-5. On this point, see Cooper, 
“Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value,” 265, bottom paragraph. 
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first list therefore stands closer to popular opinion, while the second represents a 
philosophical correction of it. 
Crisp is similarly compelled to read kalon as “good” (ἀγαθόν) in the list of the 
grounds for being “choiceworthy” or “choosable” (αἱρετὸν) in the Topics.263 However, 
this list is actually prima facie evidence that συμφέρον means “advantageous,” and not 
“instrumentally useful.”264 When he introduces this list for the second time, Aristotle 
says, 
Yet it remains to distinguish how many ways ‘the choiceworthy’ is said and for 
the sake of what, namely, τὸ συμφέρον or to kalon or the pleasant. For that which 
is useful with a view to all of these things or most of them would be more 
choiceworthy than that that which was not similarly useful. (1118b27-30, my 
emphasis).
265
 
 
Since this list doesn’t mentioned “good” (ἀγαθόν) and since Crisp limits τὸ συμφέρον to 
the useful and since intrinsic goods are obviously choiceworthy or choosable as such, he 
must again say that kalon here means “good” (ἀγαθόν). However, this passage actually 
implies that the things in this list, including τὸ συμφέρον, are choiceworthy as ends 
(τίνων χάριν) and stand in contrast to what is instrumentally useful (χρήσιμον) in relation 
to them.  
To then mitigate this point, Crisp introduces a distinction between “non-ultimate 
ends that are desirable not in themselves but only in so far as they further ultimate ends—
here, the καλόν (i.e., τἀγαθά) and the pleasant” (“Nobility,” 234, note 9). He thus wishes 
to assign τὸ συμφέρον to the class of “non-ultimate ends” and to kalon (which he must 
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 See 1105a27-8, 118b27-8; “Nobility,” 234, note 9. 
264
 As is argued by Cooper (ibid.). 
265
 Ἔτι διελέσθαι ποσαχῶς τὸ αἱρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν, οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ 
ἡδέος· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἢ πρὸς τὰ πλείω χρήσιμον αἱρετώτερον ἂν ὑπάρχοι τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίως. 
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claim means ἀγαθόν or “good”) and the pleasant to that of “ultimate ends.” This 
distinction among ends is not impossible for Aristotle. Although in the Eudemian Ethics 
Aristotle clearly restricts “end” (τέλος) to what is chosen on account of itself, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics he allows that not all “ends” are chosen on account of themselves or 
“complete.”266 However, it would be awkward to read συμφέρον as “non-ultimate useful 
end” in the Topics passage, since Aristotle contrasts the grounds of what is choiceworthy, 
including τὸ συμφέρον, with what is “useful” (χρήσιμον) in relation to them, while, on 
Crisp’s reading τὸ συμφέρον would essentially be something that is useful in relation to 
to kalon and the pleasant.  
However, even if συμφέρον meant “non-ultimate useful end” in the Topics list, it 
would have to have yet another meaning in the Nicomachean list. Recall that on Crisp’s 
reading the Nicomachean list of the grounds of choice is identical to the later list of 
lovable objects. This list has ἀγαθόν (“good”), ἡδύ (“pleasant”), and χρήσιμον (“useful”). 
Ἡδύ occurs in both lists. Crisp then matches kalon with ἀγαθόν and συμφέρον with 
χρήσιμον. But in the Topics passage, he had to claim that συμφέρον means “useful non-
ultimate end” in contrast to χρήσιμον (useful in the general sense). We would then have 
two lists—one in the Topics, the other in the Nicomachean Ethics—with identical 
words—καλόν, συμφέρον, ἡδύ—that we, nevertheless, have to read as having different 
senses. This is a very artificial result.  
In sum, I do not believe that Crisp is correct that συμφέρον means either “useful” 
or “useful non-ultimate end” or that kalon has the “broad sense” of “good” (ἀγαθόν) and 
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 Compare Eudemian Ethics 1248b18-19 with Nicomachean Ethics 1094a14-16, 1097a25-8. 
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its antonym, αἰσχρόν (usually rendered as “shameful” or “disgraceful” in ethical 
contexts), has the broad sense of “personal evil” (κακόν). It would have to have this sense 
on his reading because Aristotle opposes three “objects of avoidance” (τῶν εἱς τὰς φυγάς, 
1104b31-2) to the three of objects of choice, namely, αἰσχρόν (opposed to καλόν), 
βλαβερόν (“harmful,” opposed to συμφέρον), and λυπήρον (“painful,” opposed to ἡδύ, 
“pleasant”).267  
It is true that in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle locates to kalon within the class of 
intrinsic goods: 
The good (tὸ ἀγαθόν) and to kalon are different not only according to name but 
also according to themselves. For, of all good things, as many are ends as are 
chosen (or “choosable”) on account of themselves. And as many of these are kala 
as all those that, existing on account of themselves,
268
 are praised (or “praisable”). 
For these things are those things the deeds from which are praised and are also 
themselves praised: justice, both itself and its deeds, and moderation. But health is 
not praised, for neither is its work. And neither to act with strength, for neither is 
strength praised. But these things are good, but they are not praised. (Eudemian 
Ethics 1248b16-25).
269
 
 
But kalon is here merely one kind of intrinsic good. It thus looks like Crisp is imposing 
the meaning of ἀγαθόν onto kalon, perhaps in order to circumvent the difficulty caused 
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 Note that this provides more evidence that συμφέρον does not mean “instrumentally useful,” since 
βλαβερόν clearly means “harmful” rather than “useless” (ἄχρηστος).  
268
 Sc. “when they are chosen on account of themselves;” compare Eudemian Ethics 1249a1-3, 5-11, 12-16. 
This is the often missed meaning of the first definition of kalon in the Rhetoric: “kalon is that which, when 
being chosen on account of itself, is praised (or “praisable,” καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν 
ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, Rhetoric 1366a34-5). That kala actions depend on intention, as this definition suggests, is 
made clear in the Politics (1333a6-11). Most commentators read the participle as having a merely 
conjunctional meaning, i.e., as fully replaceable by καί (“and,” see Cooper, “Moral Value,” 271, bottom 
paragraph, for a representative example) as opposed to the more robust circumstantial meaning I propose 
(on the circumstantial participle, see Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar, 260). 
269
 ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ ἔχοντα 
διαφοράν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ἕνεκά ἐστιν αἱρετά. τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα 
δι’αὑτὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἀφ’ ὧν αἵ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ 
ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις, καὶ οἱ σώφρονες· ἐπαινετὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη. ἀλλ’ οὐχ 
ὑγίεια ἐπαινετόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον· οὐδὲ τὸ ἰσχυρῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰσχύς. ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὰ μέν, ἐπαινετὰ δ’ οὔ. 
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by his translation of συμφέρον. Though perhaps he does not intend that kalon literally 
means ἀγαθόν. Perhaps he is suggesting that Aristotle uses kalon to represent the more 
general class of ἀγαθά. He says kalon, but he indicates ἀγαθόν to us instead. But this 
suggestion is open to the objection that Aristotle says precisely what he means. He says 
kalon because kalon, and not ἀγαθόν, is exactly what he intends us to understand.270  
The better solution to the apparent absence of intrinsic goods from Aristotle’s list 
of objects of choice is to reject Crisp’s translation of συμφέρον. Because he narrows and 
limits its meaning to “instrumentally useful,” he excludes intrinsic goods from appearing 
under its heading. And because intrinsic goods are not included under the common 
meanings of the two other words, he is compelled to say that Aristotle means something 
other than the normal meaning of kalon in an ethical context when he says kalon. But if 
we instead allow συμφέρον to mean “advantageous,” intrinsic goods would by definition 
fall under its heading. The problem of the excluded class of intrinsic goods then 
disappears. 
Miles Burnyeat also reads συμφέρον (and not kalon) in the list of objects of 
choice as referring to “good” things.271 In support of this reading, he cites 1140a25-8 and 
1141b4-8. However, the first reference speaks of “the things that are good for oneself and 
sumpheron” (τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα). It therefore leaves open the possibility 
that τὰ συμφέροντα and τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ are non-identical classes that Aristotle is 
conjoining, i.e., “the things that are good for oneself and the things that are useful.” The 
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 It is important to note that kalon was popularly thought to be an object of choice independent of the 
good; see note 262. 
271
 See “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” 86, bottom paragraph and 91, note 27. 
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second citation, however, is reasonably read as identifying τὰ συμφέροντα with “the 
human goods,” i.e., “they do not investigate the human goods” (οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ 
ζητοῦσιν) is epexegetical of “they are ignorant of the things that are sumpheron to 
themselves” (ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς). 
However, it is possible that Crisp thinks his limitation of the meaning of 
συμφέρον is necessary because of the following passage in Aristotle’s Rhetoric:  
Since the sumpheron lies before the one who gives council as a target, for people 
do not deliberate about the end, but about the things in relation to the end, and 
these things are what is sumpheron according to actions, and the sumpheron is 
good, it would be the case that one must grasp the elements concerning good and 
sumpheron simply. (1362a17-21).
272
 
 
Crisp quotes W. R. Roberts’ translation of this passage in which τὸ τέλος is rendered as 
“ends,” that is ‘any end.’273 So translated, this passage does imply that τὰ συμφέροντα are 
instrumentally useful things. But I do not think that this translation is correct. Τὸ τέλος 
does not here mean “any end” but rather “the end,” namely, happiness.274 
Aristotle earlier in the Rhetoric declares happiness to be the end or “target” 
(σκοπός) of both exhortation and choice:  
Let us speak again about the things from which, both concerning these things and 
other things, one must exhort and discourage. For nearly each person alone and all 
in common there is a certain target at which they aim when they both choose and 
avoid.
275
 And this is, to say in sum, happiness and its parts. For the sake of a 
model, let us grasp what, speaking generally, happiness is, and also what things 
its parts are from. For all exhortations and acts of discouragement are about this 
(i.e., happiness) and the things that lead towards it as well as the things that are 
contrary to it. For, the things that provide this (i.e., happiness) or are some one of 
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 ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ 
περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν), ληπτέον 
ἂν εἴη τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς.  
273
 See Crisp, “Nobility,” 235, note 9. 
274
 This is also the view of Grimaldi (comment on 62a15). 
275
 Compare Rhetoric 1362b10-12 
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its parts or make it greater rather than less, one should do, but the things that 
destroy it or impede it or produce things contrary to it, one should not do. 
(1360b1-13, my emphasis).
276
 
 
Given that “nearly” everyone chooses and avoids things with a view to happiness, it is 
well worthy of the designation “the end” (τὸ τέλος).  
Furthermore, Aristotle tells us in the Rhetoric that “exhortation” (προτροπή) and 
“discouragement” (ἀποτροπή) are the two exclusive parts of deliberation or council-
giving (συμβουλή):  
But one part of giving council (or “deliberating”) is exhortation, the other is 
discouragement. For always those who are both giving council in private and 
making a public speech in common do one or the other of these things. (1358b8-
10).
277
  
 
But, in the previous passage, Aristotle is clear that both exhortation and discouragement 
ultimately take place in reference to happiness. Therefore, council-giving or deliberation 
(συμβουλή) must do so as well.278 And if council-giving or deliberation ultimately take 
place in reference to happiness, then it is natural to understand his earlier claim that those 
who are giving council or deliberating do not deliberate about τὸ τέλος as referring not to 
“ends” but rather “the end” of council-giving or deliberation, namely, happiness. 
That τὸ τέλος in the first passage means “the end,” which is happiness, and not 
“ends,” is also suggested by the context of this passage. It follows a long description of 
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 ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν λέγωμεν πάλιν. Σχεδὸν δὲ 
καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός τις ἔστιν οὗ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ’ 
ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἥ τ’ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς· ὥστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν 
ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην 
συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἵ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαί εἰσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ἢ μεῖζον ἀντ’ ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα 
ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν.  
277
 συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ 
δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. 
278
 See Cope, The Rhetoric, Volume I, 72, introduction to Chatper V. 
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happiness and its parts. As we saw in the second above passage, Aristotle undertakes this 
description for the stated purpose of elucidating what it is that exhortation and 
discouragement ultimately take place in reference to. The passage that Crisp quotes 
occurs right after this description of happiness and is thematically connected to it. This 
can be seen if we add in the text that proceeds his quotation: 
That which one must aim at while exhorting [sc., happiness and its parts], as 
something that will be or that currently exists and also that which one must aim at 
while discouraging is then manifest, for these things are the contrary of those 
things. But since to sumpheron lies before the one who gives council as a target, 
for people do not deliberate about the end, but about the things in relation to the 
end, and these things are what is sumpheron according to actions, and to 
sumpheron is good, it would be the case that one must grasp the elements 
concerning good and sumpheron generally. (1362a15-21, my emphasis).
279
 
 
The connection between the preceding discussion of happiness and the above passage is 
the following. Aristotle has just finished his sketch of happiness and its parts (1360b14-
1362a14). It is now clear enough what exhortation, discouragement, deliberation and 
council-giving ultimately aim at. But they obviously aim more proximately (“But 
since…as a target”) at the things that are conducive to happiness (“the things in relation 
to the end”), and these things are advantageous (συμφέρον) actions. For this reason, there 
is an additional need for Aristotle to consider in more detail “good” (ἀγαθόν) and 
“advantageous” (συμφέρον).280 This is the task that he then turns to (from 1362a20 to 
1365b20). Thus, if τὸ τέλος in the above passages means “the end,” which is happiness, 
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 Ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομένων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· 
τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ 
οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ 
συμφέρον ἀγαθόν), ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς. 
280
 Thus, the καί at 1362a21 is not epexegetic, but conjoins the two mostly overlapping classes of ἀγαθόν 
and συμφέρον—compare Crisp, “Nobility,” 235, note 9—that is, though virtually every good thing is 
advantageous insofar as it contributes towards our happiness, happiness is one good thing that fails to be 
advantageous strictly speaking. 
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then τὰ συμφέροντα are all those things that contribute towards its realization. They are, 
as I have just translated them, “advantageous things.” Therefore, contrary to Crisp, the 
above passage actually speaks in favor of understanding συμφέρον as “advantageous” 
rather than “instrumentally useful.” 
The Rhetoric also provides further evidence that τὸ συμφέρον includes intrinsic 
goods and is therefore more appropriately translated by “advantageous” than 
“instrumentally useful.” Among the actions that we do “on account of ourselves” (δι' 
αὑτούς) and which we are “responsible for” (αἴτιοι) are those done “on account of 
calculation” (διὰ λογισμὸν). Aristotle says these actions are as follows: “the things that 
seem to be sumpheron, out of the previously mentioned goods, either as an end or as 
something in relation to an end, whenever they are done because they are sumpheron” 
(1369b7-9, my emphasis).
281
 But if some goods are συμφέρον “as an end,” then 
συμφέρον embraces more than the instrumentally useful.282  
We can also find further evidence that συμφέρον means “advantageous” instead 
of “instrumentally useful” if we turn to the Rhetoric to Alexander, traditionally attributed 
to Aristotle, but now often attributed to Anaximenes. The author of this work offers a 
series of definitions to aid those who are composing popular speeches, much as Aristotle 
does in his Rhetoric. These definitions are therefore helpful indications of the commonly 
understood meaning of certain terms, including συμφέρον, which our author defines as 
follows: 
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 τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ 
συμφέρειν πράττηται. 
282
 As is observed by Grimaldi (comment on 69b8).  
98 
 
sumpheron is a guarding of existing goods or an acquisition of not already-present 
goods or a losing of already existing evils or a prevention of the coming into 
being of [otherwise] expected evils. (Alexander 1.9).
283
 
 
According to this definition, the acquisition (κτῆσις) of an intrinsic good is συμφέρον.284 
But we acquire those intrinsic goods that are constituted by actions and activities by 
doing the action or activity in question. Thus, if contemplation is an intrinsic good, 
contemplating would be συμφέρον, even if this activity is not useful for the acquisition of 
further goods. “Advantageous” is therefore a better translation than “instrumentally 
useful.”  
In conclusion, Irwin is correct to understand συμφέρον as the broader 
“advantageous,” while Crisp is making a mistake when he limits its meaning to the 
narrower “instrumentally useful.”285 
iv. Further examination of Irwin’s evidence 
Now that I have defended Irwin’s understanding of συμφέρον as “advantageous,” I will 
look more closely at his evidence that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle contrasts what 
is kalon with what is advantageous for oneself. Irwin cites 1125a11-12, 1162b35-1163a1, 
1168a9-12, and 1169a3-6 as examples of this contrast. However, the first two passages 
do not so clearly provide the contrast that he claims they do. They use the term ὠφελιμος 
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 συμφέρον δέ ἐστι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀγαθῶν φυλακὴ ἢ τῶν μὴ προσόντων κτῆσις ἢ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων 
κακῶν ἀποβολὴ ἢ τῶν προσδοκωμένων γενήσεσθαι βλαβερῶν διακώλυσις. 
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 See Grimaldi’s comment on 89b37-8. 
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 That συμφέρον means the broader “advantageous” rather than narrower “instrumentally useful” is also 
the view of Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, see 110, bottom paragraph), though he is not quite consistent on 
this point. See his comment on 1168a9-12 and note “a virtuous person seeks advantageous goods only on 
condition that his acquisition and use of them are in accord with the appropriate reasoned principle” (my 
emphasis). 
99 
 
rather than συμφέρον, and Aristotle earlier uses ὠφελιμος in the precise sense of 
“instrumentally beneficial” or productive of an intrinsic good:  
The things pursued and welcomed according to themselves are said [to be good] 
according to one form, but the things productive of these things, or that in some 
way guard them or prevent their contraries are said to be [good] because of these 
things and in another way. It is then clear that the good things would be said in 
two ways, namely, those things according to themselves, and the others because 
of these things. Then, separating out the things according to themselves from the 
beneficial things, let us consider if the things according to themselves are said 
according to one character. (1096b10-16, my emphasis).
286
  
 
It is possible that in the first two passages (1125a11-12 and 1162b35-1163a1) Aristotle is 
using ὠφελιμος in a broader sense than he does in the above passage, but that is not 
clear.
287
 And if he consistently uses ὠφελιμος in the above sense, then these passages 
would contrast what is kalon with what is instrumentally beneficial. And this contrast is 
not enough to make Irwin’s case. He needs a contrast between what is kalon and what is 
good or advantageous for someone tout court. 
The last two passages Irwin cites do use the term συμφέρον or a variant, but they 
still do not explicitly make the contrast he suggests they do. They may, however, 
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 λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ’ ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά 
πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ’ ἂν 
τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ 
σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. 
287
 The first passage is plausibly read as contrasting beautiful but otherwise useless possessions (compare 
1123a6-9) with useful ones; see Ross’ translation. Aspasius perhaps reads the second passage as contrasting 
to kalon with what benefits oneself, depending on whether he uses ὠφελεῖσθαι in a broad or narrow sense; 
see Commentaria, 185, lines 27-30. Grant reads the second passage as contrasting what is kalon and 
“disinterested” with what is “expedient,” “profitable,” and “self-interested” (The Ethics, Volume II, 277, 
notes 7-8). Ross, taking ὠφελιμος in the second passage to have a broad sense, also reads the passage as 
contrasting what is kalon with what is advantageous to oneself; see his translation of the passage and 
compare his narrower translation of ὠφελιμος at 1096b15. Although Gauthier and Jolif read ὠφελιμος in 
the second passage as “useful,” they take this passage to contrast what is “disinterested” and kalon with 
what is in one’s own interest (comment on 1162b35-6). Pakaluk, on the other hand, reads the second 
passage as contrasting the “noble goods” with what is “useful” (Books VIII and IX, 139).  
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reasonably imply this contrast. 1168a9-12 contrasts doing a benefaction, which is kalon, 
with receiving a benefaction, which is, “if anything, advantageous” (συμφέρον): 
At the same time, the things concerning the action are kalon for the one who gives 
a benefaction, so that he is delighted by the one “in whom” this is, but for the one 
who receives a benefaction there is nothing kalon in the one who gives, but, if 
anything, something advantageous.
288
 
 
It is possible to understand this passage as contrasting doing what is both kalon and 
advantageous (συμφέρον) on the one hand and experiencing what is merely advantageous 
but not kalon, on the other, but this makes for a rhetorically weak contrast. 
1169a3-6 contrasts desiring what is kalon with desiring what seems advantageous 
(συμφέρον): 
Because of this the virtuous person would most especially be a self-lover, but 
according to a different form than the one that is reproached, and differing by as 
much as living according to reason differs from living according to passion and 
longing for what is kalon differs from
289
 longing for whatever seems (or “is held”) 
to be advantageous.
290
  
 
This passage does not explicitly rule out the possibility that to kalon is advantageous 
(συμφέρον). For if it were, it would be merely one member of the larger class of 
advantageous things. There would then be a technical difference between longing for 
what is kalon and whatever seems (or is held to be) advantageous.
291
 However, this 
contrast would also be rhetorically weak. These last two passages, when combined with 
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 ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν 
καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον. 
289
 Following the reading of L
b
. 
290
 διὸ [sc. ὁ ἐπιεικὴς] φίλαυτος μάλιστ'ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων 
τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι [ἢ] τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος 
συμφέρειν. 
291
 Michael of Ephesus seems to understand the contrast in this way (Commentaria, 504, lines 32-36). 
Gauthier and Jolif, on the other hand, read this passage as contrasting to kalon with what is in one’s interest 
(comment on 1169a6). 
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the plausible claim that Aristotle intends rhetorically strong contrasts in them, are 
therefore Irwin’s strongest evidence that Aristotle preserves the popular understanding of 
kala actions in the Nicomachean Ethics.  
However, there is important evidence that Irwin does not mention. First of all, 
Aristotle claims at the beginning of the work that he will rely upon the habitual beliefs of 
his audience of well brought up gentlemen:
292
  
For one must begin from the things that are known, but these things are in two 
ways. The things that are known to us and the things that are known without 
qualification. Perhaps then it is necessary for us to begin from the things known to 
us, on account of which, it is necessary for the one who will listen sufficiently to 
the kala things and the just things and, on the whole, the political things, to have 
been nobly brought up by habits. For the “that this is so” is a beginning point, 
and if this should be sufficiently manifest, one will not need in addition the “on 
account of what?” (1095b2-7, my emphasis).293 
 
Aristotle here says that he will rely upon his audience’s habitual beliefs about what things 
are kalon.
294
 But we saw from the Rhetoric that kala actions in particular were popularly 
identified with actions that unselfishly benefitted others. We should then expect that he 
will appeal to this understanding of kala actions in the work. Moreover, since all or most 
                                                 
292
 On his audience, see Rhetoric 1365b33-7, 1366a2-6, Nicomachean Ethics 1179b4-10, b23-31. 
293
 ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ’ ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε 
ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν 
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ 
διότι. 
294
 Compare Republic 348e4-349a3. That Aristotle claims he will rely upon his audience’s habitual beliefs 
about what things are kalon is well observed by Aspasius (Commentaria, 9, line 31- 10, line 8). This point 
is also observed by Eustratius (Commentaria, 33, lines 4-11), Peter Martyr Vermigli (Commentary, 84-86), 
Burnyeat (“Learning to Be Good,” 71, bottom paragraph, 72, first paragraph, 74, first paragraph), Simpson 
(“Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle,” 95, bottom paragraph, 99, first two paragraphs), and Bruell 
(“Theory and Practice,” 18, bottom paragraph). Curzer also holds that Aristotle relies on the “common 
sense” understanding of to kalon, but not because of this passage. Rather, he infers this from the fact that 
Aristotle never gives an account of to kalon (Virtues, 27, second paragraph). 
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of his audience habitually accepted this understanding, he can do so without even needing 
to articulate it.
295
 
Further evidence that Aristotle employs the popular understanding of kala actions 
can be found in his discussion of courage. He claims there that the fully virtuous person’s 
courageous death is kalon, even though, and plausibly precisely because, he willingly 
gives up the “greatest goods”—including the enjoyment of a full life of virtuous 
activity—in order to benefit his comrades or his city: 
And by as much more as he should possess the whole of virtue and should be 
more happy, the more he will be pained at the prospect of his death. For living is 
most of all worthwhile for this sort of person, and this person is knowingly 
deprived of the greatest goods, and this is painful. But he is no less courageous 
for this, and perhaps even more so, because he chooses to kalon in war instead of 
those things (i.e., the greatest goods, 1117b9-15, my emphasis).
296
 
 
Thus, the courageous death of the fully virtuous person is especially courageous, and 
presumably also, especially kalon, because he willingly sacrifices the greatest personal 
goods for the benefit of his comrades or his city.
297
 
That virtue and its end—kala actions—are self-disregarding is also suggested by 
Aristotle’s treatment of generosity, in which he claims that: 
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 This point is well observed by Tutuska (“Noble and the Good”, 163).  
296
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ 
τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ’ 
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ’ ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. 
297
 Compare the above passage with the account of kalon action in Rhetoric 1358b38-1359a5, 1366b36-
1367a3 and Nicomachean Ethics 1168a33-35 with Percival’s editorial expansions (Aristotle on Friendship, 
123, third paragraph). That the above passage depicts courageous action as self-sacrificial is also the view 
of Aspasius (Commentaria, 87, lines 17-21), Duns Scotus (Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 437), 
Grant (The Ethics, Volume II, 44, introduction to chapter IX), Jaffa (Thomism and Aristotelianism, 85-6), 
Gauthier and Jolif (comment on 1117b14-15, note au prix d’une telle virtue et d’un tel Bonheur!, “at the 
price of such virtue and such happiness!”), Korsgaard (“From Duty,” 222, bottom paragraph), Colins 
(“Moral Virtues,” 133, second and third paragraphs, 135, first paragraph), Taylor (comment on 1117a33-
b16), and Tutuska (“Noble and the Good,” 164-5). 
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It belongs to the generous person to be vigorous and to exceed in giving, so that 
he leaves less for himself, for it does not belong to the generous person to look to 
himself. (1120b4-6, my emphasis).
298
 
 
But if the generous person were acting for his own sake when he did what was generous 
and kalon, then it would not be true that he “does not look to himself.” This claim 
therefore implies that the (kala) actions of generous people are self-disregarding.
299
 
Concerning the depiction of courage and generosity as selfless, we should also 
note that in the Rhetoric Aristotle defines virtue as “a capacity characterized by 
beneficence” (δύναμις εὐεργετική), and, on this basis, he places courage and generosity 
among the greatest virtues.
300
 Thus, if he wishes to emphasize the selfless beneficence 
that was commonly attributed to virtue and kala deeds, the discussions of courage and 
generosity is a fitting place to do so.
301
  
The popular understanding of virtue and kala actions as selfless is also reflected 
in the way that Aristotle distinguishes between the “king” (βασιλεύς) and the “tyrant” 
(τύραννος) in Book VIII: 
Tyranny is the deviation of kingship, for both are rule by one, but they differ the 
most. For the tyrant considers what is advantageous to himself, but the king what 
is advantageous to the ruled, for the person who does not have enough and does 
not exceed in all good things is not a king. And this sort of person (i.e., a king) 
needs nothing else in addition. Therefore, he does not consider what is beneficial 
to himself, but to the ruled, for the one who is not like this would be a sort of king 
appointed by lot. But tyranny is from the opposite of this. For he (i.e., the tyrant) 
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 ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ 
βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. 
299
This point is well observed by Colins (“Moral Virtues,” 136, bottom paragraph) and Tutuska (“Noble 
and the Good,” 165, first paragraph). Aspasius says concerning this passage that the generous person “does 
not look toward himself in all things, but to to kalon” (οὐ γὰρ πάντως εἰς αὑτὸν ἀποβλέπει ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ 
καλόν, Commentaria, 99, lines 19-20). He therefore implies that the generous person is selflessly dedicated 
to to kalon. Grant also observes the “self-forgetfulness” of the generous person (The Ethics, Volume II, 60, 
notes 17-19). 
300
 See 1366b3-9. 
301
 On this point, see Tutuska, ibid. 
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pursues what is good for himself, and it is more evident concerning this that it is 
the worst, and the worst is contrary to the best. And there is change from kingship 
into tyranny, for tyranny is the baseness of rule by one, and the corrupted king 
comes to be a tyrant. (1160a36-1160b12, my emphasis).
302
 
 
The true king is here distinguished from the tyrant by his selfless concern for the good of 
the ruled. Moreover, the tyrant, who is distinguished from the true king by the fact that he 
pursues his own good, is as it were a “corrupted” or “vicious” king.303 This contrast thus 
implies that virtue, and the kala deeds that issue from it, are selfless, whereas vice, and 
the shameful deeds that issue from it, are self-interested. 
This additional evidence, when combined with the best of Irwin’s original 
evidence, makes for a strong case. I therefore agree that in the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle employs the popular understanding of kala actions that he articulates in the 
Rhetoric.
304
  
Kelly Rogers, on the other hand, argues that Aristotle does not adopt the popular 
view of kala actions as unselfish.
305
 She claims that,  
Since the Ethics does not back up the altruistic conception of the καλόν sketched 
in Rhetoric I 9, and since we have four independent reasons for denying that the 
Rhetoric’s account of the praiseworthy represents Aristotle’s own considered 
view, we may conclude the following. First, Aristotle does not praise actions for 
being καλόν on the grounds of their being altruistic. He does praise some socially 
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 παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ 
τύραννος τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ 
αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὑτῷ μὲν 
οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ 
ἐναντίας ταύτῃ· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ 
ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς, 
ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. 
303
 Compare 1168a30-1 and note ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ (“by as much as he should be more corrupted”). 
304
 That Aristotle employs the popular understanding of kala (“noble”) actions as selfless is well-observed 
by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 236, note 12); compare Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue, , 72, first 
paragraph, 73, first paragraph, 175, first paragraph. 
305
 See “Aristotle’s Conception of Τὸ Καλόν,” especially 361-71. 
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beneficial activity, but that is not the same thing.” (Aristotle’s Conception of Τὸ 
Καλόν, 369).  
 
Much can be said in response to her argument. I limit myself to the following three 
points.  
First, there is a difference between to kalon—the general class or character of all 
things that are kalon—and kala deeds, i.e., actions with motivations and intentions. In the 
part of the Rhetoric where Aristotle discusses selflessness at the greatest length he is 
speaking specifically about kala deeds.
306
 The question is therefore not, as Rogers 
sometimes characterizes it,
307
 whether Aristotle adopts the Rhetoric’s presentation of to 
kalon in the general sense as “selfless” (since there is no such presentation), but whether 
he adopts its presentation of kala deeds as selfless deeds.  
Second, Rogers fairly criticizes the evidence offered by Irwin in his earlier paper, 
“Aristotle’s Conception of Morality.”308 He has since made a stronger case, which I have 
discussed above. However, as I have also noted, there is strong evidence that Irwin still 
overlooks.  
And third, Rogers overlooks the important point that Aristotle claims he will take 
his audience’s habitual beliefs about what things are kalon as a beginning point for his 
investigation. We should therefore expect the Nicomachean Ethics to reflect the popular 
views about what things are kalon, such as selfless actions. 
 
 
                                                 
306
 See 1366b36 and note τῶν αἱρετῶν (“among the [actions] chosen”); compare Politics 1333a6-11. 
307
 See “Aristotle’s Conception of Τὸ Καλόν,” 369, bottom paragraph, though contrast (2) at 362-3. 
308
 See “Conception of Morality,” 364-9. 
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v. A further difficulty 
I have concluded, with Irwin, that Aristotle employs the popular understanding of kala 
actions in the Nicomachean Ethics. However, this conclusion introduces a difficulty. As 
Roger Crisp well points out,
309
 Aristotle does claim in parts of the work that kala actions 
are good for those who do them:  
And if it is this way [that someone who does not delight in the actions of virtue is 
not virtuous], then the deeds according to virtue would be pleasant. But surely 
they are good (i.e., good for those who do them) as well as kalon, and they are 
each of these things most especially, if indeed the good person judges admirably 
about them, and he judges as we said. Happiness, then, is best, most kalon and 
most pleasant. (1099a21-5, my emphasis).
310
 
 
But this claim contradicts the earlier described contrast between kala actions and what is 
good or advantageous for oneself.
311
 Perhaps we should conclude that Aristotle is 
confused about whether kala actions are good for oneself or not and that Irwin has 
championed one horn of Aristotle’s confusion while Crisp has championed the other. 
However, that kala actions have been depicted as both good and not good for oneself 
seems like too obvious a problem for Aristotle to have missed. I will therefore offer a 
different explanation for why he speaks about kala actions in this contradictory way. 
vi. Aristotle’s understanding of kala actions 
To understand why Aristotle sometimes depicts kala actions as good for oneself and 
sometimes not, we must first recognize that, though in the Nicomachean Ethics he adopts 
parts of the popular understanding of kala actions that he articulates in the Rhetoric, he 
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 See “Nobility,” 238-9. 
310
 εἰ δ’ οὕτω, καθ’ αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ 
μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ’ ὡς εἴπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα 
καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Compare 1169a16-29. 
311
 This tension is well observed by Tutuska (“Noble and the Good,” 171-2, 174-5, 177, bottom paragraph). 
See, also, Colins, “Moral Virtues,” 134-6.  
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also makes certain additions to it.
312
 Though Aristotle would probably object to my 
characterization of “additions.” He would probably claim that he is bringing to light a 
less self-conscious part of the popular understanding of kala actions.
313
 However, I wish 
to remain neutral on this issue. I will therefore speak of “additions” to the at least more 
self-conscious parts of the popular understanding. 
The first addition that Aristotle makes, if it is a genuine addition,
314
 is to say that 
kala actions are done, at least by the virtuous, from an ambition to do kala actions.
315
 
This adds a certain complexity to the motivation for performing kala actions, for these 
actions were already understood to be actions that were accompanied by certain 
intentions or motivations.
316
 They were already understood to be unselfish attempts to 
benefit others. As Aristotle puts in the Politics: 
 Many of the deeds that seems to be servant-like are indeed kalon for the freeborn 
among the young to do, for with regard to what is kalon and not kalon the actions 
do not differ according to themselves but according to the end and the “for the 
sake of what.” (1333a6-11, my emphasis).317 
 
                                                 
312
 Irwin also mentions this fact, but he focuses on the difference between performing kala deeds out of 
rational calculation (in the Nicomachean Ethics) and performing them out of non-calculating character (in 
the Rhetoric, see “Conception of Morality,” 132). I will focus on some further differences.  
313
 Compare Alcibiades I 115a4-116b1, Laches 192c5-d9, Gorgias 483a5-8. 
314
 Consider 1168a33-4 with context. If it was commonly granted that virtuous people choose kala actions 
for the sake of doing kala actions, then Aristotle merely emphasizes something that was self-consciously 
accepted.  
315
 This is the effect of saying “the end of virtue is to kalon;” compare Meno 77b2-5. That virtuous people 
possess an ambition for kala actions is well observed by Crisp (“Iris Murdoch,” 285), Price (Virtue and 
Reason, 67, bottom paragraph and what follows), and Hurka (“Aristotle on Virtue,” 20, paragraphs two and 
three). 
316
 See note 268; Nicomachean Ethics 1162b36-1163a1, Rhetoric 1366b36-1367a6. That kala actions 
require certain intentions is well observed by Korsgaard (“From Duty: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good 
Action,” 216-18). See, also, Hurka, “Aristotle on Virtue,” 22, first paragraph.  
317
 πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων διακονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακονεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ 
τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτω διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὑτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκεν. 
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Aristotle thus adds, or perhaps only emphasizes, that those who attempt kala actions want 
to do kala actions. They aim at kala actions as kala actions.
318
 In other words, they strive 
to act with unselfish or “pure” intentions.319 I will name the phenomenon of striving to 
act with unselfish intentions “noble ambition.” The ascribing of noble ambition to those 
who attempt kala deeds, at least out of virtue, is then Aristotle’s first addition to the self-
conscious understanding of these actions. His second addition is that the core of this 
ambition is the belief that performing kala actions—that is, benefitting others with 
unselfish intentions—is exceptionally good for oneself.320 
I can now offer the following explanation for why Aristotle sometimes depicts 
kala deeds as good for oneself and sometimes as not. When he contrasts kalon with 
“advantageous” (συμφέρον) or otherwise implies that kala actions are not good for 
oneself, he is speaking according to the most common understanding of these actions. He 
withholds his additions and lets these actions appear to his audience as they most 
commonly appeared. But when Aristotle deems kala actions to be good, as he plainly 
does, he speaks then according to his “sophisticated” or “philosophical” understanding of 
what motivates virtuous people to attempt these actions. He takes us a step beneath their 
                                                 
318
 This point is well made by Alexander of Aphrodisias (Libri Mantissa, 154, lines 30-4; compare 1099a7-
15, 1179b7-9). 
319
 Compare 1168b34-1169a2. The virtuous person “most especially cherishes his mind” since the 
possession of intelligence allows us to act with specific intentions, and therefore, it seems, with specifically 
kalon ones. On this point, see Kraut, Human Good, 128, bottom two paragraphs; Pangle, Philosophy of 
Friendship, 172-3; Hurka “Aristotle on Virtue”, 22, second paragraph. 
320
 See 1099a21-9, 1100b30-1101a13, 1169a18-32. That kala actions are pursued as personal goods is 
observed by Politis (The Primacy of Self-Love in the Nicomachean Ethics, 160, first paragraph), Colins 
(“Moral Virtues,” 133-4), Bostock (Aristotle’s Ethics, 178-9), Hurka (“Aristotle on Virtue,” 16-17), Crisp 
(“Iris Murdoch,” 285), and Price (Virtue and Reason, 68, bottom paragraph). 
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most common appearance.
321
 This is why Aristotle says inconsistent things about kala 
actions.  
To repeat, Aristotle begins by granting the popular understanding of kala actions 
as selfless attempts to benefit others. However, he adds to this understanding that such 
actions are actually pursued by virtuous people as great personal goods. This addition 
then compels him to modify a certain part of the popular understanding of kala actions. 
Kala actions, as actions of selfless beneficence, were popularly thought to be in tension 
with one’s own good. But since Aristotle believes that these actions are pursued as great 
personal goods, he is compelled to revise this part of popular opinion. He depicts kala 
actions as good for oneself or personally advantageous.  
However, Aristotle proceeds to his philosophical revision of the at least self-
conscious part of popular opinion only gradually. He most fully unveils it near the end of 
the work, at IX.8, where he argues that virtuous people are the greatest “self-lovers” 
(φίλαυτοι) who strive after kala actions, even to the point of giving up their life, on the 
grounds that these actions constitute the greatest personal goods.
322
 And he does not 
always assume this revision in his presentation. And when he does not, he allows kala 
actions to appear to be in tension with one’s own good.323  
                                                 
321
 Compare Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, I.1. 
322
 Aquinas well observes that Aristotle here offers a “wise” view that is not shared by the “crowd” 
(Commentary, paragraph 1865). That in IX.8 Aristotle overturns parts of his earlier, more popular treatment 
of kala actions is well observed by Burger (Aristotle’s Dialogue, 76, first paragraph, with 176) and Tutuska 
(“Noble and the Good,” 171-2), though he does not think that IX.8 represents Aristotle’s decided view. 
Rather, he does not think that Aristotle ever adequate resolves whether kala actions are good for oneself or 
not (172, first paragraph and following, 177, bottom paragraph).  
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 This difference in perspective can be seen by comparing III.9 with IX.8, as Tutuska well observes 
(“Noble and the Good,” 171, bottom paragraph). See, also, Pangle, Philosophy of Friendship, 236, note 12. 
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We may wonder whether Aristotle’s combination of the popular understanding of 
kala actions as selfless benefactions with his philosophical understanding of the virtuous 
person’s motivation as self-regarding is ultimately consistent. Are not kala actions, 
understood as selfless actions that are chosen as personal goods, self-contradictory and 
impossible? Some interpreters do conclude that kala actions, as they are commonly 
understood, are for this reason impossible.
324
 I will not settle this matter here, but I will 
sketch some of the considerations it involves. 
First, it is reasonable that an action can be selfless and aim at the benefit of the 
one who acts as long as it does so in a “motivationally incidental” way. If I believe that 
my selfless action will somehow benefit me, I cannot help but want this benefit. But as 
long as I would still do this action if I did not think it would benefit me, it is reasonable 
that my action can still count as selfless and therefore as kalon. However, IX.8 as well as 
Aristotle’s explanatory starting point that our own happiness is the ultimate end of our 
action do strongly suggest that kala actions are pursued on the grounds that they are good 
for oneself. If so, then those who do kala actions do not aim at their own benefit in a 
motivationally incidental way. 
Second, is merely having some amount of disinterested motivation for an action, 
even if, unlike above, it is insufficient to motivate the action by itself, enough to make 
that action kalon? This does seem contrary to the spirit of the popular understanding of 
kala actions. But even if such an action would still be kalon, it is a separate question 
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 For this interpretation, see Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue, 73, 175-6; Pangle, Philosophy of Friendship, 
69, bottom paragraph, 175-6, though she does still allow for a limited range of unselfish actions (181-2); 
compare Broadie’s comment on 1168a10-11. 
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whether Aristotle thinks genuinely disinterested motivations are available to us. Thus, if 
we deny that virtuous people pursue their own good in a motivationally incidental way 
and if we deny that merely having some amount of disinterested motivation for an action 
is enough to make it kalon or, even if we accept this, if we deny that Aristotle thinks 
genuinely disinterested motivations are available to us, then we should conclude that kala 
actions, as they were commonly understood, are impossible.  
Moral virtue, at least as it was commonly understood, would then be impossible 
as well. And if moral virtue cannot exist apart from disinterested or selfless action, as 
some philosophers maintain,
325
 then we would have to conclude absolutely that moral 
virtue is impossible. This will no doubt seem to be a depressing result, but, by Aristotle’s 
lights, it would not simply be a cause for despair. After all, it is the life of theoretical 
virtue, and not moral virtue, that is the best life for a human being.
326
 
However, does Aristotle agree with these philosophers that moral virtue cannot 
exist apart from selfless actions? It is tempting to say he does on account of the fact that 
he (i) begins by granting his audience’s habitual understanding of what things are kalon, 
which included that kala actions are selfless; (ii) appeals to this understanding of kala 
actions several times in the work; and (iii) never explicitly offers a substitute for it. On 
the other hand, one could claim that he implies a substitute understanding without 
explicitly stating it. One could claim, for example, that he holds that actions which 
                                                 
325
 For this view, see Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 10, bottom paragraph, 19, bottom 
paragraph; H. A. Prichard, “Duty and Interest,” 35, bottom paragraph; Annas, “Morality of Happiness,” 
255 and note “These are not just casual beliefs—they are, if anything is, ground-floor, basic beliefs in 
ethics,” “Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism,” 208, second paragraph; Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 179; 
Taylor, Books II-IV, 91; Hurka, “Aristotle on Virtue,” 16, first paragraph; Crisp, “Iris Murdoch,” 278-9, 
284, first paragraph. 
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 See 1178a4-9. 
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benefit others, when chosen for their own sake, even if one chooses them as personal 
goods, are kalon. This would be a revised understanding of the intentional element of 
kala actions that does not require any degree of selflessness.
327
  
However this may be, it is an important consequence of Aristotle’s philosophical 
understanding of kala actions that he is able to maintain, as he clearly does, that virtuous 
people pursue these actions as personal goods. Understood in this way, virtue and kala 
actions do not actually challenge the principle that everyone acts ultimately for the sake 
of their own happiness as they would otherwise appear to.
328
 Irwin’s insight that Aristotle 
employs the common understanding of kala actions as “disinterested” or “unselfish” 
therefore does not challenge the interpretation that he holds each person’s own happiness 
as the ultimate end of their action. To the contrary, it makes this interpretation richer, for 
it helps reveal that Aristotle is making additions to the popular understanding of kala 
actions that resolve their apparent conflict with his explanatory starting point and it 
provides us the opportunity to wonder at his justification for doing this.  
In acknowledgement of this wonder, I must emphasize that I have not explained 
how Aristotle actually justifies his belief in the self-interested character of noble ambition 
or his belief in its universal presence among those who attempt kala actions, or at least 
among those who do so out of virtue. My goal has rather been to show that his full 
understanding of what motivates people to attempt kala actions is consistent with the 
claim that each person’s own happiness is the end of their action. Nevertheless, the 
question of Aristotle’s justification for his philosophical understanding of virtue and kala 
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 This possible response was suggested to me by Marta Jimenez. 
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 This point is well observed by Price (Love and Friendship, 113). 
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actions is vital to any understanding of the Nicomachean Ethics. I will therefore briefly 
say something about this.  
To begin, the existence of noble ambition is an apparent part of everyday life. We 
have all heard others exhort themselves, and have all exhorted others ourselves, to be 
“less selfish” or to care more about other people, or higher things, and less about 
themselves.
329
 And in general, since acting with unselfish motivations is widely 
praised,
330
 and the opposite widely blamed,
331
 how could it not appear to people, and 
especially the young,
332
 that the one is extremely choiceworthy and the other extremely 
worthy of avoidance?
333
 
It is still unclear, however, how Aristotle justifies his belief that noble ambition is 
essential to virtue and kala actions, as well as his belief that the core of this ambition is 
the conviction that kala or unselfishly motivated actions constitute great personal goods. 
But I think a promising place to begin is to observe his clear indications that kala actions 
are understood by the people who are most serious about doing them as being 
preeminently deserving of—and perhaps, therefore, as also being in need of—personally 
beneficial rewards. 
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 On the common experience of noble ambition, see Kant, Ethics, 3, first paragraph; Strauss, Natural 
Right and History, 128; Bostock, Aristotle’s Ethics, 179, second paragraph; Crisp, “Iris Murdoch,” 277-9, 
286, bottom. 
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 See Rhetoric 1358b38-1359a5, 1366a23-5 with 1366b36-1367a6.  
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 See 1168a28-33. 
332
 See Rhetoric 1389a28-9, 1389a32-5; compare Republic 492a5-d1, 538c6-e4. 
333
 For the point that praise makes its object appear worth pursuing, see Rhetoric 1367b37-1368a8; 
Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence, Part Two, number 467, 
lines 3-7; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I.2. Consider, also, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Commentary, 84-5 and 
note “But he who has no high morals will not do that, for everything that we extol in praises as just and 
right is odious to him” (my emphasis) and “only when the student has proper morals will he either himself 
have the principles of this knowledge (not the matter that we investigate) because he will see instinctively 
that these principles are honest, just, and worth striving for” (my emphasis). 
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As I have had the opportunity to observe, Aristotle understands a reward to be a 
certain return that is given for virtuous action.
334
 And he understands that we are 
deserving of a return from another, such as a reward, on account of our action towards 
them, such as our virtuously benefitting them, only if we get less out of the interaction 
than they do.
335
 For example, if I got more out of my virtuous benefaction than my 
beneficiary, he would not owe me anything in return. If anything, I would be indebted to 
him for providing me the opportunity to do something so choiceworthy as acting 
virtuously.
336
 But Aristotle does not think that virtuous people accept either that their 
beneficiaries owe them nothing in return or that they are themselves indebted to their 
beneficiaries as a result of virtuously benefitting them.
337
 He therefore concludes that the 
virtuous view their own actions as less choiceworthy than the benefits they provide to 
others. And since the virtuous view virtuous actions as unqualifiedly deserving of 
rewards,
338
 they must also view them as unqualifiedly less choiceworthy than the benefits 
they provide. And a plausible explanation for why this is so is that virtuous actions are 
simply not seen by the virtuous as choiceworthy for their own sake.
339
 
But if the actions pursued by the virtuous are not seen by them as choiceworthy 
for their own sake, then they must be seen by them as choiceworthy for the sake of other 
things, namely, the rewards that virtuous actions are commonly agreed to deserve.
340
 But 
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 See Chapter 1, section b.iv. 
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 See ibid. 
336
 See note 61. 
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 See note 62. 
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 For an additional argument, see end of Chapter 1, section b.iv. 
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 Compare Thucydides 7.86.5.1-5; Kant, Ethics, 77-8; Prichard, “Duty and Interest,” 27, fourth paragraph. 
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these rewards are further agreed to be good things.
341
 We can then plausibly conclude 
that the virtuous pursue virtuous actions—that is, kala actions—on the grounds that they 
will acquire external benefits through them. In other words, kala actions are undertaken 
by the virtuous in the hope that their merit will be observed and respected.
342 
And this is 
perhaps why, in Book X, Aristotle claims that virtuous people need their virtue to be 
visible to others: 
The generous person will be in need of money with a view to doing generous 
actions, and so will the just person with a view to making repayments (for the 
wishes are not manifest, and even those who are not just pretend to wish to do just 
actions) and the courageous person will be in need of ability, if indeed he will 
accomplish any of the things according to his virtue, and the temperate person 
will be in need of license; for how will it be manifest that he is this person or one 
of the others? (1178a28-34, my emphasis).
343
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 See 1099b16-18, 1123b17-21; compare Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 680, first paragraph (A810-
11/B838-9). 
342
 This is Pangle’s view (Philosophy of Friendship, 165-6). It also appears to be the view of Michael of 
Ephesus. See Commentaria, 506, lines 27-32 and note “‘securing for himself what is kalon,’ and this is 
honor from virtuous people and repayment from god, our creator” (<περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν·> 
τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἡμῶν θεοῦ ἀμοιβή), 507, lines 7-10 
and note “to live in a kalon way for a time in dying on behalf of his fatherland rather than to live in 
whatever chance way for a long time—that is, without fame and divorced from honor” (βιῶσαι ἕνα χρόνον 
καλῶς ἐν τῷ ὑπεραποθνήσκειν τῆς πατρίδος, ἢ πολλοὺς τυχόντως, ἤτοι ἀκλεῶς καὶ δίχα τινὸς τιμῆς), 507, 
lines 21-24 and note “to be honored continually by the city with likenesses and statues and memorials and 
sacrifices and things of this sort” (τὸ τιμᾶσθαι διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως εἰκόσι καὶ ἀνδριάσι καὶ μνήμαις 
καὶ θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις). 
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 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς 
ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ 
ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος 
ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; That virtuous people need their virtue to be visible to others is observed by 
Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 2118). 
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§ Chapter Three: Aristotle’s Defense of His Explanatory Starting Point 
In this chapter, I will argue that Aristotle defends his explanatory starting point that the 
ultimate aim of our action is our own happiness. I will begin with the fact that he 
recognizes the important difference between arguments that proceed to an explanatory 
starting point and those that proceed from one. I will then argue that Aristotle defends, 
and thus argues to, his explanatory starting point in his discussion of friendship.  
a. Arguing to and from an Explanatory Starting Point 
Aristotle claims at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics that there is an important 
distinction among arguments. There are those that proceed from an explanatory starting 
point, which has either been established or merely assumed, and there are those that 
proceed to and establish an explanatory starting point: 
Let it not escape our notice that arguments from explanatory starting points are 
different from arguments to explanatory starting points, for Plato also used to 
raise this perplexity well and investigate it, whether the way is from the 
explanatory starting points or to them, just as in a racecourse, there is either the 
way from the judges to the boundary or the way back again. (1095a30-1095b1).
344
 
 
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by assuming that each person’s own happiness 
is an explanatory starting point. However, as is shown above, he is keenly aware of the 
difference between arguing from an assumed explanatory starting point and actually 
arguing to and establishing it. Therefore, the fact that he initially posits each person’s 
own happiness as an explanatory starting point and proceeds to reason from it does not 
preclude that he will later attempt to reason to this explanatory starting point as well. 
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 μὴ λανθανέτω δ’ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ 
Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ 
σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. 
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Indeed, the fact that he calls our attention to this crucial distinction, and praises Plato for 
making it before him, makes it all the more likely that he will at some point attempt to do 
so. 
It is often said that Aristotle argues to his explanatory starting point by arguing to 
his definition of happiness,
345
 but this is not correct. An argument that establishes that 
this is the definition of happiness does not establish that happiness is an explanatory 
starting point, for someone could grant a given definition of happiness, for example, that 
it is theoretical contemplation, while still denying that it has the status of an explanatory 
starting point—that is, denying that our own happiness is the ultimate end of our 
action.
346
 A true “argument to an explanatory starting point” would therefore establish 
that our own happiness is the ultimate end of our action, and this is the sort of argument 
that we should expect, even demand, from Aristotle. 
b. Arguing to Aristotle’s Explanatory Starting Point 
 i. The argument in IX.8 
One place where Aristotle argues to his explanatory starting point is IX.8. He there 
describes a popular opinion that denies that human beings act ultimately for the sake of 
their own happiness. Because this view is popular, it qualifies as an ἔνδοξον or “reputable 
opinion.”347 But reputable opinions have evidentiary weight for Aristotle. They cannot 
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 For this view, see Hardie, Ethical Theory, 35, bottom paragraph, 37, bottom paragraph; Reeve, 
Practices, 30, 59-60, 62, second paragraph; Dominic Scott, Levels of Argument, 166, 168-9. 
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simply be dismissed.
348
 This popular opinion therefore constitutes a credible challenge to 
his explanatory starting point.
349
 
The popular opinion in question is a certain view about the nature of virtue and 
the virtuous person. The Ancient Greeks popularly thought that the virtuous person 
disregards his own good for the sake of others and especially for the sake of his friends: 
People reproach those who are most of all fond of themselves, and, as something 
shameful, they disparagingly refer to them as “self-lovers;” and it seems to them 
that the vicious person does all things for the sake of himself, and by as much as 
he should be more corrupt, by this much he does so more—and they reproach him 
for being the sort of person who does nothing apart from himself (i.e., apart from 
his own good)—while the virtuous person acts on account of to kalon and, by as 
much as he should be better, the more he does so, and for the sake of a friend, and 
he disregards what concerns himself (i.e., his own good). (1168a30-5, my 
emphasis).
350
 
 
This popular view thus understands the nature of virtue as a dedication to others—or to 
something “abstract” such as justice or to kalon—that takes prominence over one’s self-
concern. It correspondingly understands the nature of “badness” or “vice” (κακία) as the 
absence of any more prominent concern—that is, as “loving oneself most of all” or as 
being a “self-lover” (φιλαύτος).351 In other words, it associates virtue with looking past 
one’s own happiness or selflessness and vice with extreme self-love or selfishness 
(φιλαυτία).  
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 See 1145b2-7; Pakaluk, An Introduction, 25-7. 
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 Compare Topics 101a34-101b4. The issue of challenges to an explanatory starting point on the basis of 
reputable opinion is admirably discussed in Reeve, Action, Contemplation, 61-3. 
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 ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν 
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καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ’ αὑτοῦ παρίησιν. 
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 This popular view is echoed by the Magna Moralia (1212a30-33). 
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It is also part of this popular view that virtuous people are especially selfless in 
relation to their friends.
352
 We can explain this part of the view in two ways. First, we 
plausibly owe more to our friends than we do to strangers.
353
 This is why it strikes us as 
more vicious and depraved to exploit a friend than a stranger.
354
 Second, we have seen 
that selfless action was commonly considered to be kalon and characteristic of virtue. 
However, selfless action is not possible without selfless motivation. But this sort of 
motivation was reasonably thought to be most possible for us in relation to friends as 
opposed to strangers.
355
 That the love we have for our friends is the greatest love we are 
capable of is even echoed by the Gospels, which are usually thought to present a 
contrasting view of the strength of our love for our fellow human beings. To quote John, 
“Nobody has a greater love than this: that someone lay down his life on behalf of his 
friends.” (John 15:13).356  
It would thus have been natural to think that virtuous people most of all act 
selflessly towards their friends. Indeed, friendship, by providing the greatest motivation 
for selfless action, would appear to provide the possibility for the greatest acts of virtue. 
As Seneca puts it: “For what purpose, then, do I make a man my friend? In order to have 
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 Or perhaps I should say “their friends and country.” For this view, see Michael of Ephesus, 
Commentaria, 500, line 31-501, line 3 and Aspasius, Commentaria, 175, lines 19-21 with 1169a18-20. 
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Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 44; Gauthier and Jolif, ibid.; Christopher Gill, “Altruism or Reciprocity in 
Greek Philosophy?,” 322, bottom paragraph. Kant, by contrast, claims that the Gospels do not present such 
a view (Groundwork, 12, bottom paragraph). 
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someone for whom I may die, whom I may follow into exile, against whose death I may 
stake my own life, and pay the pledge, too.” (Epistle IX, 121).357 
We have seen that virtue was popularly thought to involve looking past one’s own 
happiness or selflessness, especially in relation to one’s friends. But if this popular view 
is correct, then Aristotle’s explanatory starting point is false. For there would be at least 
some human beings, namely, the virtuous ones, who have a concern that takes 
prominence over their concern for their own happiness. This reputable view about virtue 
thus constitutes a credible challenge to his explanatory starting point. 
After stating this challenge, Aristotle responds to it. He declares that the popular 
“speeches” about the selflessness of the virtuous person “do not agree with the facts” (or 
“deeds,” 1168a35-1168b1).358 He then replaces the popular division of human beings into 
vicious self-lovers (φιλαύτοι) and virtuous non-self-lovers with a novel division into 
vicious and virtuous self-lovers: 
On account of which the virtuous person would most especially be a self-lover, 
[but] according to a different form [of being a self-lover] than the one that is 
reproached (i.e., the form of the vicious person). (1169a3-4, my emphasis).
359
 
 
As Aquinas observes: “he explains that this manner of loving oneself differs in kind from 
that previously discussed. He notes that the virtuous person is a lover of self according to 
a kind of self-love that differs from the brand censured before.” (Commentary, paragraph 
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120, second paragraph). 
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 διὸ [ὁ ἐπιεικής] φίλαυτος μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη, καθ’ ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου. Compare 1168b21-3 and 
note “those who are self-lovers in this way” (τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις).  
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1873, my emphasis).
360
 Aristotle thus revises the popular view that contradicts his 
explanatory starting point.
361
 He denies that virtuous people act selflessly and, on the 
basis of this denial, assigns loving oneself most of all or “being a self-lover” to virtuous 
human beings in addition to vicious ones.
362
 To borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, he 
“translates the virtuous person back into nature” as he understands it.363  
It may be alleged that Aristotle’s response to this popular challenge begs the 
question. We may think that he simply presupposes that human beings act ultimately for 
the sake of their own happiness and then, on the basis of this presupposition, denies that 
virtuous people overlook their own happiness when they act. But this is not correct. As 
we have seen, he justifies his denial of the popular understanding of the virtuous person 
by an appeal to τὰ ἔργα in explicit contrast to οἱ λόγοι, the (observable) “deeds” in 
contrast to the misleading “speeches.” His response therefore appeals to the 
(independently) observable deeds and, for this reason, does not beg the question.  
Aristotle’s appeal to the “facts” or “deeds” thus constitutes a genuine argument to 
an explanatory starting point. In particular, it constitutes a “negative argument” or an 
attempted refutation of a credible view that contradicts a view we wish to support.
364
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 A parallel revision occurs with regard to “gain-lover” (φιλοκερδής) in the Hipparchus; see 232c4-9 with 
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Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 233, note 1). 
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Contrary to what is commonly thought, he does defend his explanatory starting point in 
the Nicomachean Ethics. 
ii. Aristotle’s defense 
However, there is an obvious difficulty with Aristotle’s defense. He rejects the popular 
understanding of the virtuous person as selfless on the grounds that it “does not agree 
with the facts.” But, what facts? And how can the listener or reader come to appreciate 
these alleged facts as facts? They are clearly not obvious to everyone, for otherwise, there 
would be no opposing view for Aristotle to disagree with in the first place. The listener or 
reader is therefore likely to be in need of some guidance in order to recognize these 
alleged facts. 
This difficulty is often overlooked since “the facts” are often mistakenly 
identified with the considerations that Aristotle lists following his claim that “the facts 
disagree with these speeches, and not unreasonably” (1168a35-b1, my emphasis).365 
These considerations are primarily (i) “people say” (φαςί) that one should love one’s 
greatest friend most of all
366
 and (ii) “all the proverbs agree” (αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι 
ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν) in suggesting that each person is their own greatest friend.367 However, 
these considerations explain Aristotle’s “and not unreasonably,” not his “facts” or 
“deeds.” They are, after all, more “speeches.” His point is that there are other popular 
views (“speeches”) that suggest that the popular view about the virtuous person is wrong. 
                                                 
365
 τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. 
366
 See 1168b1-2. 
367
 See 1168b5-10. 
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It is for this reason “not unreasonable” that the facts turn out to contradict this view.368 As 
Aquinas observes: “He states that the facts are not in agreement with the reasons just 
presented, according to which men are shown to love, themselves most. And this is not in 
a way unlikely. First because…” (Commentary, paragraph 1858, my emphasis).  
To return to the problem of how we are to recognize these alleged “facts” or 
“deeds”, the context of Aristotle’s claim provides us with some guidance. This claim 
occurs near the end of his extensive two book examination of friendship, and further, the 
virtuous person’s apparently selfless action is explicitly said to be “for the sake of a 
friend.” As I have discussed, the selfless action that was considered to be characteristic of 
virtue was thought to be most possible for us in relation to friends. If Aristotle can show 
that virtuous people fail to act selflessly when they act towards their friends, he will have 
dealt a blow to the popular view. For if selfless motivation turns out to be unavailable to 
virtuous people in friendship, where it was thought to most of all be available, we would 
have a reason to doubt its availability in other less promising contexts. 
It is therefore worth seeing whether at least some of the “facts” or “deeds” that 
Aristotle has in mind are the facts or deeds of virtuous people in relation to their friends 
as they come to light in his examination of friendship. This possibility is further 
encouraged by the fact that in this examination he pays explicit attention to the 
friendships of virtuous people. It is to this possibility that I will now turn. It is important 
to note, however, that any given observation about friendship that seems to speak against 
                                                 
368
 That the above considerations are more “speeches” is observed by Annas (Morality of Happiness, 255, 
note 31), Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 169-70), and Reeve (Nicomachean Ethics, 332, note 746), but 
they fail to conclude from this that they are therefore not the facts that Aristotle mentions. 
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the selflessness of friends is unlikely to settle the matter outright. There are too many 
apparent examples of friends sacrificing for their friends for this to be the case.
369
 It is 
therefore better to approach each supposed observation that Aristotle adduces as part of a 
larger body of evidence that, taken together, may tip the scales away from the view that 
friends are selfless. 
c. Aristotle’s Principle of Friendship Dissolution 
Before we proceed to these observations, we must first recognize an important principle 
that Aristotle makes use of in his investigation of friendship. This principle is “that on 
account of which people were friends being destroyed, the friendship is also dissolved, 
since the friendship exists in relation to these things.”370 According to this principle, the 
conditions under which friendships dissolve reveal the conditions under which they 
existed. Aristotle can thus shine light on the true bases of friendship by looking to what 
conditions dissolve it. 
d. Friendship Dissolves with Distance 
 i. Friendship is mutually recognized goodwill 
As I discussed before,
371
 Aristotle initially defines goodwill (εὔνοια) as “wishing good 
things [for someone] for that person’s sake” (1155b31);372 and friendship as mutually 
recognized goodwill: 
For [people say that] goodwill among those who experience it in return is 
friendship. Or must “while not escaping each other’s notice” be added in 
addition? For many have goodwill for those who they do not know, but who they 
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 Pangle makes this point well (Philosophy of Friendship, 59). 
370
 ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. See, also, 
1164a8-10, 1165a36-b4. 
371
 See Chapter 1, section b.v. 
372
 βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. 
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suppose to be virtuous or useful. But some of these people may experience this 
same thing with regard to this person [who has goodwill towards them]. These 
would manifestly have goodwill towards each other, but how could someone say 
that they are friends while it escapes their notice that they are so disposed to each 
other? (1155b33-1156a3).
373
 
 
Mutually recognized goodwill thus appears to be the definition friendship.  
 However, it soon turns out that only some of those whom the Greeks were in the 
habit of calling “friends” (φίλοι) truly live up to this standard of friendship, namely, 
virtuous friends, who genuinely love each other for their own sake and, Aristotle adds, 
because of their virtue:  
Perfect friendship is the friendship of the virtuous and of those who are similar 
according to virtue, for these, in the same way, wish good things for each other 
insofar as they are good, and they are good with respect to themselves. And those 
who wish the good things for their friends for their sake are most especially 
friends. (1156b7-10, my emphasis).
374
 
 
Virtue friendship
375
 is “perfect friendship” because “those who wish good things for their 
friends for their sake are most especially friends.”376 This implies that wishing good 
things for their friends for their friend’s sake is a unique feature of virtue friends.377 That, 
in Aristotle’s eyes, only virtue friends appear to meet the initial definition of friendship 
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 εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς 
οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι 
πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν 
ἑαυτοῖς; 
374
 Τελεία δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται 
ἀλλήλοις ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ καθ’ αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα 
φίλοι. 
375
 I will use “virtue friends” as shorthand for “friends on account of virtue” (δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι, 1162b7) and 
“virtue friendship” to refer to the friendship of such friends.  
376
 For the sense of “perfect” (τελείον) here, see Metaphysics 1021b30-1022a1.  
377
 See 1167a18-21; compare Eudeimian Ethics 1241a2-10. This is the view of Percival (Aristotle on 
Friendship, 15-16), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 277, notes to paragraphs §1 and §4), Price (Love and 
Friendship, 139, 146, 153-4), and Pakaluk (An Introduction, 269-71). 
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also explains why he sometimes speaks as if non-virtue friends are not really friends.
378
 
According to the strict standard of his first definition, they are not, but, according to a 
looser standard that accommodates popular usage, they can be considered friends, though 
of a less “perfect” type.379 
 There is an alternative interpretation, inaugurated by Cooper, that sees goodwill as 
present in all forms of friendship.
380
 Cooper is challenged (successfully in my view) by 
Price and Pakaluk, who argue (i) he relies too much on the chapter divisions that derive 
from later editors. He therefore grants too much finality to the initial definition and 
division of friendship when it is merely one moment in an ongoing investigation;
381
 and 
(ii) Aristotle fairly clearly denies the presence of goodwill among “use” and “pleasure” 
friendships.
382
 
ii. Friendship is the mutual wish to live life together 
However, Aristotle’s first definition of friendship soon encounters a difficulty. This 
difficulty stems from his observation that friends “forget” their friendship when they are 
absent from each other for a long time: 
For the [distant] locations do not dissolve the friendship without qualification, but 
the activity. But if the absence becomes lengthy, then it also seems to make the 
                                                 
378
 See 1157a14-16, 1158a18, 1164a6-12, 1165b1-4, 1167a10-21. 
379
 See 1157a20-32. Compare the usage of “circle.” Strictly speaking, only shapes whose boundaries are 
equidistant from the center are “circles,” but we commonly call “circles” shapes that are sufficiently similar 
to “perfect” or “true” circles.  
380
 For this view, see Cooper “Forms of Friendship”; Whiting, “Nicomachean Account,” 281-3; Pangle, 
Philosophy of Friendship, 45-7. 
381
 For this criticism, see Price, Love and Friendship, 138, first paragraph, 150; Pakaluk, Books VIII and IX, 
62, bottom paragraph. 
382
 For this criticism, see Price, Love and Friendship, 152-4; Pakaluk, Books VIII and IX, 63, bottom 
paragraph. 
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friendship forgotten, from which it has been said “many friendships a lack of 
contact dissolves.” (1157b10-13).383 
 
Aristotle adds no qualification to this statement. As is independently plausible, this 
“forgetting” then occurs even for virtue friends, and even if they continue to believe their 
absent friends possess virtue.  
 We may wonder, as Pakaluk does, what exactly “forgotten” means.384 It at least 
means that the persistent disposition (ἕξις) that constitutes friendship385 ceases to exist,386 
though perhaps a trace remains;
387
 hence Aristotle’s quotation of a proverb that speaks of 
friendships “dissolving.” Because there is a certain resistance to the fact that distance 
dissolves friendship (see discussion of Aspasius below), he uses palliating language, 
perhaps imitating virtuous people themselves. 
 Aristotle thus revises his earlier, more optimistic position that “the friendship of 
these [i.e., virtuous] people lasts as long as they are virtuous” (1156b11-12). 388  As 
Aquinas observes:  
He says that if the absence of friends from one another is prolonged, it seems to 
cause forgetfulness of a previous friendship. In this way other habits are also 
weakened and finally disappear from lack of use. As habits are acquired by 
practice, they must be preserved by practice, for everything is preserved by its 
cause. For that reason it has become proverbial that many friendships are 
destroyed through a man’s neglect to call upon his friend, to converse and 
associate with him. (Commentary, paragraph 1597). 
 
Aspasius, on the other hand, senses the difficult implications of Aristotle’s observation 
                                                 
383
 οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ 
τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται “πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.” 
384
 See his comment on 1157b11-13. 
385
 See 1157b5-7, 28-32; compare Eudemian Ethics 1237a30-4. 
386
 See Aquinas, Commentary, paragraph 1597. 
387
 See 1165b32-6. 
388
 διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν. Contrast Pakaluk, Books VIII and IX, 70, first 
paragraph. 
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and adds in an exception for virtue friends that Aristotle does not: 
But whenever the absence becomes lengthy, he says, it seems to make the 
friendship forgotten. He did well to add here the “seems,” for since those who are 
friends on account of pleasure or use become forgetful of friendship, it seems to 
most people that friendship is like this, easily dissolved and diminished by 
absence, whenever it should become lengthy. But the friendship of the virtuous is 
not like this; rather, it is solid and lasting, and nothing is stronger than it, neither 
time nor division of place. (Commentaria, 171, lines 1-8).
389
 
 
We have seen that Aristotle observes that prolonged distance dissolves friendship and 
that he makes no exception for virtue friends. If we then apply Aristotle’s principle of 
friendship dissolution to this observation of a situation that dissolves friendship, we can 
conclude that the presence of the virtuous friend, and not his virtue per se, is “that on 
account of which” virtuous friends are friends. This would indeed explain his observation 
that, when virtue friends are absent for a long time, they find themselves “forgetting” 
their friendship, including, presumably, their love for their friends’ happiness.390  
I say “presumably” because Aristotle identifies two “aspects” of the persistent 
disposition that is friendship: enjoying each other’s presence and providing each other 
with good things.
391
 Thus, if the disposition to secure the friend’s good remained after 
long separation, the friendship would not really be “forgotten.” The “benefactory” aspect 
                                                 
389
 ἂν δὲ χρόνιος, φησίν, ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας λήθην δοκεῖ ποιεῖν. εὖ δὲ προσέθηκεν ἐνταῦθα 
τὸ δοκεῖν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φίλοι ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον λήθην λαμβάνουσι τῆς φιλίας, ἂν χρόνιος ἡ 
ἀπουσία γίνηται, δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς τοιοῦτον ἡ φιλία εἶναι, εὐδιάλυτον καὶ ἀμαυρούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς 
ἀπουσίας, ὅταν χρόνιος ᾖ. οὐ μὴν ἥ γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοιαύτη ἀλλὰ βέβαιος καὶ μόνιμος καὶ οὐδὲν κρεῖττον 
αὐτῆς οὔτε χρόνος οὔτε διάστασις ἡ κατὰ τόπον. Compare Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, V.3.17-23 and 
note “the most misanthropic of proverbs” (τῇ μισανθρωποτάτῃ τῶν παροιμιῶν). 
390
 This is Aquinas’ view (Commentary, paragraph 1597 with 1596). 
391
 See 1157b5-10. 
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of friendship thus turns out to depend on our enjoyment of our friend’s presence, as 
Aristotle pretty much states in IX.5.
392
  
The dependence on the benefactory aspect of friendship on our enjoyment of our 
friend’s presence can be explained in the following ways: (i) we wish our friends to have 
those good things that most allow us to enjoy their company, such as freedom from 
despair or pressing need;
393
 (ii) we especially participate in the joys of our present 
friends, we therefore wish them to enjoy good things around us; (iii) sharing a good or 
pleasure with a friend is more pleasant than enjoying it by oneself, we therefore wish our 
friends to share good things with us so that we may enjoy them more intensely.
394
 
That virtuous friends primarily wish for each other’s presence, rather than each 
other’s happiness, would also explain why virtuous people are not friends with every 
person they believe to be virtuous,
395
 but rather with those whose companionship they 
especially enjoy.
396
 In other words, virtuous people are friends “on account of virtue” 
insofar as they seek the companionship of a virtuous friend. But if friends primarily wish 
for the presence of their friends, and not their happiness per se, then the primary wish of 
                                                 
392
 See section d.iii. This is also Pakaluk’s view (Books VIII and IX, 84, bottom paragraph). 
393
 On this point, see Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics, 249; Pakaluk, ibid. 
394
 On this last point, see 1171b12-14, Eudemian Ethics 1244b17-18, 1245a18-20. That sharing good things 
with our friends increases our enjoyment of them is also observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 40, 
bottom paragraph). 
395
 On this problem, see Millgram, “Other Selves,” 362, bottom paragraph; Konstan, Friendship, 75, first 
paragraph. 
396
 See 1157b13-16, 1158a1-7, 10-14, 1167a3-12 with 18-20; compare Eudemian Ethics 1237a40-b7, 
Magna Moralia II.11.26-27. That virtuous people are friends with those whose companionship they 
especially enjoy is well observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1608, 1610), Pakaluk (Books VIII 
and IX, 85, first paragraph, 89, second and third paragraphs) and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 42, first 
paragraph, 54, second paragraph, 55, bottom paragraph). 
130 
 
friends falls short of goodwill as it was initially defined.
397
 Aristotle’s initial definition of 
friendship therefore fails to match the primary wish of friends. It should consequently be 
rejected and replaced with the mutual wish for the presence of the other or the mutual 
wish to “live life together” (συζῆν). 
This is in fact the very change that Aristotle makes immediately following his 
observation that friendship is dissolved by prolonged distance: 
Those who approve of each other but do not spend their lives together are more 
like those who have goodwill than friends, for nothing belongs to friendship in the 
way that spending one’s life together does. (1157b17-19).398 
 
Aristotle thus rejects mutually recognized goodwill as the essence of friendship and 
replaces it with the mutual wish to live life together, or if friendship essentially involves 
several characteristics, then the most important of them is now the mutual wish to live 
life together and not goodwill.
399
  
 To better grasp what Aristotle is doing, it is useful to cite a passage from the 
Eudemian Ethics: 
It seems to some that a friend is the one who wishes good things for someone, or 
the sorts of things he thinks good, not on account of himself, but for the sake of 
that person. And in another way, the person would seem most especially to love 
who wishes existence for someone because of that person, not himself, even if he 
should not distribute good things to that person, not even existence. And in 
another way, the one who chooses to live life together with someone for the sake 
                                                 
397
 That the wish for the presence of the other falls short of goodwill, as it was initially defined, is well 
observed by Joachim (The Nicomachean Ethics, 249) and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 40, bottom 
paragraph). 
398
 οἱ δ’ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ 
φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν. The demotion of goodwill, and the elevation of living life together, is again 
emphasized at 1158a1-10. For a discussion of these two passages, see Chapter 1, section b.v. 
399
 That living life together is more essential to friendship than mutually recognized goodwill is well 
observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1600), Gauthier and Jolif (comment on 1155b27-1156a3), 
and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 54, bottom paragraph). Pakaluk notes this “surprising” change in 
Aristotle’s account (Books VIII and IX, 84, top paragraph). I hope to have explained why Aristotle makes 
this change. 
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of the association itself, not for the sake of anything else, for example, fathers 
wish that their children exist, but they live their lives with others. And all these 
views are in conflict with each other. (Eudemian Ethics 1240a23-31).
400
 
 
There is thus a conflict between the different possible definitions of a friend. What 
Aristotle does in the Nicomachean Ethics is resolve this conflict in favor of “living life 
together,” just as he does in the Politics.401  
 I therefore conclude that Aristotle’s first definition of friendship as mutually 
recognized “popular” goodwill was merely a preliminary one—one which he indicates 
was especially oriented by the popular understanding of friendship.
402
 Aristotle chooses 
to begin his investigation from this position precisely because it reflects a popular and 
attractive view of friendship. As in other cases of his investigative procedure, he wishes 
to bring to light the deficiencies of an attractive view, which deficiencies first appear in 
the observation that prolonged distance dissolves friendship. Then, after observing these 
deficiencies, he replaces his preliminary account of friendship with a second account that 
can be plausibly inferred from the fact that prolonged distance dissolves friendships. 
 However, that prolonged distance dissolves friendship is not the only reason why 
Aristotle rejects mutually recognized goodwill as the definition of friendship. He also 
makes one further observation and gives one further argument that support his rejection 
                                                 
400
 δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἴεται ἀγαθά, μὴ δι' αὑτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· 
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ δι' αὑτὸν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανέμων τἀγαθά, μὴ τοι τὸ 
εἶναι τούτῳ, ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἱρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' 
ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς 
ἄλληλα. 
401
 See 1280b38-9; compare Rhetoric 1389a35-1389b1. Gauthier and Jolif observe this point well; see their 
comment on 1155b27-1156a3 with their comment on 1166a1-10. 
402
 Note φάσι, λέγουσιν, “people say,” in 1155b31-4; compare Magna Moralia II.xii.6-7. The popular 
character of the first definition is well observed by Joachim (The Nicomachean Ethics, 246, first 
paragraph), Pakaluk (comment on 1155b29-31, note “Aristotle’s evident reliance on endoxa”), and Burger 
(Aristotle’s Dialogue, 163, bottom paragraph).  
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of his initial definition.  
First, if friendship exists primarily with a view to living life together, then those 
with whom it is easy to spend one’s days should be prone to making friends, while those 
with whom it is difficult should not. But this is what Aristotle claims we actually observe: 
Friendship comes to be less among the sour and the old, to the degree that they 
are more irritable and enjoy associating less, for these things seem to be most 
especially characteristic of friendship and productive of it. This is why the young 
make friends quickly, but the old do not, for nobody becomes friends with those 
who they do not enjoy. Similarly, sour people do not make friends quickly either. 
(1158a1-7).
403
 
 
That friendship exists primarily with a view to living life together is therefore in harmony 
with the observed facts and helps explain them.
404
  
And second, Aristotle argues that those who live life together but do not exchange 
benefits (because of their good fortune) are clearly friends,
405
 but those who exchange 
benefits but do not live life together are not really friends:
406
 Therefore, living life 
together is more essential to friendship than exchanging benefits, even when people do so 
out of mutually recognized goodwill.
407
  
 iii. Friendship and goodwill 
We have seen that Aristotle comes to reject mutually recognized goodwill as the 
definition of friendship. What are the implications of this rejection for the existence of 
                                                 
403
 Ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς 
ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι 
ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. See, also, 
1157b13-16; compare Eudemian Ethics 1237b4-7. 
404
 This point is well observed by Heliodorus (Paraphrasis, 170, lines 26-29), Aquinas (Commentary, 
paragraphs 1598, 1607-8), and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 88, third paragraph). 
405
 See 1157b17-22. 
406
 See 1158a7-10 and note “but they are not quite friends” (φίλοι δ’ οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ); compare 1165b26-31. 
407
 This argument for the centrality to friendship of “living life together” is well observed by Aquinas 
(Commentary, paragraphs 1600, 1608) and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 84, bottom two paragraphs, 88, 
bottom paragraph). 
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goodwill among friends? Logically speaking, the fact that the mutual wish to live life 
together, and not mutually recognized goodwill, is the essence, or at least the most 
important essential characteristic, of friendship does not imply that friends fail to exhibit 
goodwill.
408
 Nevertheless, the reasoning that leads Aristotle to reject goodwill as the 
definition of friendship does plausibly suggest that friends do not exhibit goodwill insofar 
as they are friends.  
 We saw that Aristotle was motivated to reject mutually recognized goodwill as the 
essence of friendship by the observation that prolonged distance dissolves friendship. 
This observation, in turn, implied that the continual presence of the friend is a condition 
of friendship. But since friendship manifestly includes being disposed to benefit one’s 
friend, and since this disposition should also be dissolved by prolonged distance, the 
benefactory disposition that is proper to friendship turned out to depend on the continual 
presence of the friend (and not on his virtue per se). I then suggested three plausible ways 
to explain this dependence. However, none of these ways results in the benefactory 
disposition that is proper to friendship meeting the standard of goodwill. It therefore 
appears that the benefactory disposition that is proper to friendship falls short of 
goodwill. 
 However, the conclusion that friends do not exhibit goodwill insofar as they are 
friends would appear to be contradicted by IX.5. Though this chapter again emphasizes 
that mutually recognized goodwill is not the essence of friendship,
409
 it appears to uphold 
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 Compare Eudemian Ethics 1241a12-14. 
409
 Gauthier and Jolif see that Aristotle in this chapter rejects mutually recognized goodwill as the definition 
of friendship (comment on 1166b30), which they consider an Academic definition (ibid.; they are referring 
to the first two “marks of friendship” at 1166a2-6), though they claim at the same time that Aristotle 
134 
 
the presence of goodwill among virtue friends. Aristotle says, 
It is reasonable that goodwill is the starting point of friendship, just as the 
pleasure through sight is the starting point of loving passionately, for nobody 
loves passionately without having before been pleased by someone’s looks, but 
the one who takes pleasure in someone’s looks does not for all that love 
passionately, but when he longs for the person who is absent and desires their 
presence. In the same way, people would not be able to be friends if they did not 
have goodwill, but those who have goodwill do not for all that love, for they only 
wish good things for those for whom they have goodwill, but they would not 
assist them at all, and neither would they be troubled (i.e., experience emotional 
disturbance)
410
 on account of them. On account of this, someone could say 
metaphorically that goodwill is “lazy friendship,” but existing for a time and 
reaching the point of habitual association, it becomes friendship. (1167a3-12).
411
 
 
However, as Aristotle here claims, this “goodwill” is incapable of causing us to act and 
even to “love” (φιλῶ).412 Further, it exists without “tension” and “longing” (διάτασις and 
ὄρεξις),413 the second of which is elsewhere said to be an essential feature of “wish” 
(βούλησις).414 Neither do we feel “troubled” when the object of this “goodwill” fails to 
prosper, which in the Rhetoric is said to be a necessary sign of a genuine wish for 
                                                                                                                                                 
upholds his earlier definition from VIII.2 (comment on 1167a10-21). However, this is only because they 
read Aristotle’s earlier definition as obliquely referring to “living life together” or “l’intimité” (comment on 
1155b27-1156a3). That IX.5 rejects mutually recognized goodwill as the essence of friendship is also 
observed by Pakaluk (comment on 1166b32-4), though he changes his view later (see subsequent 
discussion). 
410
 Compare ὀχληθέντες in 1171b18-19 with context. That we fail to be emotionally troubled over those 
who we merely have goodwill toward is also the reading of Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1825). It 
may also be Michael of Ephesus’. Note that in Commentaria 488, lines 23-6 συγκακοπαθεῖν (“to suffer 
with”) appears to stand in for ὀχλεῖσθαι καὶ θορυβεῖσθαι (“...and to be disturbed”). Ross, on the other hand, 
translates ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν as “take trouble for them.” On this reading, Aristotle would be reiterating 
that we do not choose to help those toward whom we have (mere) goodwill. 
411
 ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς 
ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω 
δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ 
μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ'ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις 
ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν. 
412
 Compare 1157b28-31. People love “with choice,” and choice stems from a persistent disposition. 
However, those who have goodwill lack precisely this, since they are in no way disposed to do (or choose) 
anything for the object of their goodwill.  
413
 See 1166b33. 
414
 For ὄρεξις as an essential feature of wish, see Eudemian Ethics 1223a26-7, De Anima 414b2, 433a22-3. 
This discrepancy is well-noted by Pakaluk, see Books VIII and IX, 178, second paragraph. 
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another’s good, “for all rejoice when the things which they wish for come to be, and all 
are pained at the contrary, so that pains and pleasures are a sign of wish” (1381a5-7).415 
 One could thus could argue on Aristotelian grounds that the abovementioned 
“goodwill” is not a genuine wish in the following ways: (a) every wish is a sort of 
longing (ὄρεξις),416 but this “goodwill” is not accompanied by longing; therefore, it is not 
a genuine wish;
417
 (b) every sort of longing, including wish, is accompanied by an 
“internal tension” (διάτασις) that is “relaxed” when it is satisfied (we “feel lighter” when 
we acquire the object of a longing), but this “goodwill” is not accompanied by internal 
tension; therefore, it is not a genuine wish, though perhaps Aristotle would reject the first 
premise;
418
 and (c) when a wish is frustrated we are troubled or distressed to some 
degree,
419
 but we are not troubled or distressed when the object of this “goodwill” fails to 
prosper; therefore, this “goodwill” is not a genuine wish.420 
In light of these difficulties, it may be that this “goodwill” is not actually a 
positive wish. Rather, it is the absence and inhibition of ill will toward someone (on 
account of their virtue)
421
 combined with the pretence of, or even self-deception 
regarding, a positive wish for their happiness, as when we politely “wish” someone to 
                                                 
415
 γιγνομένων γὰρ ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως 
σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. For the whole passage, see Rhetoric 1381a3-7. Compare Aspasius, 
Commentaria, 170, lines 24-6; Heliodorus, In Ethica Nicomachea Praphrasis, 207, lines 16-17. 
416
 See note 414. 
417
 Michael of Ephesus seems to be on the verge of drawing this conclusion. See Commentaria, 486, lines 
21-8, though note “urging wish” (τὴν ἠπειγμένην βούλησιν), i.e., perhaps he takes Aristotle to be 
distinguishes between “urging” and “non-urging” wishes, only the former of which qualifies as a “longing” 
(ὄρεξις). 
418
 See Topics 146a36-b2, where he mentions a definition of wish as “painless longing” (ὄρεξιν ἄλυπον). 
419
 See note 415.  
420
 In this regard, it is interesting to note that goodwill (εὔνοια) is explicitly distinguished from the wish to 
benefit another in the Magna Moralia (II.xii.8). 
421
 See 1155b34-1156a1, 1167a18-19. 
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have a good day
422 —a pretence, or self-deception, that Aristotle delicately 
accommodates.  
There is precedent for Aristotle accommodating pretence or self-deception. We 
saw before that he uses palliating language—“forgotten”—that helps disguise the (harsh) 
fact that prolonged distance dissolves friendships. I noted in the previous section that 
there is a certain idealistic resistance to this observation. We saw it in the fact that 
Aspasius adds in an exception for virtue friends that Aristotle does not and goes on to 
describe the indomitable strength of friendship in almost poetic terms. We saw it also in 
the fact that Athenaeus declares the proverb “friends who live in a far away country are 
not friends” (Deipnosophistae 5.3.21) 423  to be “the most misanthropic of proverbs” 
(5.3.19).
424
 That he is aware of this resistance is presumably why Aristotle uses the 
palliating language he does.  
Another example of Aristotle accommodating pretence or self-deception can be 
found in his discussion of friends who first give what appears to be a generous gift but 
later expect a repayment. He says this happens because “all or most people wish for kala 
things, but choose the beneficial things.” (1162b35-6).425  The fact that “all or most” 
people choose beneficial things instead of kalon ones surely shows that they either (i) do 
not actually wish for the kala things or (ii) wish for them less than beneficial things (or 
                                                 
422
 Pakaluk offers this example in An Introduction (262, first paragraph), though, pace Pakaluk, this is most 
commonly not an example of a genuine wish. On the phenomenon of “fanciful” or self-deceived love for 
others, see Kant, Ethics, 29-30. Consider, also, the self-serving claims of unrequited lovers to deserve to be 
loved because they are dedicated to their beloved’s happiness (1159b16-19, 1164a2-4). Presumably, the 
lovers do not claim they should be loved because they erotically desire the beloved, but rather because they 
desire his happiness; compare Phaedrus 255b3-b7, 255e4-256a5. 
423
 τηλοῦ φίλοι ναίοντες οὔκ εἰσιν φίλοι. 
424
 τῇ μισανθρωποτάτῃ τῶν παροιμιῶν. Incidentally, in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle cites with approval 
the following proverb: “far away friends are a burden.” (μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι, 1245a23). 
425
 τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. 
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the goods the beneficial things brings). However, Aristotle here refrains from drawing 
this conclusion. He allows the pretence to stand that “all or most” people actually wish 
for what is kalon, but somehow fail to choose it. As Pangle observes, “They [friends who 
choose what is beneficial over what is kalon] can wish for one thing and choose another 
because they actually wish for the second thing even more, but without fully 
acknowledging it to themselves” (Philosophy of Friendship, 126). 
A third example can be found in Aristotle’s discussion of when we should invite 
our friends to share in our suffering. He says we should imitate those who hold back from 
sharing their suffering with their friends, “for one should share evil things as little as 
possible” (1171b17).426 And he cites with approval the saying “I myself suffering is 
enough.”427 One the other hand, he says that we should eagerly go “unasked” (ἄκλητος) 
to the side of our friends when they are suffering.
428
 In other words, the noble, suffering 
friend is unwilling to ask his friends to join him in his suffering but he willingly receives 
them if they go “unasked.” (1171b17). That way, he can pretend that he isn’t choosing 
something that will benefit himself, but cause his friends pain. As Aquinas puts it: 
A friend appropriately confers benefits [i.e., unbidden] especially on those who 
are in need and are ashamed, or think it unbecoming to ask this of a friend…the 
reason is that the giver seems to bestow more spontaneously and the beneficiary 
to act more virtuously in being reluctant to burden a friend. This is also more 
satisfying to both, since the recipient does not feel the embarrassment that a man 
suffers in making a request of a friend. (Commentary, paragraph 1940, my 
emphasis).
429
 
That what is at issue here is appearance is also suggested by the parallel passage in the 
                                                 
426
 μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν. 
427
 ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν. 
428
 See 1171b21-2. 
429
 Compare paragraph 1942, and note “it is not proper to show oneself eager to accept help from a 
friend.” (my emphasis). 
138 
 
Eudemian Ethics: 
It seems to people that one should not choose what is good for oneself (i.e., when 
it would be bad for one’s friend). On account of which, people prevent their 
friends from sharing their sorrows, since it is enough that they themselves are 
suffering, in order that they not visibly be seeking their own good and choosing to 
feel pleasure while their friend is pained. (1245b37-1246a1, my emphasis).
430
 
As in the Nicomachean Case, the friend here is primarily concerned with avoiding the 
appearance—either to others or himself—of seeking what is good for himself at the 
expense of his friends. This is why, when Aristotle returns to this topic, he does not say 
that friends do not wish for the presence of their friends if it would cause their friends 
pain. Rather, he says that friends wish for the presence of their friends whenever it would 
be more pleasant for themselves.
431
 
Lorraine Pangle, on the other hand, considers the Nicomachean discussion to 
involve a different self-deception on the part of the suffering friend, namely, that his 
unsuffering friend would enjoy helping him insofar as he (a) performs a noble action and 
(b) appreciates his greater happiness in comparison to his suffering friend. Thus, the 
suffering friend does not wish his friend to help him out of pride or envy, and he 
rationalizes keeping his friend at bay by exaggerating the pain that his friend would 
experience.
432
  
On the other hand, if Aristotle is not accommodating a pretence or self-deception 
in his discussion of goodwill in IX.5, he must be revising his classification of wish. We 
would then have to distinguish between strong and slight wishes, the latter which fail to 
                                                 
430
 δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὑτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα 
μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὑτῶν σκοποῦντες [καὶ] αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν < καὶ> λυπουμένου τοῦ φίλου. 
431
 See Eudemian Ethics 1246a10-20. 
432
 See Philosophy of Friendship, 193, bottom paragraph, and what follows. 
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be “longings” (ὀρέξεις) and, unlike strong wishes, do not involve pleasure or pain when 
they are fulfilled or frustrated. We would then have to understand Aristotle’s other 
comments about “wish” to be about strong wish, and not slight wish, and we must also 
reject his classification of “wish” as a species of “longing”; it is only “strong” wishes that 
are a species of “longing.” 433  Or does ὄρεξις here not mean “longing” but rather 
“striving,”434? However, its pairing with “tension” does suggest that Aristotle is talking 
about internal conditions not external behavior.  
 In sum, if we adopt the first of the above three readings, friendship would not 
involve genuine goodwill. If we adopt the second or the third, it would, but this goodwill 
would be a sort of vestigial condition that is (a) of such weakness that it is practically 
impossible for it to motivate us to act;
435
 and (b) distinct from the benefactory disposition 
that is proper to friendship (since that disposition does motivates us to act).  
Whichever of these readings we adopt, one thing will be true. The benefactory 
disposition that actually motivates friends to benefit each other falls short of goodwill—
that is, falls short of involving wishing good things for the friend for his own sake. For if 
goodwill is, as it was earlier said to be, “wishing good things for the other’s sake,”436 and 
if effective friendly love involved wishing good things for the friend’s own sake, then 
effective friendly love would actually be a form of goodwill. But Aristotle denies this by 
(a) relegating goodwill to the starting point of friendship only; and (b) calling it a “weak” 
                                                 
433
 This may be Michael’s view; see note 417. 
434
 “Reach out” is the basic meaning of the related verb, ὀρέγω. 
435
 This is Aquinas’ view (Commentary, paragraph 1823). 
436
 See 1155b31-2, 1167a15-17.  
140 
 
or “superficial” wish.437 This confirms my conclusion at the beginning of this section that 
the benefactory disposition that is proper to friendship falls short of goodwill, though we 
have seen that he may allow for the presence of a genuine but ineffective goodwill among 
friends. 
Regardless of whether the goodwill that is the “starting point” of friendship is 
pretence or self-deception or genuine but ineffective, what must be added to convert it 
into the (effective) benefactory disposition that is proper to friendship is “habitual 
association” (συνήθεια)—that is, it is reasonable to add, enjoyable habitual association.438 
Here too, then, Aristotle traces the benefactory disposition that is proper to friendship not 
to the recognition of the virtue of another, but rather to their enjoyable presence. To quote 
Heliodorus, “Habitual association and spending time together makes friendships.” (Ethica 
Nicomachea Paraphrasis, 170, lines 28-29, my emphasis).
439
 This confirms my earlier 
conclusion that the benefactory disposition that is proper to friendship depends on our 
enjoyment of our friend’s presence. 
 Michael Pakaluk recognizes that Aristotle’s statements about goodwill in IX.5 
appear to contradict his earlier claims that (a) friendship is mutually recognized goodwill; 
and (b) the (effective) love that belongs to friends is a form of goodwill.
440
 However, 
instead of reading these differences as part of a revision of his initial account of 
friendship, as I have, Pakaluk (at least in his later work) argues that Aristotle is using 
                                                 
437
 See 1167a2-3. 
438
 On this point, see Aspasius, Commentaria, 170, lines 30-3. 
439
 ἡ γὰρ συνήθεια καὶ τὸ συνδιάγειν τὰς φιλίας ποιεῖ. This point is also observed by Michael of Ephesus 
(In Ethica Nicomachean Commentaria, 487, lines 12-15, 488, line 34-489, line 4) and Pangle (Philosophy 
of Friendship, 45, top paragraph, 54, bottom paragraph). 
440
 See Pakaluk, Books VIII and IX, 178. 
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“goodwill” in two different senses:  
As for friendship, Aristotle seems to think of it in the first instance as a certain 
kind of affection that one person can have for another—what we might call 
“friendliness” or “affability” (cf. 1105b22, 1108a28). But there are two distinctive 
notes of this sort of affection, Aristotle thinks: first, it wants or expects 
reciprocation (antiphilēsis, antiprohairesis); second, it aims at and seeks the good 
of the other person “for his sake” (autou heneka). Aristotle sometimes calls this 
second note “goodwill” as well—this would be “goodwill” in the narrow sense, 
previously mentioned. “Goodwill” in this restricted sense refers to the special 
character of that affection which is distinctive of friendship. (An Introduction, 
263, his emphasis). 
This distinction allows Pakaluk to read Aristotle’s claims about goodwill in IX.5 as 
having no implications for (a) the definition of friendship or (b) the character of effective 
friendly love. When Aristotle claims that goodwill is not friendship, only its starting 
point, he is not rejecting his earlier definition of friendship.
441
 Moreover, when he claims 
that goodwill does not result in action, he is not implying that the effective friendly love 
that friends have for each other, since it does result in action, falls short of goodwill or 
“wishing good things for the other for their own sake.” Rather, he is talking about 
goodwill in a different sense than before and calling this other “goodwill” weak and 
merely the starting point of friendship.
442
 However, that Aristotle is using goodwill in a 
different sense than before is far from clear. I have, at any rate, offered a way to interpret 
Aristotle’s statements about goodwill in IX.5 that does not require resorting to the 
hypothesis that he is there using the word in a different sense. 
iv. Why do friends wish to live life together? 
We have seen that Aristotle concludes that the mutual wish to live life together is the 
                                                 
441
 See Pakaluk, An Introduction, 261-3. 
442
 See ibid. 
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most essential characteristic of friendship. Since this condition is now of central 
importance to the phenomenon of friendship, he also attempts to explain why it is that 
friends wish for the presence of their friends. His explanation is that human beings, like 
other “social” animals, such as cattle, have a natural desire to live their lives with others 
of their own kind:
443
 
It would perhaps be strange to make a man who is alone blessed, for nobody 
would choose to have all the good things by himself, for a human being is a 
political animal and by nature lives his life with others. (1169b16-19, my 
emphasis).
444
 
 
Friends are therefore those who are stably disposed to come together to satisfy this 
natural, human desire. As Aristotle puts it in the Politics, “Even those who need no 
assistance from each other no less desire to live life together” (1278b20-1),445 while 
friendship, which is “the choice of living life together” (1280b38-9),446 aims at meeting 
this natural desire. 
That human beings possess a natural desire to share their lives with others is 
supported by Aristotle’s observation about the uncalculating friendships of the young:  
Friendship according to pleasure is more like friendship (i.e., “true” friendship),447 
whenever the same things come to be from both and both enjoy each other or the 
same things. The friendships of the young are like this, for there is more of the 
                                                 
443
 Aspasius (Commentaria, 171, lines 27-32) and Heliodorus (Paraphrasis, 202, lines 36-8, note “by 
nature desires to live life with others” (φύσει ὀρέγεται μετὰ ἄλλων ζῆν) observe this point well. This point 
is also observed by Ross (Aristotle, 230, first paragraph), Percival (Aristotle on Friendship, 35, note “as 
companionship is a natural need of human nature,” 132, bottom paragraph), Kahn (“Altruism,” 31, first 
paragraph), and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 203, second paragraph, 225, second paragraph). That 
friendship is rooted in a natural desire for companionship is also the view of Seneca (Epistle IX, 122, 
bottom paragraph).  
444
 ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν 
ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. Compare 1155a4-6, 1158a21-3. 
445
 καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρὰ ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν. 
446
 ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. 
447
 See note 379; Aaspasius, Commentaria, 173, lines 30-1. 
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freeborn (i.e., freedom from neediness)
448
 among these friendships (i.e. of the 
young), and friendship on account of what is useful is like something that belongs 
to the marketplace. (1158a18-21).
449
 
 
The point here is that the young, and even children, are drawn together not by calculation 
about their future needs—what “belongs to the marketplace”—which sort of calculation 
they are disinclined to anyway, but rather by the immediate desire for, and pleasure in, 
companionship and shared activity. As Aristotle puts it in the Rhetoric: 
[The young] live more by character than by calculation, and calculation concerns 
what is advantageous, but virtue concerns what is kalon. And they are friend-
lovers and companion-lovers more than people of other ages on account of taking 
pleasure in living life together and not yet deciding anything with a view to 
advantage, so that neither do they decide their friends this way. (1389a33-
1389b2).
450
 
 
The existence of the natural desire to share our lives with others can also be supported by 
the pain or distress that we feel in living an isolated life. It is not merely that, being 
deprived of friends, we live a life deprived of certain goods, but, as when other natural 
desires go unsatisfied, we experience positive pain or distress. Just as the condition of the 
prolonged dissatisfaction of hunger is “starvation,” and the condition of the prolonged 
dissatisfaction of sexual desire is “sexual frustration,” so the condition of the prolonged 
dissatisfaction of the natural desire to share our lives with others is “loneliness.” That 
Aristotle recognizes this condition is presumably why he says that “nobody would choose 
                                                 
448
 On this reading of τὸ ἐλευθέριον in contrast to τὸ ἀγοραίον, see Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics, 248 
(b). 
449
 τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς 
αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. 
Compare 1156a31-1156b6. 
450
 τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. 
καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ 
συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. That the friendships of children points to a natural desire 
for shared activity is also observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 197, first paragraph). 
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to live without friends, even if they had all the remaining goods” (1155a5-6);451 or, as he 
puts it in the Eudemian Ethics, “friendlessness and isolation are most terrible” 
(1234b33).
452
 That is, a life without friends is not merely a life in which we are deprived 
of a good; it is a life in which we positively suffer. 
That friendship is grounded in the natural desire to live our lives with others is 
also implied by Aristotle’s comparison of friendship and passionate love (ἔρως). He 
understands passionate love to involve a desire for the presence, or perhaps the perceived 
presence,
 453
 of the beloved, for “the one who takes pleasure in the looks (of another) 
does not for all that love passionately, but whenever he also longs for him when he is 
absent and desires his presence” (1167a6-7, my emphasis).454  
Then, in attempting to answer in IX.12 why the presence of friends is 
choiceworthy, Aristotle deploys a comparison between passionate love and friendship: 
The presence of friends appears to be choiceworthy in all situations. Is it the case, 
then, that just as among lovers seeing is most cherished and they choose this form 
of perception more than the others because, according to this, passionate love 
most especially comes into being and is; in this way, is living life together also 
most choiceworthy to friends? For friendship is a sharing in common, and as one 
is towards oneself, in this same way is he also towards a friend. And the 
perception concerning oneself that oneself exists is choiceworthy, so, too, is that 
concerning a friend. And the activity of it comes to be in living life together, so 
that friends reasonably aim at this. (1171b19-1172a1, my emphasis).
455
 
                                                 
451
 ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα. 
452
 τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν δεινότατον. 
453
 Compare 1167a4-7 with 1171b29-31; it is unclear whether “passionate love most especially is and 
comes to be according to this perception” (κατὰ ταύτην [αἴσθησιν] μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ 
γινομένου) in the second passage expresses the essential object of passionate love or an experience which 
sustains its existence. Gautheir and Jolif take the view that it is the desire for the perceived presence of the 
beloved (comment on 1164a3). 
454
 ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ. 
455
 ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ φαίνεται. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν 
ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος 
καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 
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As we have seen, passionate love is a particularly clear example of a natural condition 
that involves the desire for the presence, or perhaps the perceived presence,
456
 of another. 
And so, Aristotle wishes to make clear by comparing it to passionate love, is 
friendship.
457
  
 It is true that in the above passage Aristotle appears to be comparing the way that 
“living together is choiceworthy to friends” to the way that “sight is choiceworthy to 
erotic lovers,” but note that the choiceworthiness (to friends) of living life together is 
there explained by the choiceworthiness of the perception of the friend, which is clearly 
similar to the choiceworthiness of the perception (but, especially sight) of the beloved. As 
Michael of Ephesus puts it: 
To perceive and see the friend would therefore be choiceworthy. But it is not 
possible to see one who is absent. Therefore, the presence of him [the friend] is 
choiceworthy; from which it follows that to see him is also more choiceworthy 
than his being absent but hearing about what he is doing, insofar as not seeing him 
accompanies his being absent. (Commentaria, 527, lines 30-3).
458
 
 
I therefore take the similarity to ultimately be between the way that the perception of the 
friend is choiceworthy to friends and the way that the perception of the beloved is 
                                                                                                                                                 
ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· περὶ αὑτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ δ' 
ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. 
456
 See note 453. 
457
 The Eudemian Ethics makes this same comparison in reverse: “Erotic love seems to be similar to 
friendship, for the lover desires to live life together, but not in the way that he most especially should, but 
rather according to perception (i.e., the lover wishes to behold or touch the beloved, rather than to perceive 
him engaged in shared activity)” (ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλίᾳ ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἔρῶν, ἀλλ’ 
οὐκ ᾗ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ’ αἴσθησίν, 1245a24-6). Compare Laws 776a3-7. 
458
 καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἄρα καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον αἱρετὸν ἂν εἴη. ὁρᾶν δὲ ἀπόντα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἡ παρουσία 
ἄρα αὐτοῦ αἱρετή, ἐξ ἧς καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν αὐτόν ἐστι καὶ αἱρετωτέρα τῆς ἀπουσίας ᾗ ἕπεται τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν 
δέ ποτε πῶς ποτε διάγει. 
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choiceworthy to passionate lovers.
459
 
 In sum, like passionate lovers, friends possess a natural desire either for the 
presence or the perceived presence of the friend. If it is the first, then the presence of the 
friend becomes choiceworthy as the fulfillment of a natural desire, while the perception 
of his presence becomes choiceworthy as the awareness of ourselves in possession of the 
good that is the presence of our friend.
460
 If it is the second, then the presence of the 
friend becomes choiceworthy as a means to, or even a part of, our perception of his 
presence,
461
 while this perception itself becomes choiceworthy both as the fulfillment of a 
natural desire and, since every perception of another involves the perception that we are 
perceiving another,
462
 as the awareness of ourselves in possession of the good that is the 
perception of our friend’s presence. 
 I have argued that Aristotle’s comparison between friends and passionate lovers 
shows that (he thinks) friends possess a primitive desire either for the presence of their 
friend or for the perception of their friend’s presence. Following Aristotle’s lead, I 
associated this primitive desire with the natural human desire to live our life with others. I 
also claimed that he explains the choiceworthiness of the perception of the friend’s 
presence by appealing to this primitive desire.
463
 Michael Pakaluk, on the other hand, 
                                                 
459
 That the comparison between friendship and passionate love ultimately concerns the choiceworthiness 
of the perception of the beloved and friend also appears to be the view of Michael (Commentaria, 527, 
lines 21-35). 
460
 On the point that the awareness of ourselves in possession of a good is choiceworthy, see 1170b1-3, 8-
10; compare Eudemian Ethics 1245a39-1245b2. 
461
 That the presence of the friend is choiceworthy because it affords us the perception of him is the view of 
Michael (above quoted passage). 
462
 See 1170a29-32. 
463
 That the choiceworthiness of the perception of the friend is related to the natural desire to share our lives 
with others is also the view of Michael of Ephesus (Commentaria, 519, lines 9-15) and Pangle (Philosophy 
of Friendship, 189, bottom paragraph). Broadie comes close to this interpretation, but she doesn’t explicitly 
147 
 
offers a different account of why the perception of the friend is choiceworthy. While he 
agrees that we wish for the presence of our friends on account of our political or social 
nature,
464
 he takes Aristotle’s argument in IX.9 (in particular 1170a13-b12) to provide the 
more fundamental explanation for why the presence of our friends is choiceworthy.
465
  
In contrast, I take the argument in IX.9 to assume that the perception of our friend 
is choiceworthy without explaining why this is so:  
As the virtuous person is towards himself, so is he toward a friend (for the friend 
is another oneself). Therefore, just as oneself existing is choiceworthy for each, in 
this way so also is the existence of a friend, or nearly so. But existence was said to 
be choiceworthy on account of perceiving what is good belonging to oneself (i.e., 
including life itself), and this sort of perception is pleasant according to itself. 
Therefore, one should share the friend’s perception that he exists, and this would 
come to be in living life together and sharing in conversation and thought. 
(1170b5-11).
466
 
 
That is, Aristotle expects us to accept that the perception of our friend’s existence is 
choiceworthy just as is the perception of our own.
467
 However, why we find the 
perception of our friend’s existence to be choiceworthy remains to be explained. As 
Pangle observes, “In this passage, Aristotle does not, indeed, explain why we are initially 
drawn to others.” (Philosophy of Friendship, 189). This task is then taken up at the 
beginning of IX.12, immediately following his claim at the end of IX.11 that the presence 
                                                                                                                                                 
connect the choiceworthiness of the perception of the friend with our social nature; see Nicomachean 
Ethics, 64. 
464
 See Books VIII and IX, 203, paragraph two. 
465
 See his comment on 1170a13-b19. 
466
 ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν 
τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ 
τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας. 
467
 Compare Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, 299, note to paragraph §10. 
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of the friend is choiceworthy.
468
  
On the other hand, if Pakaluk’s interpretation is correct, then my claim that 
Aristotle explains the mutual wish for the other’s presence that is the most essential 
characteristic of friendship by appealing to the natural human desire to live life together 
is false. Rather, he would explain this wish by appealing to the general principle that “if 
having the relation T is choiceworthy, and T ~ U [where “~ signifies a similarity of 
relations”], then having the relation U is choiceworthy” (Books VIII and IX, 209). In 
other words, if perceiving our own existence, and especially our perception and thought, 
is choiceworthy, and if perceiving the existence of a friend, and especially his perception 
and thought, is like perceiving our own, then it would follow from this general principle 
that perceiving the existence of a friend, and especially his perception and thought, is 
choiceworthy.  
However, it is a weakness of Pakaluk’s interpretation that it requires the 
introduction of this hypothetical general principle that Aristotle does not state and that is 
not obvious. It is therefore unclear why he would have accepted it. I think it is preferable 
to read IX.9 in a way that does not require unstated, non-obvious principles. Especially if 
this reading makes better sense of the beginning of IX.12; that is, it still remains to be 
explained why the presence of the friend is choiceworthy. Aristotle then takes up this task 
through his comparison of friendship with passionate love. 
The natural, human desire to share our lives with others is thus the central reason 
why Aristotle thinks friends wish to live their lives together. However, he perhaps thinks 
                                                 
468
 Note, in this regard, the artificiality of the chapter division. 
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there is a further reason that is related to the fact that we seek the company of those who 
have the qualities that we admire. By sharing our lives with such people and observing 
their admirable qualities in action, we hope to imitate them and acquire, perfect, or even 
maintain these qualities in ourselves.
469
 This desire to imitate our friend’s admirable 
qualities can be seen in Aristotle’s description of how friendships among the virtuous 
provide a sort of training in virtue: 
The friendship of the virtuous is virtuous and is increased by their association, and 
the friends, being active together and correcting each other, seem to become even 
better, for they take imprints from each other of the things which please them, 
from which it is said ‘good things from good people’. (1172a10-14, my 
emphasis).
470
 
 
That is, friends provide each other with examples of qualities that they then imitate (if 
these qualities “please them”). As Aquinas puts it: “Friends become better by working 
together and loving each other. For one receives from the other an example of virtuous 
work which is at the same time pleasing to him.” (Commentary on the Nicoamchean 
Ethics, paragraph 1951, my emphasis).
471 
 
 This same desire to observe and imitate the admirable qualities of another is 
perhaps what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of lovers and beloveds who, after the 
youthful bloom of the beloved fades, “remain [friends] whenever, having the same 
character, they are fond of [each other’s] character from their habitual association” 
                                                 
469
 This point is well made in the Magna Moralia (II.xi.39). This aspect of friendship is well observed by 
Nehamas (“Alexander Nehamas on Friendship,” “Aristotelian Philia,” 217, bottom paragraph, 241-3) and 
Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 188).  
470
 ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες 
καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν “ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' 
ἐσθλά.” Compare 1159b3-7, 1170a8-13. 
471
 This point is also observed by Nussbaum (Fragility, 363, second paragraph). Consider, also, Heliodorus, 
Paraphrasis, 208, lines 18-25 and note “for they take imprints from each other of the good things in each of 
them, on account of which they love each other” (ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ’ ἀλλήλων τὰ παρ’ ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθά, 
δι’ ἃ φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, my emphasis). 
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(1157a10-12).
472
 This desire also appears in the friendships of vicious people, who 
“become friends for a short time, taking pleasure in each other’s wickedness” (1159b9-
10).
473
 That vicious people would be pleased by each other’s wickedness is only natural. 
As Aristotle notes, “there are unique things that are kalon (i.e., admirable or estimable) 
and pleasant according to each persistent disposition” (1113a31), 474  including, 
presumably, vicious ones.
475
 Therefore, even vicious people would desire the opportunity 
to observe and imitate the (vicious) qualities that they admire.
476
 
 v. Conclusion 
I have argued in this section that although Aristotle initially defines friendship as the 
mutually recognized wish for the friend’s good (for his sake), he ultimately concludes 
that friends primarily wish for each other’s presence. We also saw that he thinks friends 
wish for each other’s presence for at least two reasons. First, and most fundamentally, 
they have a natural desire to share their lives with others of their own kind. Second, 
friends desire the company of friends who possess the qualities that they admire. By 
being close to such a friend, they hope to acquire, perfect, and even maintain these 
qualities in themselves. 
 However, to wish for the presence of a friend because we have a natural desire to 
share our lives with others, and also so that we can observe and imitate their admirable 
qualities, is not to love a friend for their own sake. It is rather to love them for what they 
                                                 
472
 διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. 
473
 ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. 
474
 καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα. 
475
 Compare Republic 348e1-349a3. 
476
 Compare 1172a8-10. This is the opposite case of the training in virtue cited above, as is observed by 
Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1950, note “one becomes evil by imitating the other,” my emphasis). 
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provide to oneself—their presence and their example. And since, as Aristotle continually 
reminds us, the presence of a friend is both a great pleasure and a great good,
477
 it is 
plausible that this love is ultimately grounded in the friend’s love for his own pleasure or 
good. Aristotle’s final, as opposed to his merely preliminary, account of friendship, thus 
brings a self-regarding character to the primary love of (even virtuous) friends. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that friends, as friends, are disposed to benefit one 
another. Even if friends, as friends, do not aim primarily at each other’s good, they still 
possess an (effective) benefactory love. But if the benefactory love that is proper to 
friendship is dependent upon and tied to the friend’s presence in the ways that I have 
discussed,
478
 which is suggested by the observation that prolonged distance dissolves 
friendship, then the benefactory love that is characteristic of friendship falls short of 
loving the friend for his own sake or “goodwill.” This point was confirmed by the fact 
that in IX.5 Aristotle separates goodwill from the love that actually motivates friends to 
benefit each other. 
 In sum, both Aristotle’s conclusion that friends wish primarily for each other’s 
presence (which is something that is good and pleasant for themselves) and his 
conclusion that the benefactory love that friend’s possess falls short of goodwill suggest 
that friends, even virtuous friends, do not, as friends, overlook their own good for the 
sake of their friends. But these conclusions were primarily motivated by the observation 
that prolonged distance dissolves friendship. I therefore offer this observation as one of 
the alleged “facts” or “deeds” that speaks against the popular view that the virtuous 
                                                 
477
 See, for example, 1156b12-15, 1157b7-8, 19-22,1169b8-10, 16-21, 1171a27-29. 
478
 See sections d.ii and iii. 
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person overlooks his own good for the sake of his friends. 
e. Not Wishing Your Friend to Become A God 
A second, related, fact that contradicts the popular view of the virtuous person as self-
disregarding in relation to his friends appears in Aristotle’s investigation of friendships 
involving superiority. These are friendships that involve an important inequality between 
two friends. He claims that a friendship can only endure so much of this sort of 
inequality. And to illustrate this point, he points to the example of a god. A human being 
cannot be friends with a god because a god exceeds us in all important respects to the 
greatest possible degree:  
It is clear that [numerical equality is primary to friendship] when there comes to 
be a great difference of virtue or vice or resources or some other thing, for they 
are not longer friends but neither do they think they are worthy to be. And this is 
most clear in the case of gods, for these most exceed in all good things. (1158b33-
6).
479
 
 
Then, after making this point, Aristotle introduces the following perplexity:  
From which [sc. that there is no friendship between human beings and gods] the 
perplexity is raised that perhaps friends do not wish the greatest of goods for their 
friends, for example, to be gods, for they will no longer be friends to them, and 
neither will they be good things, for friends are good things. (1159a5-8).
480
 
 
Gods are understood by Aristotle to be perfectly blessed or “self-sufficient” beings,481 
that is, beings who need absolutely nothing else in addition to what they already possess. 
To become a god is therefore the greatest benefit that one could wish for one’s friend. It is 
to leave behind all neediness and deficiency forever. But, since a human being cannot be 
                                                 
479
 δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν 
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς 
ὑπερέχουσιν. 
480
 ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ’ οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς 
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. 
481
 See note 208. 
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friends with a god, this benefit would also bring about the destruction of the original 
friendship. Aristotle’s perplexity is therefore the perplexity of whether a friend would 
wish a good for his friend that would destroy the personal good he finds in their 
friendship. Which does the friend care more about in the end; his friend’s good or his 
own?
482
 
This perplexity can be analyzed into two “horns.” First, friends do not appear to 
wish the greatest goods for their friends “since” (γάρ) their friends possession of those 
goods would end the friendship and “since” (γάρ) friends are good things. Thus, wishing 
the greatest good for one’s friend is in effect wishing oneself to be deprived of a good 
thing without compensation,
483
 and one would not knowingly wish that. As Aristotle says 
earlier, “nobody chooses to harm himself” (1134b11-12).484  
The other horn of the perplexity is that we commonly think friends wish good 
things for their friends for their friend’s sake.485 This implies that friends wish for their 
friends’ possession of good things simply or as an end. But if friends wish simply for 
their friends to have good things, then they would also wish for their friends to have the 
                                                 
482
 This is Percival’s understanding of the perplexity (Aristotle on Friendship, 43). There is a contrary view 
about the character of this perplexity that casts it as a difficulty about whether we would wish for a good 
for our friend that would deprive him of the good of (our) friendship, but, as I have discussed before 
(Chapter 2, section b.iii), this is not a plausible interpretation. 
483
 Aristotle is presuming that since the friendship will be terminated, the original friend will not be 
sufficiently compensated for his loss, as is especially clear in the example of the friend becoming a god. 
This point is Pakaluk’s (Books VIII and IX, 97, second paragraph). Percival (ibid.) also thinks that the view 
that we would not wish for ourselves to suffer an uncompensated loss motivates this horn of the perplexity. 
484
 αὑτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν. Compare Hipparchus 227b6-9, Alcibiades I 115c8-d4, Meno 
78a4-b2, Protagoras 358c6-d4. 
485
 See 1155b31; compare Rhetoric 1380b35-1381a2. 
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greatest goods, since this is an example of them having good things.
486
 It therefore 
appears that friends both do and do not wish for their friends to have the greatest 
goods.
487
 
 Aristotle provides his solution to the general perplexity of whether friends wish 
for each other to have the greatest goods (when it would result in themselves being 
harmed or deprived) by solving the more particular perplexity of whether a friend would 
wish for his friend to become a god.
488
 His solution to the particular perplexity is as 
follows:  
If it has been well said that a friend wishes good things for his friend for his sake, 
he must remain the sort of being he is; the friend will wish the greatest goods for 
his friend as a human being. But perhaps not all good things, for each person most 
of all wishes good things for himself. (1159a8-12).
489
 
 
Aristotle here denies that we would actually wish that our friend become a god, even 
though this is the greatest imaginable good he could enjoy. If we do wish good things for 
our friend, he must remain a human being; that is, he must remain a friend, and therefore 
a good thing, to us. His solution to this particular perplexity therefore implies that friends 
care more about their own good, including the personal good they find in their 
friendships, then they do about the happiness of their friends per se. When friends believe 
that their friends’ possession of a certain good will at least greatly deprive themselves, 
                                                 
486
 This is Aspasius’ analysis of the second horn (Commentaria, 179, lines 14-16.) Heliodorus also makes 
the same general point, but with regard to wishing one’s friend to possess the greatest goods and wishing 
one’s friend to become a god (Paraphrasis, 174, lines 22-3). 
487
 For the general strategy behind this analysis of the perplexity, see Pakaluk’s comment on 1159a5-12. 
488
 Contrast Percival (Aristotle on Friendship, 43), who depicts Aristotle as avoiding the general perplexity. 
He misses that the answer to the specific perplexity already implies an answer to the general one, since the 
same considerations motivate both. To solve one is therefore to solve the other, though he perhaps ends up 
acknowledging this point; see 44. 
489
 εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ’ ἐστὶν 
ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ’ οὐ πάντα· αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ’ ἕκαστος 
βούλεται τἀγαθά. 
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they will not wish for their friend to possess that good. Aristotle thus solves the general 
perplexity of whether we would wish our friends the greatest goods (when this would 
harm or deprive ourselves) by qualifying or rejecting its second horn. 
It is interesting to note that Aspasius denies that this solution applies to virtue 
friends: “the things which he says next, when he asserts that the friend most especially 
wishes good things for himself, has not been said concerning those who have the primary 
form of friendship (i.e., virtue friendship), but concerning those who are said to be friends 
homonymously.” (Commentaria, 179, lines 16-18).490 He thus adds in an exception that 
Aristotle importantly does not.
491
 This is another example of Aspasius taking a more 
idealistic view than Aristotle himself does.
492
  
The nature of Aristotle’s solution to the particular perplexity of whether we would 
wish our friends to become gods is also misunderstood in the following way. Some 
commentators
493
 understand the solution to be that our wish for the good of our friend is 
essentially a wish for our friend to have good things as a human being; that is, we do not 
wish our friend to have “divine” goods because the “content” of our wish always was “x 
having human goods.” Thus, on their interpretation, our not wishing for our friends to 
become gods is not explained by the dominance of our concern for our own good. It is 
simply an independent psychological fact that the only wish for our friends good that we 
                                                 
490
 ἃ δ' ἑξῆς λέγει φάσκων τὸν φίλον αὑτῷ μάλιστα βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, οὐ περὶ τῶν τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν 
ἐχόντων εἴρηται ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμως λεγομένων φίλων. 
491
 On this point, see Pangle, Philosophy of Friendship, 216, first paragraph. Heliodorus does the very same 
thing (In Ethica Nicomachea Paragraphsis, 174, lines 30-2) as is well observed by David Konstan (On 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 8 and 9, 115, note 9). 
492
 For the other example, see section d.ii. 
493
 For example, Cooper (“Forms of Friendship,” 326, first paragraph) and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 98, 
first paragraph). 
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are capable of forming has as its content “enjoying human goods,” and this would still be 
true even if we cared nothing for our own good.
494
 
The difficulty with this interpretation is that it disconnects Aristotle’s response to 
the god example from the initial terms of the perplexity. The challenge he is considering 
is that we will not wish great goods for our friends, for example, becoming gods, that will 
dissolve our friendship and therefore deprive us of a good. This interpretation then 
understands his response to be as follows: “well, either way, it’s not possible for us to 
wish our friend to become a god since our wish for our friend’s good is essentially a wish 
for him to enjoy human goods.” But this would be to avoid the general perplexity by 
quibbling with the proposed example.
495
  
Furthermore, this interpretation makes Aristotle’s concluding claim that we will 
“perhaps” not wish all goods for our friends because we love our own good most of all 
unrelated to his response to the god example. The interpretation I have offered is 
therefore preferable. We do not wish our friends to have “divine” goods because we do 
not want ourselves to be deprived of the good of their friendship without compensation. 
This (i) provides a general solution to the general perplexity that applies to all examples, 
of which the god example is merely one; and (ii) explains Aristotle’s concluding remark 
that we wish most of all for our own good.
496
 
I have argued that Aristotle solves the general perplexity of whether we would 
wish the greatest goods for our friends (when their possession of these goods would 
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 For discussion of some further misunderstandings, see Chapter 2, section b.iii. 
495
 For more on this point, see ibid. 
496
 This point is well observed by Kahn (“Altruism,” 21, note 2). 
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imply a loss to ourselves) by qualifying or rejecting the second horn of the perplexity, 
namely, that friends wish good things for their friends for their friend’s own sake. But 
what about the first horn? Does he still maintain that human beings will not wish for 
themselves to suffer an uncompensated loss? 
It appears that he does. I argued earlier
497
 that the fact that friends do not wish 
goods for their friends, such as becoming gods, that would greatly deprive themselves 
suggests that they do not love each other in a selfless way. I will now give a stronger 
argument. If Aristotle rejected the first horn of the perplexity and replaced it with the 
view that we merely wish good things for ourselves most of all,
498
 then there should be 
some situations in which we would wish our friend to possess a good that required us to 
suffer a loss, namely, whenever the benefit that our friend would receive would greatly 
outweigh the loss that we ourselves would suffer.
499
 But our friend becoming a god is one 
of these situations. The benefit that our friend would receive can even be said to infinitely 
outweigh the (finite) loss that we would sustain, for our friend would gain the eternal 
possession of perfect happiness. But Aristotle denies that in this situation we would wish 
for our friend to possess this good. He therefore does not reject the first horn of the 
perplexity; rather, he maintains it.
500
 
Pakaluk, on the other hand, denies that Aristotle maintains the first horn of the 
perplexity. He says, at any rate, that Aristotle qualifies (and thus, strictly speaking, 
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 See Chapter 2, section b.iii. 
498
 This is the view of Grant (The Ethics, Volume II, 265, note 6, though it is somewhat unclear what he 
means by “utterly disinterested and selfless”), Cooper (“Aristotle on the Form of Friendship,” 326-9), 
Pakaluk (see  subsequent discussion), and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 181-2).  
499
 On this point, see Pangle, ibid. 
500
 That Aristotle maintains the view that that we would not wish for ourselves to suffer an uncompensated 
loss also seems to be the view of Percival (Aristotle on Friendship, 44).  
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rejects) both of the horns that generate the perplexity,
501
 though he is not quite clear on 
this point. He states, 
A friend’s wish of the greatest (kinds of) (human) goods to his friends is subject to 
the limitation that such a wish cannot be incompatible with the preference that 
each person has, and should have, for his own good. There is no need to interpret 
this constraint in a special and implausibly egoistic sense. Aristotle’s remark 
would have sufficient force if we took it in the weak sense that you would not wish 
a good to your friend if his acquisition of this good were outright incompatible 
with your own happiness (For what could motivate such a wish?) (Books VIII and 
IX, 99). 
 
But does this mean that friends will sometimes wish for themselves to suffer an 
uncompensated loss or not? Further, Pakaluk’s interpretation is motivated by an overly 
formal and restrictive view of how Aristotle solves perplexities. Since he assumes that the 
solution to any perplexity always involves qualifying (and thus, strictly speaking, 
rejecting) both horns,
502
 he assumes that Aristotle must here be doing so. However, pace 
Pakaluk, it is not necessary that both horns of a perplexity be rejected in order to solve it. 
After all, one of the horns may be simply true, which is what I claim Aristotle here 
maintains. 
 In sum, Aristotle claims that if we look into our hearts, we will see that we do not 
want our friends to become such complete beings that they no longer need us or care 
about spending time with us. And since having present friends is such a great good that 
life does not appear to be worth living without it,
503
 this unwillingness to wish away our 
friends can be explained by our deep love for our own happiness. This, at any rate, is how 
Aristotle understands it. We are unwilling to wish that our friends become gods because 
                                                 
501
 See Books VIII and IX, 98-9. 
502
 See Books VIII and IX, 96, bottom paragraph, 98, first paragraph. 
503
 See 1155a5-6, 1169b16-18; compare “Alexander Nehamas on Friendship” (in Philosophy Bites), 39, 
second answer. 
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we are unwilling to wish that we suffer the harm of losing them.  
 However, if even virtue friends do not wish benefits for their friends, such as their 
becoming gods, that require themselves to suffer uncompensated losses, then friendship 
fails to motivate even virtue friends to overlook their own good for the sake of their 
friends. And this is exactly what we would expect if, as I argued in the previous section, 
the (effective) benefactory love that friends possesses falls short of goodwill. I therefore 
offer Aristotle’s claim that we do not wish benefits for our friends that would destroy our 
friendship, such as our friends becoming gods, as another alleged “fact” or “deed” that 
speaks against the popular view that the virtuous person overlooks his own good for the 
sake of his friends.  
f. The Necessity of An Equal Return 
 i. Equality in friendship 
A third supposed fact that speaks against the popular view that the virtuous person is self-
disregarding in relation to his friends is related to the presence of equality (ἰσότης, τὸ 
ἴσον) and reciprocation in friendship. Aristotle claims first of all that equality is 
characteristic of friendship. He several times quotes the proverb “friendship is equality,” 
(φιλότης ἰσότης),504 and he explicitly endorses it.505 
By “equality” and “friendship is equality,” Aristotle does not mean that friends 
are similar to one another. He rather means that friends pay back or reciprocate an equal 
amount of benefit or pleasure. This is how Aspasius understands the proverb. He 
                                                 
504
 See 1157b36, 1168b8; compare 1158b27-8. 
505
 See 1159b2-3. This point is noted by Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 91, first paragraph). 
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paraphrases Aristotle’s “it is said that friendship is equality” (1157b36)506 with “it is said 
that friendship is a certain paying back in return, being that of the friend” (Commentaria, 
173, lines 1-2).
507
  
Aquinas, on the other hand, appears to understand the proverb to mean 
specifically that friends love each other equally. He explains the proverb as follows: 
“friendship is a kind of equality precisely as it requires mutual love” (Commentary, 
paragraph 1605).
508
 However, he later acknowledges that the equal, or proportional, 
return of benefit and pleasure is also characteristic of friendship. As he puts it, “If then 
friends would be equal in any kind of friendship, they must be equated both in respect to 
loving—so that each loves the other equally; and in respect to the other requirements 
such as the courtesies of friends” (Commentary, paragraph 1727).509 
Gauthier and Jolif strike a middle ground between Aspasius and Aquinas. They 
agree with Aspasius to the extent that they think the proverb refers to equal exchange 
between friends.
510
 On the other hand, they agree with Aquinas to the extent that they 
think equality in virtue friendship extends only to the exchange of “love” (l’amour) and 
not of “material goods” (biens matériels), the exchange of which is a “degraded” (se 
dégrade) and “self-interested” (intéressée) form of friendship.511 However, like Aquinas, 
they later acknowledge that “the ideal of friendship, it is that one give an equal quantity 
                                                 
506
 λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης. 
507
 λέγεται φιλία ἀνταπόδοσίς τις οὖσα τοῦ φίλου. That “equality” refers to equal exchange is also the view 
of Percival (Aristotle on Friendship, 30, bottom paragraph, 41-42) and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 133, 
bottom paragraph, and his comments on 1157b35-1158a1, 1158b19, 1158b29-33). 
508
 See, also, paragraphs 1630, 1649. 
509
 See, also, paragraphs 1621, 1629, 1751, 1758, 1760. 
510
 See their comment on 1157b36. 
511
 See their comment on 1158b25. 
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of affection and of services” (L’Éthique à Nicomaque, Volume II, 690-1, my 
emphasis).
512
 
That by “equality” (ἰσότης) Aristotle means the equal exchange of benefit or 
pleasure and not similarity between friends is supported by his claim that “equality and 
similarity is friendship” (1159b2-3).513 Since “equality” (ἰσότης) already refers to equal 
reciprocation, he must add “similarity” (ὁμοιότης) to pick out to the similarity between 
friends that is also characteristic of friendship. 
That “friendship is equality” refers to equal exchange, as opposed to similarity or 
sameness, also explains why Aristotle first introduces the proverb in the context of his 
claim that virtuous friends “pay back what is equal in wish (i.e., of good things for the 
other friend) and in pleasure,” (alternatively, “in form,” 1157b35-6, my emphasis),514 
“for,” he goes on to explain, “it is said that ‘friendship is equality” (1157b36).515  
Similarly, when Aristotle speaks of “what is equal” (τὸ ἴσον), as he does in the 
previous quotation, or of “being equalized” (ἰσάζομαι, ἐπανισόω), he has in mind equal, 
or at least proportional, exchange.
516
 In sum, Aristotle uses “equality” (ἰσότης), “what is 
                                                 
512
 l’idéal de l’amitié, c’est qu’on se rende une égale quantité d’affection et de services. 
513
 ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης. 
514
 τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ. τῷ εἴδει is the reading of Lb and Γ in Bywater’s edition, 
adopted by Burnet and Pakaluk among others. However, Aspasius, in commenting on this section, 
explicitly mentions that virtuous friends both wish good things for each other and are pleasant to one 
another (In Ethica Nicomachia Commentaria, 172, line 34- 173, line 1). This suggests that his manuscript 
read τῷ ἡδεῖ; see Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Volume II, 291. If we read τῷ 
εἴδει (“in kind”), the thought is presumably that virtue friends repay each other (i) with respect to wishing 
each other to have good or pleasant things; and (ii) with respect to providing the same kind of thing they 
have received, i.e., benefit for benefit, pleasure for pleasure, or perhaps, the same kind of benefit for the 
same kind of benefit and the same kind of pleasure for the same kind of pleasure; contrast with friends who 
give returns that are “not of a similar kind,” ἀνομοιοειδής, 1163b29-35; compare Burnet, The Ethics, 400, 
note §1. Aquinas, on the other hand, understands the same kind of wish, i.e., wish for the same object 
(Commentary, paragraph 1605).  
515
 λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης. 
516
 See 1158b23-33, 1159a33-1159b4, 1162a35-b4, 1163a16-19, 1163b10-12, 1163b29-35. 
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equal” (τὸ ἴσον) and “being equalized” (ἰσάζομαι, ἐπανισόω) all to refer to the same 
aspect of friendship—equal exchange between friends.  
Beyond being simply characteristic of friendship, Aristotle also claims that equal 
exchange is necessary for its existence and preservation. As Michael puts it, “friendship 
provides equality to friends, for it is necessary for there to be equality, if friendship is 
going to be preserved” (Commentaria, 461, lines 7-8).517 However, strict equality (which 
Aristotle calls “equality according to quantity”)518 is not always required. He allows that 
“equality according to worth,” or proportionate equality, can function as a sufficient 
approximation of a strictly equal return within certain limits.
519
  
 I mentioned before that “according to worth” has two senses.520 When Aristotle 
says that equality according to worth, or proportionate equality, can function as a 
sufficient approximation of a strictly equal return, which sense does he have in mind? 
Plausibly, both, since he mentions both sorts or proportionate equality in his discussion of 
friendship.
521
 However, proportionate equality in the sense of giving greater shares to 
those who are more in line with a certain standard of merit is clearly the more 
problematic case. If one is getting back things of equal “worth” to what one is giving, 
then the friendship would seem to be on solid footing. But, as we saw, getting back a 
greater share according to certain standard of merit in no way guarantees that one will 
                                                 
517
 ἡ φιλία τοῖς φίλοις ἰσότητα παρέχει· ἰσότητα γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, εἰ μέλλει σώζεςάι ἡ φιλία. This point is 
also observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 57, first paragraph). 
518
 τὸ κατὰ ποσὸν, 1158b31. 
519
 See 1158b29-33. This is Pakaluk’s interpretation of the relation between strict and proportional equality 
in friendship (comment on 1158b29-33). 
520
 See Chapter 1, section b.iv. 
521
 For the sense of getting things that are of equal “worth” to what one has given, see 1163b8-18, 32-5. For 
the sense of getting the greater share of something according to a certain standard of merit, see 1158b23-8. 
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receive things of equal “worth” to what one has given. It is presumably in this case that 
proportional equality strains to sufficiently approximate a strictly equal return. 
Proportional equality can sufficiently approximate a strictly equal return within 
certain limits, but when those limits are crossed, and one person is no longer able to 
provide the other with return benefits that sufficiently approximate a strictly equal return, 
friendship cannot exist. Aristotle claims that this point is clear from the consideration of 
cases where there is a great difference in two people’s ability to benefit each other:  
This is clear whenever there comes to be much separation in virtue or viciousness 
or prosperity or anything else, for they do not remain friends, but neither do they 
think they are worthy of being friends, and this is most manifest concerning the 
gods, for these most of all exceed in every good thing; and its clear also 
concerning kings, for those who are greatly in need do not think they are worthy 
of being friends to this sort of person; and neither those who are worth noting 
with the best or wisest. (1158b33-1159a3).
522
 
 
Aristotle here claims not only that people are not friends with those who greatly outstrip 
them in their ability to provide benefits (or pleasure), but that, recognizing that they do 
not have enough to offer such people in return, they do not even think they are worthy of 
being their friend. Heliodorus puts this well:  
What is equal is sought after [in friendship] in this way, primarily, according to 
quantity; in a secondary way, according to proportion, for if people greatly differ 
from each other and the separation between them should not be small, and the one 
should very much exceed the other in virtue or in prosperity or in some other 
thing, they will not be friends; for neither are they capable of it nor do they want 
it. (Paraphrasis, 174, lines 7-11, my emphasis).
523
 
 
                                                 
522
 δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆςἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν 
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς 
ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ 
καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. 
523
 Τὸ γὰρ ἴσον ἐν ταύτῃ ζητεῖται, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν ποςότητα, δευτέρως δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. ἐὰν γάρ 
πολὺ διαφέρωσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα οὐκ ὀλίγον ᾖ, σφόδρα δὲ ἅτερος θαατέρου ὑπερέχῃ 
ἀρετῇ ἢ εὐπορίᾳ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ, οὔκ εἰσι φίλοι· οὔτε γὰρ δύανται οὔτε βούλονται. 
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Though, presumably, the inferior would want to be friends with the superior, but the 
superior would not want to be friends with the inferior.
 
 
Aspasius, on the other hand, waters down Aristotle’s point. At least when 
discussing the example of how there cannot be friendship between human beings and 
gods, he says that Aristotle only wishes to exclude the possibility of friendship according 
to equality: “neither are virtuous people and those who are called “god-loved” friends 
with the gods with respect to ‘authoritative’ friendship, and I mean the friendship 
according to equality.” (Commentaria, 178, line 30-179, line 1).524 That there cannot be 
friendship between a human being and a god is another difficult view of Aristotle’s that 
Aspasius cannot accept. 
However, if, as Aristotle claims, we judge our worthiness for friendship with 
others by our ability to provide them a sufficient approximation of a strictly equal return, 
then we imply that a strictly equal return is an essential, or at least vital, part of 
friendship.
525
 At least a sufficient approximation of a strictly equal return would then be 
necessary if friendship is to exist, for either equals or unequals.
526
 Thus, Aristotle says, 
“that which is according to worth (i.e., proportional equality) equalizes and preserves 
friendship” (1163b11-12, my emphasis).527 
                                                 
524
 οὐδὲ τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ τὴν κυρίως φιλίαν εἰσὶ φίλοι οἱ σπουδαῖοι καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι θεοφιλεῖς, λέγω δὲ τὴν 
κατ' ἰσότητα. 
525
 Pakaluk observes this consequence well (Books VIII and IX, 5-6). 
526
 See 1162b2-4. Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1727, 1758) and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 91-3) 
observe this point well. Konstan, however, disagrees that an equal return is a necessary feature of 
friendship (Friendship, 78-82). He relies on Aristotle’s later contrast between gifts given on the condition 
of a return and those given “to a friend” (1162b31-1163a6), but, as we shall see (section f.ii), the matter is 
not so simple.  
527
 τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν. Compare 1163b29-30. 
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Aquinas, on the other hand, interprets Aristotle’s claim that friendship cannot 
endure great separation between friends not in terms of their ability to make a sufficient 
approximation of an equal return but in terms of similarity between friends: “Friendship 
is a kind of union or association of friends that cannot exist between widely separated 
persons; but they must approach equality. Hence it pertains to friendship to use an 
equality already uniformly established.” (Commentary, paragraph 1632).528 However, the 
context of Aristotle’s claim makes it clear that he is talking about the ability to provide 
equal returns and not similarity. 
This context is Aristotle’s contrast between friendship and justice. 529  Justice 
involves primarily “equality according to worth” (τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀξίαν), i.e., proportional 
equality, and only secondarily “equality according to quantity” (τὸ ἴσον κατὰ ποσόν). 
Friendship, on the other hand, primarily involves equality according to quantity and only 
secondarily equality according to proportion. But justice primarily involves equality 
according to proportion insofar as it distributes an amount of goods to people that is 
proportionately equal to their merit.
530
 “Equality according to quantity,” by contrast, is 
distributing a strictly equal amount of goods to different people. Friendship prefers this 
sort of equality, and, in contrast to justice, only resorts to proportionate equality as a 
workable approximation to its preferred sort of distribution.
531
 
Since an equal return is necessary for friendship, Aristotle points to various ways 
in which two people can create an equal, or at least a sufficient approximation of an 
                                                 
528
 See, also, paragraphs 1631-4. That Aristotle is here discussing the necessity of similarity, and not equal 
exchange, is also the view of Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 58, second paragraph). 
529
 See 1158b31-3.  
530
 See 1131a25-32. 
531
 For more on this point, see Pakaluk’s comment on 1158b29-33. 
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equal, exchange and thus allow for the possibility of friendship. He says, for example, 
that “those among whom this (sc. “loving”) comes to be according to merit (ἀξίαν), these 
are lasting friends and so is their friendship. And in this way also those who are unequal 
may especially be friends, for they would be equalized” (1159a33-b2, my emphasis).532  
According to Aristotle, being loved is a good that is seemingly chosen on account 
of itself.
533
 Thus, love itself can function as a good that friends exchange among 
themselves,
534
 and by exchanging this good in an equal, or at least proportional, way, two 
people can create the equal exchange of benefit that makes friendship both possible and 
“lasting.” In particular, an inferior can equalize friendship with a (more beneficial) 
superior by paying back proportionately more love in return for the greater benefits he 
receives.
535
 
In addition to “being loved,” Aristotle points to honor as another good,536 the 
equal or proportional exchange of which, both makes friendship possible and preserves it, 
especially between unequals. After claiming that honor is given to benefactors as a 
remedy against their getting “what is less” (τὸ ἔλαττον) out of their relationships with 
their beneficiaries, he says, “in this way one also must associate with unequals, and the 
one who has been helped with regard to money or virtue must pay back honor (1163b12-
14, my emphasis).
537
 Thus, honor can serve as another proxy benefit that, being paid back 
in proportion to the favors granted by a superior friend, makes a sufficient approximation 
                                                 
532
 ἐν οἷς τοῦτο [sc. τὸ φιλεῖν] γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 
ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. 
533
 See 1159a25-7. 
534
 This point is well observed by Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 94). 
535
 See 1159a34-b2; Pakaluk, ibid. 
536
 See 1123b17-21. 
537
 οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον. 
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of an equal exchange of benefit, and therefore friendship, possible.
538
  
Nevertheless, Aristotle does relax somewhat the requirement of equality: 
“friendship seeks what is possible, not what is according to worth, for neither is this 
possible in all circumstances, just as in the case of the honors given to gods and parents” 
(1163b15-17).
539
 I take it, however, that he does not wish to undo every claim he made 
about the importance of equality.
540
 That this is not his intention is supported by the fact 
that he soon repeats that proportional equality “preserves friendship” (σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, 
1163b30).  
Aristotle rather wishes to point to certain circumstances in which the requirement 
of an equal, or even proportional, return is relaxed. When one friend is incapable of 
making an equal, or even proportional, return, sometimes the other friend is satisfied with 
the return that is possible. This is Heliodorus’ interpretation. He follows Aristotle’s 
statement that friendship seeks what is possible by “for everyone is not able to pay back 
what is according to the worth of what they owe, for it is not possible concerning all 
things to find what is according to worth” (Paraphrasis, 185, lines 38-40, my 
emphasis).
541
 That is, the return that is possible is accepted because a proportional return 
is not possible in that circumstance.  
But this is not to say that any given person would be willing to be friends with 
                                                 
538
 This point is well observed by Michael of Ephesus (Commentaria, 461, lines 8-10), Aquinas 
(Commentary, paragraph 1751), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 288, note to chapter 14, paragraph §3), 
Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 146-7). 
539
 τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς 
θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. 
540
 Thus Rowe translates, “Friendship looks also for what is possible,” (my emphasis), even though καί 
(“and”) is not present in the manuscripts. 
541
 οὐ γὰρ δύνανται πάντες τὰ κατ’ ἀξίαν ὧν ὀφείλουσιν ἀποδιδόναι· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ κατ’ 
ἀξίαν εὑρεῖν. This is also Aquinas’ interpretation (Commentary, paragraph 1752). 
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any other person only provided they make whatever return they are capable of making. 
As was implied by Aristotle’s claim that a proportional return can only preserve 
friendship within certain limits, there is presumably some minimum degree of 
choiceworthiness that the returns of the other must meet.
542
 However, either way, 
Aristotle does not abandon the requirement of a return. Rather, he points out that the 
(required) return does not always have to be equal, or even proportional, at least when 
one friend is not capable of making such a return. 
However, if, as Aristotle claims, equal exchange, or a sufficient approximation of 
it, or at least what is close enough given the circumstances, is necessary for the 
preservation of friendship, then the breach of this exchange should be another observable 
circumstance that dissolves friendship. And if a lack of an equal return of benefit or 
pleasure, or at least one that meets the previous qualifications, really does cause the 
dissolution of friendship, then, by Aristotle’s principle, the presence, or expected 
presence, of an equal return of benefit or pleasure, or at least one that meets the previous 
qualifications, is another condition under which friendships are formed and maintained.  
However, this condition is self-concerned. It is the condition of a friend that he 
also get benefit or pleasure out of the friendship, and if this condition is not met, then the 
friendship will allegedly dissolve. The necessity of an equal return for the existence of 
friendship is thus another supposed fact that suggests that friends do not love each other 
in a selfless way. As Ross puts it, “Traces of an egoistic view are present even in the 
account of friendship, as they should be, for friendship is not mere benevolence but 
                                                 
542
 This point is observed by Grant (The Ethics, Volume II, 264, note 3), Pakaluk (comment on 1159a1-5), 
and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 58, first paragraph). 
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demands a return” (Aristotle, 230, my emphasis).543  
On the other hand, Gabriel Richardson Lear, following what she takes to be a 
suggestion of Pangle’s, denies that the requirement of an equal return is self-concerned. 
Speaking specifically about returns in unequal friendships, she says, “The inferior’s 
return of honor is necessary not to ensure that the superior gets something out of the 
relationship, but to enable him to see the inferior as a kindred sprit. This sympathy and 
sense of similarity, once in place, is the origin of goodwill.” (“Review,” paragraph 19). 
There are several problems with Lear’s interpretation. First, her claim that an 
equal return is required in order to see the other as a kindred spirit is motivated by a 
misreading of Pangle. She notes that Pangle claims that, since the pleasure of spending 
time with a kindred spirit is central to friendship, equality is important to friendship. Lear 
understands this claim to mean that the requirement of an equal return is explained by our 
need to see the friend as a kindred spirit:  
When Pangle first introduces the topic of unequal friendships, she suggests 
another rationale for making equality a requirement. Since the primary pleasure of 
friendship is the pleasure of spending time with a kindred spirit, equality is 
especially important to the pleasure of friendship and thus to friendship itself 
([Philosophy of Friendship,] p.57). More needs to be said in defense of this 
suggestion since it is not clear why equality of reciprocation is necessary for 
seeing another person as a kindred spirit. (“Review,” paragraph 18, my emphasis).  
 
However, Lear is misreading Pangle. Pangle is not making a point about the need for 
equal returns (though she does mention it), but rather about the need for (equal) virtue 
friends to have equal degrees of virtue. In other words, she is talking about the need for 
                                                 
543
 This point is also observed by Kant (Ethics, 184), Kierkagaard (Love, 53-5), Gauthier and Jolif 
(comment on 1158b25), Gill (“Altruism or Reciprocity?,” 318, bottom paragraph), and Pangle (Philosophy 
of Friendship, 79, 89, first paragraph, 126-7). 
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similarity: 
To the extent that friendship turns upon utility, it is of course essential that the 
friends have something of more or less equal value to offer. To the extent that it 
turns upon pleasure, they must have similar capacities to please, and since the 
greatest pleasure in friendship is the pleasure of companionship and shared 
activity with a kindred spirit who has similar aims and feelings and desires, 
equality and similarity contribute enormously to the pleasantness of friendships. 
And Aristotle has stressed repeatedly that the perfect friendship of virtue will be a 
friendship of equals, each fully worthy of the other’s confidence, trust, and 
generous support. (Philosophy of Friendship, 57, my emphasis). 
 
Second, Lear’s claim that an equal return is required in friendship because we need to see 
the other as a kindred spirit doesn’t make sense in the context of unequal friendships. 
These are friendships that are based on a presumed inequality between the friends,
544
 ”for 
those who are similarly virtuous comes to be friends, and also a more virtuous and a less 
virtuous person, and the same thing for those who are pleasant and also the friendship 
according to use” (1162a36-b2).545 In other words, these friendships presuppose that the 
friends do not see each other as kindred in important ways, but, as we have seen, they still 
require returns. 
And finally, contrary to what Lear suggests, Aristotle clearly explains the need for 
a return by the need for both friends to get something out of their relationship. He 
justifies the claim that a return of honor must be given to a superior friend with the claim 
that “nobody endures having what is less in everything” (1163b9).546  
 ii. Equality in virtue friendship 
I have argued that the necessity of an equal return between friends is another alleged fact 
                                                 
544
 See 1162a34-1162b2. 
545
 Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων 
τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ 
διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. 
546
 ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. Contrast with “Review,” paragraph 19.  
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that suggests that friends do not love each other in a selfless way. But we may wonder 
whether this necessity extends to virtuous friends. Perhaps they are an exception? They 
are not. Aristotle extends the need for a return of benefit or pleasure even to virtuous 
friends.
547
 There are two important forms of friendships that involve virtuous people. 
There are friendships between those who are equal in virtue and those between a superior 
and inferior in virtue.  
We saw in the previous section that being loved and being honored are two goods 
that, by serving as proxy return benefits, allow an inferior to sufficiently approximate an 
equal return of benefit to a superior and thereby create the possibility of friendship 
between them. Aristotle is clear that these proxy returns are also necessary to allow for a 
friendship between a superior and an inferior in virtue. Concerning the return of love to a 
friend of superior virtue, he says: 
But in all friendships that are according to superiority, the love ought to be 
proportional, for example, the more virtuous ought to be loved more than he loves, 
and the one who is more beneficial, and each of the other [people relevantly 
superior] in the same way, for whenever the love comes to be according to merit 
(ἀξίαν), at that time, equality in a certain way comes into being. (1158b23-8, my 
emphasis).
548
 
 
Aristotle speaks of the return of honor to a superior in virtue in the context of 
adjudicating disputes between a friend who is either more virtuous or beneficial and one 
who is less so. “The one who is more virtuous,” for his part, “thinks that it is fitting for 
                                                 
547
 This point is well observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 81, bottom paragraph, note “including 
the best and most equal”) and Nehamas (“Aristotelian Philia,” 229, bottom paragraph). 
548
 ἀνάλογον δ’ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω 
μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἡ 
φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεταί πως ἰσότης. That the superior in virtue should be loved more is observed by 
Aspasius (Commentaria, 177, line 24-178, line 1), Stewart (Notes, Volume II, 299, note §2), and Pakaluk 
(Books VIII and IX, 136, bottom paragraph, with 94). 
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him to have more, for it is fitting to distribute more to the virtuous person” (1163a26-7, 
my emphasis).
549
 As he also does in his earlier discussions of greatness of soul and 
justice,
550
 Aristotle endorses this claim, only qualifying that it is more “honor” (τιμή) that 
“should be distributed” (δεῖν νέμειν) to the superior in virtue,551 “for,” he explains, honor 
is the reward of virtue and benefaction” (1163b3-4, my emphasis).552 And to support his 
claim that virtuous superiors should be given a return of honor, he points to the 
ubiquitous fact that cities provide returns in the form of honors to their (virtuous) 
benefactors: 
For the one who provides no common good [to the community] is not honored, 
for what is held in common is given to the one who provides a common benefit, 
and honor is held in common, for one does not at the same time profit from what 
is common and receive honor, for nobody endures having what is less in 
everything. To the one who suffers a loss concerning money, they distribute honor 
and to the one who can be paid, money. (1163b6-11).
553
 
 
Pakaluk, on the other hand, claims that we should not read Aristotle’s above statements 
about “the more virtuous” and “virtue” in his own voice, but in the voice of a superior 
friend who, thinking himself to be virtuous, but not being so, disputes about a reward or 
return that he (falsely) thinks he is entitled to: 
                                                 
549
 οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὑτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον. 
550
 In the discussion of greatness of soul: 1123b17-21, 26-28, 34-1124a1; in the discussion of justice: 
1134b2-7. 
551
 That the more virtuous person in a superior friendship requires a return of honor is observed by Aspasius 
(Commentaria, 185, lines 11-12, note “honored as virtuous”, [τιμᾶσθαι] ὡς ἐνάρετον, 186, lines 11-23, note 
“that is, the virtuous person,” ἤγουν ὁ ἀγαθός) and Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 288, notes to chapter 14, 
paragraphs §2 and §3). 
552
 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας. 
553
 οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ 
τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον 
οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα. Compare 
1113b21-6, 1115a31-2. Consider the monuments and memorials we have given to our (noble) founders and 
(noble) leaders as well as to those who have served the country in war and especially those who have died 
while doing so. For monuments and memorials as a form of honor, see Rhetoric 1361a34-6. 
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The rationalizations he employs, and which Aristotle attributes to the superior, 
involve just these things; the better person, or the one who has achieved more, A 
[viz., the superior friend] reasons, should receive the greater share of profits. (Of 
course, these are rationalizations: the gift was not an investment, and it led to 
nothing like profits to be shared between them; and the idea that the very action of 
benefitting another is what establishes someone as the better person, and therefore 
deserving of getting more from the other, is obviously misguided). (Books VIII 
and IX, 146, his emphasis).
554
 
 
No doubt, Pakaluk is uncomfortable with the degree to which Aristotle depicts virtuous 
people as concerned with rewards or returns.
555
 But, as we have observed, Aristotle 
points to this concern throughout the Nicomachean Ethics.
556
 The virtuous person’s 
concern for a reward could even be said to be a minor theme of the work.  
To more specifically motivate his reading, Pakaluk points to Aristotle’s claim in 
VIII.13 that friends on account of virtue do not quarrel with each other:
557
  
Throughout this chapter [VIII.14], it is true, Aristotle mentions matters that seem 
connected with virtue…; moreover, his discussion of civic officers (b6-11) and 
gods and fathers (b16ff.) seems to presuppose that they are virtuous rather than 
merely useful superiors. However, it would seem that his explanation at VIII. 13, 
1162b6-13 of why friendships based on virtue do not give rise to complains 
(reaffirmed at the end of that chapter, 1163a21-2) apply to unequal friendships as 
much as equal. (Books VIII and IX, 143). 
 
But Aristotle is there speaking about (equal) virtue friends, and the reasons (equal) virtue 
friends do not quarrel are as follows: (i) they compete with each other to prove their 
superiority in virtue (see subsequent discussion); and (ii) because they are both virtuous, 
they reliably pay what they owe to each other.
558
 However, these reasons are not 
applicable to a friendship involving a manifest superior in virtue.  
                                                 
554
 See, more generally, 143-7. 
555
 See 139, 143, bottom paragraph, 145-6. 
556
 See note 58 and end of Chapter 2, section c.v. 
557
 See 1162b5-13, 1163a21-2, though note a return is still owed: 1163a22-3. 
558
 See 1157b33-6 and note “pay back” (ἀνταποδίδωσι). 
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Concerning (i), since the superior in virtue is manifestly superior, he would gain 
nothing from a competition with a manifest inferior; and (ii), the inferior friend, being 
less virtuous, would less reliably pay what he owes to the other. Pace Pakaluk, there is no 
need to contort our reading of VIII.14 in order to avoid a contradiction with VIII.13. 
Furthermore, if a superior in virtue requires a greater share of love in order to remain in a 
friendship with an inferior, as Pakaluk acknowledges,
559
 why is it implausible that he 
may require greater honor as well?  
We have seen that a virtuous person will not remain in an unequal friendship if he 
is deprived of certain return benefits, such as love or honor. However, even in the 
friendships of the virtuous that involve equal virtue, Aristotle thinks that an equality of 
benefit must be maintained. He says without qualification that “among those who this [sc. 
“loving”] comes to be according to merit (ἀξίαν), these are lasting friends and so is their 
friendship” (1159a35-b1).560 The return of the benefit of being loved therefore helps 
preserve the friendships of even the virtuous.
561
  
Aquinas, on the other hand, interprets the need for a return of being loved in the 
previous passage in light of Aristotle’s preceding claim that loving is the virtue of 
friends.
562
 He takes loving a superior friend to act as a substitute virtue that allows a 
person who is otherwise inferior in virtue to approach the similarity that is necessary for 
friendship:  
                                                 
559
 See Books VIII and IX, 136, bottom paragraph. 
560
 ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. 
561
 This point is observed by Aspasius (Commentaria, 185, lines 8-10) and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 
105, first paragraph). 
562
 See 1159a34-5. 
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Because everyone is praised for his own virtue, the virtue of a lover should be 
judged according to his love. For this reason persons who love their friends in 
proportion to their worth remain friends and their friendship is lasting. Thus, 
when people love one another according to their worth, even those who are of 
unequal condition can be friends because they are made equal in this way—
provided that the one who is more lacking in goodness or some other excellence 
loves that much more. In this way the abundance of love makes up for the 
inadequacy of condition. So by a kind of equality and likeness, which properly 
belong to friendship, people become and remain friends. (Commentary, paragraph 
1649). 
 
In this way, Aquinas’ interpretation is similar to Lear’s.563 Moreover, he presumably 
thinks that equal love between equal virtue friends helps preserve their friendship in the 
same way as above—by maintaining their similarity in virtue to one another.  
This is a subtle interpretation, but it conflates the requirements of equality and 
similarity. As I have argued, Aristotle uses “equality” to refer to equal returns and not to 
similarity. It is in the context of this sort of equality, and not similarity, that being loved 
according to merit is first introduced,
564
 and this later discussion is a continuation of that 
earlier one. This is clear from their proximity and from the fact that he follows his claim 
that friends who love each other according to merit are lasting friends with: “in this way 
also those who are unequal may especially be friends, for they would be equalized; and 
equality and similarity are friendship” (1159b1-3).565 As I pointed out earlier, “equality” 
and “equalized” refer to equal returns. This is why he Aristotle must explicitly say 
“similarity” (ὁμοιότης) to refer to the additional element of similarity. 
Pakaluk finds Aristotle’s claim that the exchange of love helps preserve even a 
virtue friendship “surprising” for two reasons; (i) equal virtue friends are already in a 
                                                 
563
 See section f.i. 
564
 See 1158b23-33. 
565
 οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης. 
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position to reciprocate with the same sorts of benefits, but the return of love was 
introduced as a proxy return that allows for friendship between unequals;
566
 and (ii) the 
presence of exchange calls into question the generosity of the gifts of virtue friends.
567
 He 
then offers an analysis in which equal virtue friends, by benefitting each other, 
temporarily take on the role of a superior friend, who, as a superior, does not expect an 
equal return, but is satisfied with receiving the greater share of love:  
When an equal friend does something good for his friend, not on condition of his 
receiving anything back in return, he temporarily adopts a role like that of a 
superior in an unequal friendship, who similarly has no expectation that his good 
service be reciprocated by one of equal worth in return; yet he does count his 
good service as reciprocated (as per the analysis of Chs. 7 and 8), if it is answered 
by the appropriate gratitude and friendly affection of the recipient, who would 
thereby temporarily adopt a role like that of the inferior in an unequal 
relationship, because he similarly does not consider himself otherwise bound to 
reciprocate. (Books VIII and IX, 106). 
 
However, we do not need to take this step in order to make sense of why the return of 
love helps preserve equal virtue friendships. If “being loved” is itself a good, as Aristotle 
claims, then, a friend, by loving his virtuous friend, provides him with a benefit that then 
requires an equal return, namely, being loved in return. Furthermore, Pakaluk’s analysis 
does not resolve the difficulty in (ii). It merely shifts the requirement of a return from an 
equal to a proportional one. 
However, Aristotle thinks equal virtue friends should exchange more than love. 
He says without qualification that equal friends “should make things equal according to 
[strict] equality with regard to loving and the remaining things” (1162b2-3, my 
                                                 
566
 See Books VIII and IX, 105, first paragraph. 
567
 See Books VIII and IX, 105, bottom paragraph. 
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emphasis).
568
 Thus, equal virtue friends preserve their friendship not only through an 
equal return of love, but also through an equal return of the “remaining things,” including 
benefits or favors.
569
 As Aquinas puts it, “Obviously, friendship between equals is 
preserved by a fair (or “equal value,” aequivalens) return” (Commentary, paragraph 
1758).
570
 
There is, however, one place where Aristotle seems to suggest that sufficiently 
equal benefit can be achieved between two friends merely by one friend performing a 
kalon benefaction. The idea is that the other friend gets a benefaction while the one who 
acts gets the personal benefit of a kalon action as well as the satisfaction of knowing that 
he is superior in virtue to his virtuous friend: 
For, on the one hand, those who are friends because of virtue eagerly benefit each 
other (for this belongs both to virtue and to friendship), and there are neither 
fights nor accusations among those who compete with regard to this, for nobody is 
displeased with one who loves and benefits, but, if he is refined, he retaliates by 
doing something good. And the one who surpasses, obtaining that at which he 
aims, would not accuse his friend, for each longs for the good. (1162b6-13, my 
emphasis).
571
 
 
This passage thus appears to absolve virtue friends of the need to make any return 
benefits. 
However, Aristotle is describing a special case. Two virtuous friends are 
competing with each other in order to prove that they are outstanding in virtue. His use 
                                                 
568
 τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν. 
569
 This point is well observed by Stewart (comment on 1162b3). Burnet (commentary ad loc.) glosses “the 
remaining things” above as τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῷ ἡδεῖ or τῷ χρηςίμῳ, “what is good, pleasant, or useful.” 
570
 Compare paragraph 1727. 
571
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι’ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦντα (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς 
τοῦτο δ’ ἁμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς 
δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ’ ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ’ ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη 
τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται. 
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of ἁμιλλάομαι (“contend”) and ἀμύνομαι (“retaliate”) suggest this.572 Furthermore, this is 
exactly the sort of competitiveness that he attributes to the great-souled man, who “is the 
sort to do a benefit, but is ashamed to be done a benefit, for the one belongs to the one 
who exceeds, the other to the one who is exceeded, and he is likely to benefit more in 
return, for, in this way, the one who initiated will have been done a good turn and will be 
in debt to him in addition” (1124b9-12).573 The previously described virtue friends are 
thus using each other as a measure of virtue that each is hoping to surpass.
574
 The one 
who turns out to be superior is then satisfied by the resulting proof of his outstanding 
virtue and does not in this circumstance require a return. 
However, Aristotle is clear that when virtue friends are not competing with each 
other in order to prove that they are outstandingly virtuous, they must pay back each 
other’s benefactions.575 Thus, he says that virtue friends "pay back what is equal” (τὸ 
ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι, 1157b35). The verb ἀνταποδίδωμι marks the intention of a deliberate 
return. It is not simply that, out of equal love, virtue friends spontaneously provide each 
                                                 
572
 This point is well observed by by Pakaluk (comment on 1162b5-21) and Pangle (Philosophy of 
Friendship, 124, top paragraph). Stewart also understands the friends to be competing with each other 
(comment on 1162b11, note “competition”), though he misses the point that the friend who excels is 
satisfied by the proof of his superior virtue. Gauthier and Jolif also appear to understand the passage this 
way; see their comment on 1162b12-13 and note “si elle doit justifier les mots “ce qu’il désirait,” elle est 
bien négligemment rédigée; on devrait avoir “car l’un et l‘autre aspirant à faire plus de bien,” (“If this 
remark [“for each longs for the good”] is to justify the words ‘that which he desired,’ it is carelessly 
written; we should have ‘for the one and the other aspire to do more good,’ my emphasis). 
573
 οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ 
ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. Aristotle also 
speaks of competition concerning kala deeds in IX.8: “all people competing with a view to to kalon and 
straining to do the most kalon deeds, there would be both in common and for each person individually all 
the things that are needed as well as the greatest of goods” (πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ 
διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν, 1169a8-9). 
574
 That friendship sometimes involves this sort of competition is also observed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric 
(1381b21-3). Plato dramatically depicts this point in the Lysis (207b8-c6). 
575
 This point is observed by Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 287, note to paragraph §11) and Pangle 
(Philosophy of Friendship, 126, bottom paragraph, with 130, first paragraph). 
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other with equal benefits. Rather, they deliberately pay each other back.
576
 As Aquinas 
observes, “In friendships of virtue, however, complaints do not arise, as has been 
indicated. Nevertheless (tamen), a return must be made in them.” (Commentary, 
paragraphs 1742-3, my emphasis). 
Aristotle even goes so far as to speak explicitly about how virtue friends should 
measure the ἀμοιβή (“repayment”) that they must make to each other.577 He says that in 
the friendship according to virtue, “one must make the repayment according to the choice 
[of the friend], for this same thing is characteristic of a friend and virtue” (1164a34-
1164b2, my emphasis).
578
 And when addressing the controversies over how to measure a 
“repayment” (ἀνταποδόσις) in a friendship,579 he specifies that, in friendships according 
to virtue, “there are not disputes [about how to measure the repayment], and the choice of 
the doer [of the virtuous benefaction] is like a measure [sc. for repayment], for what is 
authoritative for virtue and character is in choice” (1163a21-23, my emphasis).580  
Thus, the return payments in virtue friendships should take into account the 
“choice” of the virtuous friend rather than only looking to how much one friend was 
benefitted or at what cost the benefactor provided it; that is, one should attempt to give 
                                                 
576
 This implication is observed by Pakaluk (comment on 1157b35-1158a1, note “equal, reciprocal 
exchanges”).  
577
 This implication is also observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1742-3, 1767), Pangle 
(Philosophy of Friendship, 126, bottom paragraph), and Nehamas (“Aristotelian Philia,” 229, bottom 
paragraph), though he misunderstands the standard, it is not the “cost to the benefactor,” but rather the 
“choice” (προαίρεσις) of the benefactor that serves as the standard for determining repayment. 
578
 τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. 
579
 See 1163a9-20. 
580
 ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους 
ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον. 
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him the sort of benefit his virtuous choice makes him worthy of.
581
 As Irwin observes, 
“Aristotle does not suggest that fair exchange of benefits is unimportant in friendship 
based on virtue, but only that the basis for determining the fair exchange is different” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 287). 
That virtue friends exchange benefits as opposed to providing spontaneous gifts is 
also implied by Aristotle’s comparison of friendship to justice: 
The equal does not appear to be the same in matters of justice and in friendship, 
for in matters of justice equality is primarily that which is according to merit 
(ἀξίαν), and that which is according to quantity in only a secondary way, but in 
friendship, the equality according to quantity is primary, while that which is 
according to merit is secondary. (1158b29-33).
582
 
 
As I discussed earlier, a just distribution is essentially “according to merit” (κατ’ ἀξίαν). 
Only when two people happen to be of equal merit (or when it is practically difficult to 
determine the exact differences in merit between a group of people) does justice proscribe 
an equal distribution. Friendship, on the other hand, prefers an equal distribution or return 
and only resorts to distribution according to merit as a workable substitute when an equal 
distribution is not practical.
583
 
                                                 
581
 Perhaps Aristotle is thinking of honor: “honor is the prize of virtue, and it is distributed to virtuous 
people” (τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, κὰι ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, 1123b35-1124a1). On this 
interpretation, see Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, 288, note §3 under chapter 14. Though Pangle thinks he 
means a return of benefit plus gratitude (Philosophy of Friendship, 126, bottom paragraph), while Stewart 
takes him to mean pay back the benefit the friend intended to confer (comment on 1164b1). On the other 
hand, in the Eudemian Ethics, virtue friends reciprocate in choice only: “If they are character friends, they 
must look to the choice, if it is equal, and one must not expect anything else from the other” (εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιωτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου, 1243b2-
3), i.e., virtue friends pay back their friend’s pure intentioned choice to benefit them with a pure intentioned 
choice to benefit their friend, but not necessarily with an equal amount of benefit (1243b9-11).  
582
 Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις 
ἴσον πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ 
κατ' ἀξίαν δευτέρως. 
583
 This Pakaluk’s interpretation (Books VIII and IX, 94, bottom paragraph). See, also, Grant, The Ethics, 
Volume II, 264, note 3.  
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But the important point is that justice and friendship are comparable. They both 
require a certain distribution or return, or, to put it another way, in both some benefit is 
“owed.” 584 Michael of Ephesus puts this point as follows: 
That friendship is a part, not of justice as a whole, as is lawfulness, but of justice 
in part, namely, that part which is distributive of what is equal, is not completely 
unclear. For justice is like this, as he showed in the fifth book of the present 
treatise, it is distributive of equality, and friendship provides equality to friends, 
for there must be equality, if friendship is going to be preserved. (Commentaria, 
461, lines 3-8).
585
 
 
However, if the friendships of the virtuous consisted of spontaneous gifts, then virtue 
friends would neither “pay each other back” nor would their friendship be comparable to 
justice.
586
 And if the friendship of virtue friends was not comparable to justice, then 
Aristotle could not unequivocally compare friendship to justice as he does, for virtue 
friendship is the primary form friendship.
587
 
We have seen that Aristotle thinks the benefactions of even virtuous friends 
require returns. It follows that neither the performance of a kalon benefaction nor the 
friend’s resulting happiness is sufficiently good or choiceworthy for the virtuous friend to 
free his beneficiary from the need of repayment.
588
 Indeed, if the performance of a kalon 
                                                 
584
 That justice and friendship are comparable in this way is also observed by Grant (The Ethics, Volume II, 
250, division II) and Pakaluk (Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII & IX, 87, bottom paragraph, 94, bottom 
paragraph, 134, bottom paragraph). 
585
 Ὅτι μὲν ἡ φιλία μόριόν ἐστιν οὐ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης, τῆς ὡς νομιμότητος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐν μέρει, ἥτις ἦν 
τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητική, οὐ παντάπασιν ἄδηλόν ἐστιν. ἥ τε γὰρ τοιαύτη δικαιοσύνη, ὡς δέδεικται ἐν τῷ 
πέμπτῳ βιβλίῳ τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας, ἰσότητός ἐστι διανεμητική, καὶ ἡ φιλία τοῖς φίλοις ἰσότητα 
παρέχει· ἰσότητα γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι ἡ φιλία. 
586
 This point is acutely observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 79, 126, second paragraph and note 
“but these two moral concerns are at odds”). It is also mentioned by Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 105, 
bottom paragraph), but, as I have discussed, he unsuccessfully attempts to mitigate it. 
587
 See 1157a30-2. 
588
 This point is acutely observed by Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 128-30). That, according to 
Aristotle, virtuous benefactions require repayment is also observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 
1749-51, note retributio, “compensation”). Consider, also, Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics, 288, note to chapter 
182 
 
benefaction, or the resulting happiness of the friend, were enough for virtuous friends, 
then they would have sufficient motivation to maintain friendships without any return 
whatsoever from their friends. The mere opportunity to continually perform kala 
benefactions, or to observe the resulting happiness of their friends, would itself be a 
sufficient return, but this is not what Aristotle thinks is observable or true of the 
friendships of the virtuous. 
The limited way in which Aristotle thinks virtuous friends love their friend’s 
happiness is perhaps clearest through a comparison with his account of the love of 
mothers for their children. He claims that mothers love their children “without seeking to 
be loved in return, if both [sc. the happiness of their children and being loved by them in 
return] should not be possible, but it seems to be enough for them if they see them doing 
well” (1159a30-1).589 To then illustrate this point, he points to the example of mothers 
who give away their children to be raised by others and “love them even though they 
distribute to them none of the things it is fitting to give a mother on account of their 
ignorance [of who their mothers actually are]” (1159a32-3).590 Thus, mothers, by loving 
their children without requiring a return, present a standard of loving the happiness of 
another that virtuous friends, by requiring a return, fall short of.
591
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14, paragraph §3 and note “that is what prevents friendship from collapsing into entirely one-sided ‘public 
service.’” On this general problem, see Chapter 1, section b.iv. 
589
 ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν 
εὖ πράττοντας. 
590
 καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προςήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. 
591
 Consider 1166a2-9 and note the use of mothers as an example. That mothers serve as a standard of love 
for Aristotle is observed by Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 102, bottom) and Pangle (Philosophy of 
Friendship, 86, bottom paragraph and following with 95, second paragraph).  
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At this point, we must discuss a contrary piece of evidence that I alluded to 
earlier.
592
 There is one place where Aristotle seems to say that true friends—which virtue 
friends are presumably examples of—do not benefit their friends on the condition of a 
return. In discussing quarrels that occur in friendships for the sake of the useful, he 
distinguishes between “character” (ἠθική) and “law-like” (νομική) forms of this 
friendship. The second form rests on an explicit statement of the terms of exchange (ἐπὶ 
ῥητοῖς). The first form “does not rest on statements [of terms], but something is given as 
to a friend, or in whatever other way, but he thinks he is worthy of getting back what is 
equal, or more, on the grounds that he has not given something away, but made a sort of 
loan” (1162b31-3).593 In other words, this form of useful friendship is confused. The 
giver is self-deceived about his current (or future) motivations in the friendship.
594
  
The important point, however, is that the standard of friendly giving that the giver 
falls short of is one that does not need a return. As Aristotle says, the recipient of the gift 
was not given something “by a friend, and neither did he [the one who gave] do this on 
account of itself” (1163a4-5, my emphasis). 595  However, it follows from my 
interpretation that virtuous friends do benefit their friends on the condition that these 
benefits will be returned. How, then, do I make sense of Aristotle’s apparent claim to the 
contrary?
596
  
                                                 
592
 See note 526. 
593
 οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ 
δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. 
594
 See 1162b34-1163a1. On the various ways of reading the self-deception, see Pakaluk, Books VIII and IX 
, 139. 
595
 οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος. 
596
 The tension between these two parts of Aristotle’s account of friendship is well observed by Pakaluk 
(Books VIII and IX, 105-6). However, as I have argued, his proposed solution is inadequate.  
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I will address this difficulty in three ways. First, we have seen that there is at least 
one situation in which virtue friends do not require a return, namely, when they are 
competing with each other to prove their superior virtue. I will discuss a second situation 
in the next section. In general, these are situations where virtue friends already get 
something out of benefitting their friends and so do not need a further return in order to 
create an equality of benefit between themselves and their friends. Therefore, virtue 
friends do sometimes satisfy the condition of giving a gift without requiring a return, 
though, admittedly, they often fail to do so. This brings me to my second point. 
I have pointed to several places where Aristotle seems to be accommodating 
pretence or self-deception among friends.
597
 That virtue friends give unconstrained gifts, 
at least, to the degree that they usually think they do, can be counted as another such 
example. This is especially plausible given that (i) Aristotle acknowledges this sort of 
self-deception in his description of “character” useful friendship; and (ii) he follows his 
description of a true friendship that does not require returns by repeating his claim that 
(actual) virtue friends do provide each other with returns.
598
 We can now appreciate my 
third point.  
To claim that something is a condition of “true” friendship is not to claim that 
actual friends live up to it. As Kant puts it, “No friendship ever matches the Idea of 
friendship…for it is not in fact possible. But the Idea is true, nonetheless.” (Kant, Ethics, 
185). And this is one thing, I submit, that Aristotle is trying to show us—friends fail to 
                                                 
597
 See section d.iii. 
598
 See 1163a21-23; compare 1164a33-b2. 
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live up to the popular idealizations about friendship.
599
 This is perhaps why he will 
eventually argue, despite the fact that friendship is understood to be an interpersonal 
relationship,
600
 that each person is their own greatest friend.
601
 For in the case of our 
relationship with ourselves we at least find a genuine example of the “unconditional” 
love that was thought to belong to true friendship.
602
 
In conclusion, that friendship requires an equal return, as well as that this 
requirement extends to virtuous friends, are further alleged facts that speak against the 
popular view that virtuous people disregard their own good for the sake of their 
friends.
603
 The alleged fact of the necessity of an equal return would show that the 
friendship that a virtuous person has for his friend is tied to his expectation that their 
friendship will benefit him as well, and if this turns out not to be the case, then the 
friendship will allegedly dissolve. 
iii. Equality and living life together 
It may be wondered how the requirement of an equal return is consistent with Aristotle’s 
view that friends primarily aim at living life together. If friends are sufficiently motivated 
to benefit each other in order that they may enjoyably live life together, why would they 
also require an additional return? Isn’t the “payment” of the enjoyable presence of the 
friend enough? Aristotle does not deny that it is possible to imagine a friendship that 
                                                 
599
 This point is well-observed by Burger (Aristotle’s Dialogue, 162, bottom paragraph). 
600
 See Eudemian Ethics 1240a8-15. 
601
 See 1168b9-10. 
602
 For the point that unconditional love what thought to be part of friendship, see 1156a16-19 and note 
that Aristotle is describing a friendly love where the friend is loved “insofar as he exists” (ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός 
ἐστιν) and “insofar as he is the very one he is” (ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅςπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος), i.e., loving Socrates 
insofar as he exists or insofar as he is Socrates. For the point that each individual has this sort of love 
towards himself, see 1166a19-22, 1168b2-4, Eudemian Ethics 1240b4-6. 
603
 This point is well-observed by Pangle, see Philosophy of Friendship, 197, bottom paragraph. 
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consists entirely of living life together and does not include any proper exchange of 
benefits.
604
 Moreover, as we have seen, he holds this activity to be the core of friendship. 
However, it is practically difficult to limit one’s friendships to this activity. Given the 
neediness and vulnerability of human life,
605
 it is very useful for us to have others with 
whom we can reliably exchange favors. And especially those who (a) are reliably present 
for us and (b) who we trust. But such are our friends.
606
 Therefore, it is extremely 
common that friends fall into the habit of exchanging favors with each other.
607
 But, as 
soon as they do, they step beyond their “original” motivation for benefitting each other—
securing and enjoying each other’s presence—and cannot help but begin to expect a 
return. And it is this less essential, but extremely common, aspect of friendship that 
Aristotle explores under the heading of “equality.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
604
 See 1158a22-3. 
605
 See 1154b9-12. 
606
 See 1156b25-32, 1157a20-4.  
607
 See 1158a25-7, 1169b6-7. 
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§ Conclusion 
a. Summary of Conclusions 
To sum up the major conclusions of this dissertation, Aristotle often uses an investigative 
procedure in the Nicomachean Ethics; that is, he often lays down preliminary positions 
that he later revises or rejects. As a result, we must read the work with a view to 
distinguishing his final from his (merely) preliminary positions (Chapter 1). Despite some 
scholarly challenges to the contrary, Aristotle does indeed posit it as an explanatory 
starting point that human beings act ultimately for the sake of their own happiness, which 
is a form of psychological egoism (Chapter 2). However, contrary to what is commonly 
said, he does not merely assume this egoistic principle. Rather, he defends it against a 
credible challenge. This challenge is the popular view that the virtuous person acts 
selflessly, and most especially in relation to his friends. Aristotle’s defense is that (what 
he claims to be) observations of friends actually imply the contrary, that friends, even 
virtuous friends, do not act selflessly toward each other. These observations are primarily 
(a) that prolonged distance destroys friendships; (b) that we do not wish that our friends 
become perfectly happy beings that have no interest in being friends with us; and (c) that 
friendship, even virtue friendship, requires an equal return of benefits. For Aristotle 
concludes from (a) that the primary end of friendship is not the happiness of the other 
friend per se, but rather his (good and pleasant) presence, and that our love of our friend’s 
good is dependent upon, and tied to, this more fundamental end; from (b) that we are 
unwilling to wish benefits for our friends that harm or deprive ourselves; and from (c) 
that we maintain friendships with others on the condition that they will be beneficial to 
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ourselves as well as to our friends (Chapter 3). Finally, I show in the attached appendix 
that a careful reading of Aristotle’s claim that the friend is “another oneself” shows that 
this claim is consistent with the above understanding of friendship. 
b. What Remains to be Done? 
I began by claiming that philosophers and scholars have not adequately engaged with 
Aristotle’s egoism and, in particular, his psychological egoism. I claimed, further, that 
this failure to adequately engage his egoism occurs in two ways: (i) by denying that he 
held a form of psychological egoism; and (ii) by claiming that he merely assumes this 
position and never attempts to defend it. If I have been successful, then I have gone part 
of the way in correcting this inadequacy. Not only have I presented evidence that 
Aristotle holds it as an explanatory starting point that the ultimate aim of human action is 
each person’s own happiness, which is a form of psychological egoism, but I have 
discussed how he defends this egoistic starting point against the popular challenge that 
virtuous people overlook their own good for the sake of their friends. In doing so, he also 
defends it against the popular challenge that friendship involves selfless love. But this 
does not constitute Aristotle’s complete defense of his explanatory starting point in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  
It is true that showing that friendship does not provide virtuous people with the 
selfless motivation that virtue was commonly thought to require would be a blow to the 
popular understanding of virtue. This is because this sort of motivation was thought to be 
most possible for us in friendship. But, as we have seen, Aristotle has a further defense 
against the popular understanding of virtue—the fact that virtuous action was commonly 
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understood to be deserving of rewards or returns. But this aspect of his defense could 
surely use a more sustained treatment.  
There is perhaps one more way in which Aristotle defends his explanatory starting 
point—through his discussion of ἀκραςία or “weakness of will.” Ἀκραςία is a challenge 
to Aristotle’s explanatory starting point insofar as the akratic person was thought to be 
someone who, having a strong desire for something they believe to be bad for 
themselves, pursues it anyway. A complete understanding of how Aristotle defends his 
explanatory starting point would therefore require attending to his discussion of ἀκραςία 
as well.  
Finally, my ultimate purpose in undertaking this project was to make possible a 
more adequate critical engagement with Aristotle’s egoism. Once we have fully laid out 
his defense of his psychological egoism, we must investigate whether it is successful. 
Should we agree with him? Or, even if we do not personally agree with him, should we 
consider his psychological egoism to be a philosophically respectable position? This, 
above all, remains to be done. 
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§Appendix: The Friend as “Another Oneself” 
In this Appendix, I will respond to a potential objection to my interpretation of Aristotle’s 
account of friendship. It might be objected that the self-regarding character I claim he 
discerns in friendship is incompatible with his description of the friend as “another self,” 
or, more literally, “another oneself” (ἄλλος/ἕτερος ἀυτός).608 This phrase does plausibly 
suggest that the love we have for our friends is equal, and equally “unconditional,” to the 
love that we have for ourselves. 
a. The Friend as “Another Oneself” 
However, if we attend to the details of Aristotle’s account of the friend as “another 
oneself,” we will see that he does not believe we love our “other oneself” in a self-
disregarding way. There are two plausible interpretations of what he has in mind by 
calling the friend an “other oneself.” The first is what I will call the “extension” 
interpretation. On this interpretation, the friend is “another oneself” in the sense that they 
are seen by the other friend as an extension of himself. Each friend consequently loves 
the other “as himself” or as a part of himself. Such love clearly fails to be self-
disregarding.  
The second interpretation of the friend as “another oneself” is what I will call the 
“similarity” interpretation. This interpretation takes the “other oneself” to have a more 
general sense. Aristotle does not necessarily mean that we love our friends as ourselves, 
or as parts of ourselves, but that we are (psychologically) related to our friends in ways 
that are the same as, or similar to, the ways that we are related to ourselves. But if we 
                                                 
608
 For the uses of this phrase, see 1161b27-9, 1166a30-2, 1169b5-7, 1170b5-7. It derives from the 
“intensive” use of ἀυτός, i.e., “one oneself.” On the intensive pronoun, see Smyth, Greek Grammar, 1206. 
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follow out the details of his account, we will see that we love our friends as we love 
ourselves only in a qualified way that turns out to not be self-disregarding.  
b. The Extension Interpretation 
The extension interpretation is supported by the way that Aristotle introduces the phrase 
“another oneself.” He first uses the phrase in discussing the love that parents have for 
their children. He says, “parents love their children as themselves, for the children from 
themselves are, as it were, other themselves by virtue of having been separated” 
(1161b27-9).
609
 That is, children, having come into being out of their parents, and 
especially out of their mothers, appear to them, and especially to their mothers, to be 
separated, but living, parts of themselves.
610
 Parents therefore love their children with an 
“extended” self-love.611 They love them as parts of their own being that happen to be 
spatially separated from themselves.  
If we allow this introductory use of the “other oneself” to guide us, we will say 
that friends are “other oneselves” to each other in the sense that they love each other as 
themselves. Either friends in some way take their friends to be themselves or, like 
parents, they take their friends to be separated parts of themselves. As Pangle puts it:  
A clue to the real meaning of this enigmatic expression is found in its other 
appearances in the Nicomachean Ethics. In each case, Aristotle shows how the 
friend who is loved as another self is, in some important way, cherished as an 
extension of oneself, an extension that can tempt on into the delusion that this 
other really is still oneself, and as such able to help overcome one’s limitedness 
and mortality. He first uses the expression at 1161b27-29, where he says that 
children are like “other selves for the parents from whom they have sprung.” 
                                                 
609
 γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι. 
610
 See, also, 1161b18, 21-3, 1134b9-12. That parents love their children as separated parts of themselves is 
well observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraphs 1706-8, 1711). 
611
 This point is observed by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1706), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 285, 
note to paragraph §2), and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 126, second paragraph). 
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Children are loved not only as separate and distinct beings but as beings who, it is 
hoped, will carry on one’s memory and even somehow continue one’s existence 
after death. (Philosophy of Friendship, 152). 
 
It must be noted that I am not attempting to explain why Aristotle would think that 
friends take their friends to be “other themselves” in this way. Millgram (“Other Selves”) 
argues on the basis of IX.7 that (i) we are “in a way” the things we produce; (ii) friends, 
by benefitting each other, are “in a way” each other’s products; and (iii) consequently, 
friends are “in a way” each other. Similarly, Allison Murphy (“Living Well with Others: 
Aristotle on Friendship”) argues that (i) we are “in a way” the things we produce; (ii) 
friends, by cooperating to bring about shared projects, are “in a way” those realized 
projects; and (iii) by the transitivity of identity, friends are “in a way” each other. 
The extension interpretation is also supported by one of the ways that Aristotle 
argues that happy people need friends. He states that both virtuous actions and the actions 
that are “one’s own” (ὀικεῖον) are pleasant.612 In other words, what is doubly pleasant is 
for one’s own actions to also be virtuous ones. As Michael puts it, “to the happy person, 
his own actions are doubly pleasant, both as his own and as virtuous” (Commentaria, 
512, lines 10-12).
613
 But virtuous actions that are our own are most pleasant for us when 
we are fully aware of them as virtuous and as our own. However, we are more capable of 
observing the actions of those who are near us than we are our own.
614
 We are therefore 
limited in our ability to enjoy our own virtuous actions. 
                                                 
612
 See 1169b31-3. 
613
 τῷ εὐδαίμονι τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα διχῶς εἰσιν ἡδέα καὶ ὡς οἰκεῖα καὶ ὡς σπουδαῖα. This point is also observed 
by Stewart (comment on 1169b29). 
614
 See 1169b33-5. 
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Aristotle claims that friendship allows us to overcome this limitation. He claims 
that the actions of a virtuous friend are both virtuous and our own,
615
 and since our 
friends are also people who are “near us,” we will be more capable of observing their 
actions. He therefore concludes, “the blessed person will need friends of this sort if 
indeed he chooses to observe actions that are virtuous and his own, and the actions of a 
virtuous friend are of this sort” (1170a2-4).616 
Aristotle’s use of ὀικεῖον in this argument has caused commentators difficulty. It 
clearly has the sense of “what belongs to oneself” or “is one’s own” when referring to the 
original actor himself (this is clearest at 1169b35 and context). But how can it also have 
this sense when referring to the actions of the original actor’s friend, who, after all, is a 
different person? Reeve puts this difficulty well,  
The features [that make the actions of a virtuous friend naturally pleasant to the 
other friend] are (1) being virtuous and (2) being properly his own. Feature (2) is 
puzzling because A’s own actions seem to be properly his own in a way that the 
action of his friend B are not. B’s are of the same sort as A’s, perhaps, but A (or 
his wish or deliberate choice) is not their starting point. Aristotle, however, seems 
to think that B’s actions are A’s in a stronger sense than that. (Nicomachean 
Ethics, 335). 
 
A common response is to read Aristotle as switching between different senses of ὀικεῖον 
within the argument. Pakaluk serves as a good example:  
A word first about translation: Greek terms with the root oikei- can have the 
sense, in various contexts, of ‘one’s own,’ ‘familiar,’ ‘akin,’ or even, ‘distinctive’ 
or ‘proper.’ But a difficulty here is that any plausible interpretation of the 
argument, it seems, cannot avoid assigning different senses to such terms 
throughout the argument. (Books VIII and IX,  206). 
 
                                                 
615
 See 1169b35-1170a1. 
616
 ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, 
τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. 
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However, Pakaluk overstates when he claims that “any” plausible interpretation must 
assign different senses to ὀικεῖον. His solution is to read Aristotle as switching between 
the senses of “one’s own” and “familiar.”617  
However, if Aristotle thinks that friends sometimes take their friends to either be, 
or be a part of, themselves, then the difficulty with assigning the same sense to ὀικεῖον 
throughout the argument vanishes. If I take my friend to be, or be a part of, myself, I will 
also take his actions to be my own. As Michael puts it, “But how is it that seeing the 
friend and the actions of the friend, he also sees himself and his own actions? Or is it 
because the virtuous friend, the one who is loved, is another oneself, and because 
virtuous friends do the same things, for, in a certain way, one soul exists in two bodies.” 
(Commentaria, 511, lines 20-3).
618
  
If we accept the extension interpretation, then, according to Aristotle, there would 
be two distinct roots of friendship. The first is the natural desire to share our lives with 
others that I have already discussed; the second is a certain belief, I would join Pangle in 
considering it a confusion, about the limits of our own being. Presumably, the natural 
                                                 
617
 Many other interpreters read ὀικεῖον as having different senses. Stewart, though he initially says that the 
virtuous person “sees ‘his own’ better at the distance of his ‘second self,’” at crucial places reads ὀικεῖον 
not as “one’s own,” but as “similar,” (ὅμοιαι, see his comment on 1169b29). Joachim takes our friends’ 
actions to be our own in the sense of “expressing our own ideals and reflecting our own endeavors” (The 
Nicomachean Ethics, 258, (i)). Irwin takes the actions of our friends to be “our own” in the sense that we 
are related to them in ways that are similar to the ways that we are related to the actions that are actually 
our own actions (Nicomachean Ethics, 297, note to paragraph §5 with 299, note to paragraph §10). 
618
 Similar interpretations are offered by Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1896) and Gauthier and Jolif 
(comment on 1170a1). Several other interpreters also read ὀικεῖον as having a consistent sense. Grant states 
that the virtuous person “identifies” the actions of his friend with himself. He therefore appears to read 
ὀικεῖον as consistently meaning “one’s own,” but he does not explain why this “identification” occurs or 
what exactly it consists in (The Ethics, Volume II, 300, note 4). Broadie also seems to read ὀικεῖον as 
consistently meaning “one’s own,” but she struggles with why the friend’s actions in particular count as 
one’s own; see Nicomachean Ethics, 63, bottom paragraph, as well as her comments on 1170a1, 1170a2-3. 
Pangle reads ὀικεῖον as having a consistent sense, but she takes the statement that the friend’s actions are 
“one’s own” to be ironic and to reflect the common but unreasonable tendency to claim other’s 
achievements as one’s own (Philosophy of Friendship, 187, second paragraph). 
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desire to share our lives with others first motivates us to continually share activities with 
friends. This habitual shared activity between friends can then foster, and maintain, a 
confusion about the limits of our being. This confusion then gives rise to a sort of 
goodwill or loving the friend for his own sake, though this love exists only insofar as we 
confusedly take the friend to be, or be a part of, ourselves. Such love therefore fails to be 
selfless. Finally, insofar as clear-sighted friendship is possible, it would rest on the 
natural desire to share our lives with others, which, as I have argued, is not supportive of 
loving the friend for his own sake. 
c. The Similarity Interpretation 
The “similarity” interpretation is supported by the context of Aristotle’s statements that 
the friend is “another oneself.” Two of the three times that he uses this phrase to describe 
the friend (1166a30-3, 1170b6-7, the other being 1169b6-7) are in γάρ (“for”) clauses 
that follow the claim that “[the virtuous person] is related to his friend just as he is related 
to himself” (πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν, 1166a30-1). The friend being 
“another oneself” thus justifies or explains that the virtuous friend is (psychologically) 
related to his friend as he is related to himself.  
One way to understand this justification or explanation is to appeal to the 
“extension” interpretation I have discussed above. Since friends take their friends either 
to be themselves or to be a part of themselves they will be disposed toward their friends 
as they are to themselves. However, another interpretation is possible. The justification or 
explanation that the friend is “another oneself” could be read as a “formal” one.619 We are 
                                                 
619
 See Metaphysics 1013a26-8. 
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related to our friends as we are related to ourselves because a friend is “another oneself” 
and for someone to be an “other oneself” just is for us to be related to them as we are 
(psychologically) related to ourselves.
620
 So interpreted, this justification or explanation 
necessitates the interpretation of the friend as “another oneself” that I have called the 
similarity interpretation; that is, the friend is “another oneself” in the sense that we are 
related to a friend in ways that are the same or similar to the ways that we are related to 
ourselves. 
However, if we accept this interpretation, we will see that Aristotle goes quite far 
in qualifying the similarity between the love that we have for our friends and the love that 
we have for ourselves. He notes that our own existence is choiceworthy to ourselves, but 
the existence of our friends is choiceworthy either “in the same way” (οὕτω) or only 
“nearly so” (παραπλησίως, 1170b7-8). Oὕτω here is sometimes read to mean “to the 
same degree” and παραπλησίως to mean “nearly to the same degree.” Hence Christopher 
Rowe’s translation, “Just as for each his own existence is desirable, so his friend’s is too, 
or to a similar degree,” (Nicomachean Ethics, 238, my emphasis).621  However, it is 
important that Aristotle pairs καθάπερ with οὕτω…ἢ παραπλησίως (“just as” with “in 
this way...or nearly so”) as opposed to ὅσοσπερ with τόσος…ἢ παραπλησίως (“just as 
much as” with “to this same degree…or nearly so”). His formulation thus allows for a 
                                                 
620
 This interpretation is acutely described by Pakaluk (comment on 1166a29-33). Τhose who read the γάρ 
clause in this way include Aquinas (Commentary, paragraph 1811), Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, xxiii, 299, 
note to paragraph §10, Socrates to the Reformation, 219-20), Broadie (Nicomachean Ethics, 59, bottom 
paragraph, 61, first paragraph), and Pangle (Philosophy of Friendship, 153, second paragraph, with 231, 
note 22). Though she thinks the extension interpretation has some credence (152, second paragraph, and 
what follows), she considers the similarity interpretation to more genuinely reflect Aristotle’s 
understanding of friendship. 
621
 This is also Aquinas’ understanding (Commentary, paragraph 1909).  
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“qualitative” reading: “in the manner that each finds his own existence choiceworthy, he 
also finds that of a friend, or nearly so.” Hence Gauthier and Jolif’s translation, 
“Therefore, in the same way that our own existence is for each one of us desirable, in this 
same way, or in a similar manner, is the existence of our friend.” (L’Éthique a 
Nicomaque, Volume I, 270, my emphasis).
622
 That the qualitative reading is the correct 
one will be confirmed by Aristotle’s later reformulation of this point. 
Soon after saying that the existence of our friends is choiceworthy “in the same 
way” as our own or only “nearly so,” Aristotle decides in favor of the “nearly so.” 
Moreover, the context makes it clear that the existence of our friends is “nearly so” 
choiceworthy on account of itself: “if being is choiceworthy to the blessed person on 
account of itself, being by nature good and pleasant, and nearly so is also the being of a 
friend, then a friend would be among the choiceworthy things” (1170b14-17, my 
emphasis).
623
 Thus, unlike our own existence, the existence of our friends fails to be 
choiceworthy on account of itself strictly speaking.  
On the other hand, the above sentence is sometimes read as “the existence of a 
friend nearly resembles our own,” i.e., a friend’s existence is like our own existence.624 
However, the παραπλήσιον almost certainly qualifies the assertion that the existence of a 
friend is also choiceworthy on account of itself.
625
 This is why Aristotle says καὶ τὸ τοῦ 
                                                 
622
 De même donc que notre proper existence est pour chacun de nous desirable, de meme, ou d’une 
manière analogue, l’existence de notre ami. This reading is also adopted by Irwin (Nicomachean Ethics, 
150) and Pakaluk (Books VIII and IX, 39 with his comment on 1170b7-8).  
623
 εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ 
τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. 
624
 See Ross’ translation; Gautheir and Jolif, L’Éthique a Nicomaque, Volume I, 270; Irwin, Nicomachean 
Ethics, 150. 
625
 For this reading, see Bartlett and Colins, Nicomachean Ethics, 205. 
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φίλου ἐστίν ,i.e., “and nearly so is the friend’s existence also [choiceworthy on account 
of itself]” (my emphasis). Not to mention the fact that this παραπλήσιον parallels the 
earlier choiceworthy in the same way “or nearly so” (ἢ παραπλησίως) at 1170b8. 
This no doubt seems to be a strange distinction to make—the existence of the 
friend is “nearly so choiceworthy on account of itself”—but it is explained in the 
continuation of this discussion in IX.12. As we have seen, Aristotle there compares 
friendship to passionate love (ἔρως), and he notes that they are similar insofar as they 
both aim at the perception (or presence) of the beloved or friend, which perception (or 
presence) he deems “choiceworthy.”626 It is the perception (or presence) of the existence 
of our friend that is really choiceworthy on account of itself, while his existence, though 
it is a necessary part of this perception (or presence), is not. And this is why the mere 
existence of our friend is “nearly so” choiceworthy on account of itself. It is not 
choiceworthy on account of itself strictly speaking, but it is choiceworthy as a necessary 
part of something else that is genuinely choiceworthy on account of itself.  
Thus, on the similarity interpretation, Aristotle’s discussion of the friend as 
“another oneself” becomes a continuation of the theme that friends most of all wish for 
the perception (or presence) of their friends. It therefore harmonizes well with the 
interpretation that friendship aims primarily at the perception (or presence) of the friend. 
d. Conclusion 
Of course, both the phenomena suggested by the extension and similarity interpretations 
may be true. We could both see our friends as extensions of ourselves and be 
                                                 
626
 See 1171b29-35. On the comparison between passionate love and friendship, see Chapter 3, section d.iv. 
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(psychologically) related to them in ways that are the same or similar to the ways we are 
related to ourselves. But both of these phenomena cannot be what Aristotle means by 
“the friend is another oneself.” Now, I do not here wish to decide between these two 
interpretations of the phrase. I merely wish to point out that, on either one, the friend is 
not loved in a self-disregarding way. And if the friend, as “another oneself,” is not loved 
in a self-disregarding way, then this part of Aristotle’s account of friendship is not 
inconsistent with the interpretation I have given of its other parts. 
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 Stephen Scully  
  Associate Professor 
  Department Chair   
  Boston University Department of Classical Studies 
  sscully_2000@yahoo.com  
  617-353-4572  
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Teaching References: 
  
 Victor Kestenbaum  
  Professor Emeritus 
  Boston University Department of Philosophy  
  vkestenb@bu.edu  
  781-235-2441 
 
 Daniel Star  
Assistant Professor 
  Boston University Department of Philosophy 
dstar@bu.edu  
617-358-2293 
  
 
 
